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iABSTRACT 
This report contains reviews of operating experiences, selected accident events, and 
industrial safety performance indicators that document the performance of the major US 
DOE magnetic fusion experiments and particle accelerators.  These data are useful to 
form a basis for the occupational safety level at matured research facilities with known 
sets of safety rules and regulations.  Some of the issues discussed are radiation safety, 
electromagnetic energy exposure events, and some of the more widespread issues of 
working at height, equipment fires, confined space work, electrical work, and other 
industrial hazards.  Nuclear power plant industrial safety data are also included for 
comparison.
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SUMMARY 
An issue of interest with the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER) 
design is the safety of the personnel who will operate and maintain the facility.  Since the 
ITER machine is much larger than existing experiments and will handle higher power 
levels and input energies than present tokamaks, there is a concern that the personnel will 
be at higher risk than the presently accepted levels of risk seen in the existing fusion 
experiments.  The existing US tokamaks have not had any personnel fatalities, and severe 
occupational accidents have also been rare.  Similar operating experiences with the 
largest US particle accelerators have had fatalities during construction, but have 
experienced any fatalities in operation.  The accelerators have had a few severe 
occupational accidents.  The accelerators and fusion experiments have had occupational 
injury rates that were somewhat higher than other DOE research and development 
facilities.  In recent years, the fission power plants have had lower occupational 
accident/injury rates than either fusion or the accelerators, but the power plant accident 
severity may be greater, and the power plants have had some occupational fatalities while 
fusion and accelerator operations have not.  These data, along with safety performance 
statistics, have been documented in this report.  The case history descriptions presented 
here are useful to understand the types of occupational events that have occurred and the 
energy sources involved in the events.  These data will support occupational safety 
analysis of ITER operations, especially a room-by-room analysis of energies and hazards 
that ITER workers will experience during plant operation and maintenance.  The safety 
performance statistics presented here highlight areas for improvement in occupational 
safety at fusion and accelerator facilities; ITER can use these data to form more robust 
occupational safety programs.  The statistics also support setting occupational safety 
goals for ITER operation.  Due to its size and power levels, ITER is envisioned to be 
greater than existing fusion experiments but less than a nuclear fission power plant, and 
safety goals can be set accordingly.   
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OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY REVIEW 
OF HIGH TECHNOLOGY FACILITIES
1.0 INTRODUCTION
The International Thermonuclear Experiment Reactor (ITER) project proposes to build a 
large tokamak experiment that will burn a deuterium-tritium plasma.  The machine will 
be larger and will handle more power and fuel than existing experiments.  Consequently, 
the personnel safety concerns are also greater with this machine than with past machines.  
The ITER team has examined occupational safety and set limits for exposure to 
hazardous energies and materials, including ionizing radiation, non-ionizing radiation, 
and beryllium.  The ITER team has also identified other industrial hazards associated 
with ITER, including high voltage electricity, cryogens, confined spaces, fires, chemical 
hazards, mechanical hazards, rotating machinery, and lifting equipment (e.g., cranes) 
(IAEA, 2002).  This report contains an occupational safety review of US Department of 
Energy (DOE) research facilities that are similar to ITER – mainly fusion experiments 
and particle accelerators.  The experiences of these facilities should be indicative of the 
hazards that ITER is likely to encounter during operation.  The results of this review can 
be used to support the ITER occupational safety assessment, which the host country is 
expected to request as part of the licensing process.  The US DOE directs that fusion 
facility workers shall be protected such that the risks to which they are exposed at a 
fusion facility are no greater than those to which they would be exposed at a comparable 
industrial facility (DOE, 1996).  The ITER host country is anticipated to have a similar 
requirement for the safety of workers. 
This report also contains information about US nuclear fission power plant occupational 
safety.  Power plants are included because ITER is a much larger experiment than the 
currently existing tokamaks in the world; ITER is approaching a small power plant in size 
and scale.  ITER cooling systems operate at moderate pressures and temperatures 
(~4 MPa and 100qC), at parameters greater than existing fusion machines but somewhat 
less than fission power plant parameters.  In that respect, nuclear power plant 
occupational safety should provide an upper bound of the ITER safety envelope.  Another 
fact to consider is that ITER will have frequent maintenance sessions for both 
refurbishment of the machine and systems and for equipment/diagnostics upgrades or 
modifications.  This is expected, as it is the nature of experimental facilities.  Power 
plants operate continuously over long times and have short duration maintenance outages 
with few upgrades or modifications; consequently the power plant workers have more 
time at risk during plant operations and generally shorter, more hurried maintenance 
sessions.  Such factors must be taken into account for occupational safety.   
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2.0 MAGNETIC FUSION EXPERIMENT OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY
This chapter presents descriptions of occupational accidents in US fusion experiments.  
Some statistics are also presented regarding the rates of injuries and types of injuries 
sustained.
2.1  Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory
The major US fusion site that has operated the most experiments is also the best known 
site - the Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory (PPPL) in Princeton, New Jersey.  This 
site also has safety data available from the DOE.  As a single purpose site, the PPPL data 
are easily retrieved from the appropriate DOE data bases.  PPPL has about 400 total 
employees and an annual budget of approximately $55M.  PPPL was the first fusion 
laboratory in the US; in the 1950’s and 1960’s, stellarators were used to study fusion.  In 
the 1970’s, tokamaks became the leading fusion research machines.  There have been 
several tokamaks of interest, including the Princeton Large Torus (PLT), which was 
operated in the 1970’s and 1980’s, and the Tokamak Fusion Test Reactor (TFTR), which 
was operated in the 1980’s and 1990’s.  The PLT studied radiofrequency (RF) heating 
and current drive, neutral beam injection heating, and other aspects of tokamak physics.  
The PLT is regarded as a direct predecessor to the TFTR.  The Poloidal Divertor 
Experiment (PDX) was a medium sized experiment in the 1970’s to study the 
effectiveness of poloidal magnetic divertors to control impurities in fusion plasmas.  The 
PDX was modified and became the Princeton Beta Experiment (PBX).  The PBX 
investigated advanced tokamak regimes, such as indented plasmas with high beta factors, 
and the second stability regime.  The PBX was later modified and became PBX-M, to 
investigate higher plasma pressure operation.  Only the TFTR used tritium (T) fuel; the 
other machines were fueled with hydrogen, hydrogen-deuterium, or deuterium (D).  
Using the smaller hydrogen isotopes was safety conservative since they are not 
radioactive, and their reactions do not emit the very high energy neutrons like D-T 
reactions.  Low neutron fluence over machine life kept the radiation fields manageable. 
Newer experiments are the National Spherical Torus Experiment (NSTX) (Neumeyer, 
1999) and the National Compact Stellarator Experiment (NCSX) (Nelson, 2003).  A time 
line of some of the major experiments at PPPL (Tanner, 1982) is: 
Princeton Large Torus (PLT), R = 1.32 m, a = 0.4 m, I = 1.6 MA  (Hosea, 1985) 
Construction   1972-1975 
First discharge December 20, 1975 
Poloidal Divertor Experiment (PDX), R = 1.4 m, a = 0.45 m, I = 500 kA 
 Construction  1975-1978 
 First discharge November 29, 1978; converted to “PBX” by 1985 
 4
Princeton Beta Experiment (PBX), R = 1.4 m, a = 0.45 m, I = 500 kA (Bol, 1985) 
 Construction  PDX conversion to PBX began in mid-1983 (Bol, 1983), 
    PBX operated 1985-1989, and the conversion to 
PBX-Modification began in 1987 
 First discharge PBX operated in 1985; the PBX-M operated 1989-1994. 
Tokamak Fusion Test Reactor (TFTR), R = 2.65 m, a = 1.1 m, I = 2.5 MA 
 Construction  1977-1982 
 First discharge December 24, 1982 (Machalek, 1983) 
National Spherical Torus Experiment (NSTX), R = 0.85 m, a = 0.67, I = 1.0 MA 
 Construction  1997-1999 
 First discharge February 12, 1999 (Neumeyer, 2000) 
National Compact Stellarator Experiment (NCSX), R = 1.4 m, average a = 0.3, 
    plasma beta = 4%, I ~ 50 kA (see ncsx.pppl.gov) 
 Construction  final design review May 2004, fabrication in late 2004, 
    magnet construction 2005-06, NCSX construction 2006-08 
 First discharge scheduled for late 2008 
It is also notable that the TFTR machine ceased operation in April 1997 and after a period 
of safe shutdown in 1997-1999, was decommissioned between late 1999 to 2002 (Perry, 
1999; Raftopoulos, 2002).  The staff dealt with many commonplace hazards, including 
power tool injuries, falls, lacerations, oxygen deficient spaces, electrical hazards, and 
hoisting and rigging hazards (Raftopoulos, 2002).  The lead oxide on shielding bricks to 
be decommissioned and the beryllium dust chemical contamination from machine 
operations both posed hazards until the particulates were removed with strippable 
coatings (Lumia, 2002; Lumia, 2003).   
The industrial safety performance of the PPPL staff over the last decade has been 
obtained from the DOE Computerized Accident/Incident Reporting System (CAIRS) and 
plotted in Figures 1 and 2.  Overall, the data in Figure 1 show a positive trend of 
decreasing the lost work days, which means PPPL is working on reducing the number 
and severity of accidents.  This is positive since the PPPL values are higher than the 
overall R&D values presented later this report.  The PPPL peak values in 1994, 1997, and 
1999-2002 are explained by the activities under way at the lab during those years.  In 
1994, the PBX-M was shut down and was placed into safe, cold shut down mode.  In 
1997, the TFTR ceased its D-T operations and entered a safe shut down mode, which 
entailed a great deal of work with all the tokamak subsystems.  In 1999, the NSTX 
machine began operations, but, more importantly, the TFTR began decontamination and 
decommissioning (D&D).  That was a significant task, demanding large efforts from the 
staff in tasks that they were not as familiar with as operations.  The PLT and PBX-M 
machines were dismantled and removed from their test cell building in the same time  
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note:  The DOE data have shown that no staff or other workers have suffered a work-related 
fatality while working at PPPL.   
Figure 1.  Plots of PPPL Industrial Safety Performance from 1993-2003. 
period as TFTR D&D.  Their removal made way for the NCSX device, which is currently 
under construction.  The NCSX will use neutral beam, vacuum pumping, and water 
cooling systems from the PBX-M, and power supplies from the TFTR.  The occupational 
injury distribution results are presented in Figure 2.  The first chart shows that lacerations 
are frequent.  The ‘other injuries’ category includes punctures, dislocations, cumulative 
trauma, dermatitis, eye injuries, insect bites, hernia, injuries “not otherwise classified”, 
and other types of injuries that individually were small in number but summed together 
comprise almost a third of all reported injuries.  The second chart in Figure 2 shows that 
finger injuries are the most common, which is to be expected with the large amount of 
hands-on work involved with tokamak maintenance.  The third chart shows that 
technicians have the highest number of injuries incurred in their work, this is because the 
technicians are continually closest to the tokamak systems and perform the majority of 
the hands-on tasks.  The data plotted in Figure 1 can be compared to the research facility 
totals that will be presented later in this report (see Figure 9).  The charts from Figure 2 
can be compared to the similar charts given for accelerator facilities.  Note that PPPL did 
not report construction contractor or services subcontractor injuries.  Some sites report 
their construction contractor and services (electricians, technicians, custodians, etc.) 
injuries, especially when the contracts involve significant amounts of manpower. 
There have been several published events of industrial safety concern at PPPL.  The most 
noteworthy events are discussed here.  On September 12, 1970, employees were 
conducting a scheduled power outage.  After completing scheduled maintenance work, an 
attempt was made to restore normal power.  Immediately after closing the main 138 kV  
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Figure 2.  PPPL Industrial Injury Distributions from 1981-2003. 
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circuit breaker, a short circuit occurred on the secondary side of the power system in the 
4160-V circuit breaker cubicles.  The fault was not cleared by the protective relays 
tripping the 138 kV breaker, but rather remained on for approximately 30 seconds before 
the breaker was manually opened.  The electrical flashover in the 4160-V switchgear 
cubicle caused the resulting fire and damage to three units of switchgear.  This damage 
could probably have been less if the 138 kV circuit breaker on the incoming service line 
had properly tripped open to clear the fault condition.  Roughly half of the $51k loss was 
due to replacement costs of the three switchgear units.  The remaining cost was labor to 
remove damaged parts and install the replacement parts.  There were no personnel 
injuries in this event (WASH, 1975).  Princeton documentation also describes this event 
in more detail (Tanner, 1982).  The fire was described as the most damaging fire in the 
first 30 years of laboratory operations.  An eyewitness recounted the following events:  
“After a few hours of outage for routine maintenance, difficulty was 
experienced in closing the automatic circuit breaker XB-1, and after about 
two hours of troubleshooting they decided to attempt closure using manual 
activation of the closure mechanism.  They followed the manufacturer’s 
instructions to manually close the breaker.  The oil pressure in the breaker 
was raised to 2,800 psi, which is adequate for closure.  The breaker closed.  
Then one of the employees saw that the ground resistors of the two 
neutrals on the step down transformer were smoking.  He called to the 
other workers to manually open the breaker.  When he looked back at the 
ground resistors, they were in flames.  He ran to a telephone and notified a 
guard to call the municipal fire department.  He returned to help the other 
employees fight the fire with hand-held fire extinguishers.  They limited 
the fire to one extensively damaged breaker and heavy damage to the 
adjacent two breakers.  The PPPL fire truck was deployed and relieved the 
employees using hand-held extinguishers with the truck-fed extinguishing 
equipment.  When the municipal fire department arrived, the flames were 
extinguished and they provided cooling to the fire damaged equipment to 
prevent re-ignition.”  {Fortunately, there were no personnel injuries and 
the personnel were trained in the proper use of fire extinguishers.}  
The DOE Occurrence Reporting and Processing System (ORPS) lists 197 off-normal 
events for PPPL between 1990 and 2003.  Some of these events are environmental 
release issues, noncompliances, security issues, equipment leaks and failures that did not 
endanger personnel, several events of receipt of counterfeit and substandard replacement 
parts, and a few events of on-site digging that severed underground telephone, electrical, 
sewer, and natural gas lines.  While the natural gas line breach events did pose an obvious 
combustion hazard, there were no adverse consequences from the gas leaks.  The ORPS 
events related to industrial safety are described below.  These descriptions provide the 
details of energy sources that harmed workers and the progression of accident events. 
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On September 10, 1990, a maintenance subcontractor attempted to lift the 16-ton stator of 
a motor-generator (MG) set with 75-ton crane.  Unknown to the subcontract workers, two 
hidden 1.5-inch bolts were still fastened.  These two bolts were broken during the lift.  
The direct cause of this incident was the failure of subcontractor personnel to recognize 
and remove two bolts holding the upper half of the field yoke assembly.  The 
subcontractor personnel made assumptions that all the bolting was removed.  Effective 
investigation during the lift was not performed when the field yoke assembly did not 
react the way it was expected as the lift proceeded.  PPPL personnel failed to research all 
of the available documentation and hence failed to locate and use an existing drawing 
which showed the bolt pattern.  The root cause involved the failure of the subcontractor 
foreman to perform a detailed investigation of all possible mounting bolts prior to 
initiating the lift (ORPS CH-PA-PPPL-PPPL-1990-0001). 
On March 28, 1991, two personnel performing maintenance on the D-Site MG crane 
traversed the room by walking on a 25 to 30 cm building frame I-beam about 18 m above 
the ground.  They were not wearing safety harnesses.  No one was injured.  The workers 
were ordered to don safety harnesses.  Several of the issues associated with this 
occurrence were identified in the Tiger Team review earlier this year and are in the 
process of being addressed (ORPS CH-PA-PPPL-PPPL-1991-0028). 
On the morning of April 12, 1991, a work assignment was started which would involve 
entry into TFTR Neutral Beam line #4, which is a confined space.  During the work 
authorization process, two individuals were found to be in the confined space for which 
the 'Confined Space Entry Work Permit' had expired.  The entry safety checklist 
prerequisites (air monitoring, ventilation, electrical isolation, safety watch) were 
implemented and followed; however, the job had not yet been checked by the 
Environment, Safety & Health (ES&H) Office, nor the permit authorized by the ES&H 
Office prior to entry.  At the time the incident took place, efforts were underway to obtain 
the necessary authorization; however, the employees assumed an expired permit, still 
posted at the entry point, was the new authorized permit.  A contributing cause for this 
occurrence involved the fact that no one had been specifically assigned the responsibility 
to remove permits once they expire.  In this case, two expired permits (covering two 
sequential time periods) were posted at the entry point.  A permit can only remain valid 
for 30 days.  The employees had requested a new permit, and were following the 
confined space rules for air monitoring, ventilation, electrical isolation, safety watch, etc.  
However, the ES&H Office had not yet issued a permit before the workers entered the 
space (ORPS CH-PA-PPPL-PPPL-1991-1002).   
On May 1, 1991, a PPPL employee noticed a manhole grate with a water hose protruding 
from the manhole.  He did not see a posted Confined Space Entry Permit.  Upon further 
investigation, he found that a maintenance technician had entered the well (manhole 
access) to make a water connection.  (The maintenance technician was performing clean-
up work on the exterior of the QA office trailers at the time).  A confined Space Entry 
Permit had not been obtained.  This is a violation of the PPPL procedure on Confined 
Space Entry.  The maintenance technician was counseled on the need for a confined 
space entry permit.  The technician had worked at PPPL for over 29 years and had not 
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needed such a permit in the past.  In January 1991, PPPL identified and labeled over 500 
confined spaces at the facility (ORPS CH-PA-PPPL-PPPL-1991-1004).
On May 16, 1991, two PPPL employees were allowed to enter the TFTR Test Cell 
without a film badge dosimeter.  This is a violation of the established rules for entry into 
the Test Cell.  At no time were these individuals in a radiation area.  The two individuals 
were counseled on the requirement for wearing dosimeters in the TFTR Test Cell and the 
TFTR Test Cell Basement (ORPS CH-PA-PPPL-PPPL-1991-1006).
On December 5, 1991, the water pump motor 806 (a 600 horsepower, 4160 Volt motor in 
the D site pump house) failed electrically by a turn-to-turn short circuit in the motor coils.  
A ground fault was created which caused a power outage in portions of PPPL’s "B" and 
"C" sites.  The extent of the power outage was determined.  Upon the report of the pump 
motor failure, the Emergency Services Unit responded to the Pump House.  An active fire 
condition did not exist.  TFTR and PBX-M terminated operations, and the "C" and "D" 
site motor generators were brought to a halt.  A small fire was discovered and 
immediately extinguished in a vacuum pump motor.  Electrical service to PPPL was 
restored within approximately 60 minutes.  The on-line spare pump was brought into 
service after power was restored.  TFTR experienced a 4-hour delay in operations, and 
PBX-M was not restarted; operations re-scheduled the week as a maintenance week 
(ORPS CH-PA-PPPL-PPPL-1991-1035). 
On January 21 and 22, 1992, a technician was assigned to cut lead blocks for a diagnostic 
on the PBX-M Device.  Prior to the work, the PPPL Industrial Hygienist was contacted 
for advice.  At his advice, the employee was outfitted with a belt mounted air sampling 
unit during the cutting operation.  On February 21, 1992, the lab results from the 
sampling unit were received and found to be 139 and 169 micro-grams per cubic meter, 
while the permissible limit for personnel exposure is 50 micro-grams per cubic meter.  
The work was stopped and the employee had blood work done to determine if his lead 
uptake was significant.  The test results showed he did not have elevated lead 
concentration in his blood.  The exact cause of apparent exposure is not known.  It may 
have been via the lead oxide loosened during the handling of the lead or it may have been 
only a sampling error caused by the employee adjusting the position of the sampling tube 
wearing the gloves that had been handling the lead (ORPS CH-PA-PPPL-PPPL-1992-
0003).  A related event occurred at the Microwave Tokamak Experiment in 1992 when 
shielding bricks were moved and restacked; the exposure is discussed later in this 
chapter. 
On March 9, 1992, an employee caught his foot on table leg while rising from the desk in 
his office.  The employee fell on his hip.  X-rays indicated a broken femur.  The office 
was found to be a safe environment and was not cluttered.  This was considered to be a 
highly unusual, unique event (ORPS CH-PA-PPPL-PPPL-1992-0007).
On April 6, 1992, a subcontractor employee who was performing maintenance on the 
PPPL C-Site Cooling Tower sustained an injury due to a fall from a ladder.  The worker 
fell with the ladder as the ladder fell from the scaffolding near the tower.  The victim was 
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transported by ambulance to the hospital.  The work crew had abandoned the original 
scaffolding as being too dangerous and they had designed their own scaffolding, but this 
scaffolding did not have rails or toeboards, and used inadequate ladders (ORPS CH-PA-
PPPL-PPPL-1992-0012). 
On August 14, 1992, a halon system discharge occurred when a subcontractor was 
working in the computer Tape Vault.  It is believed that the sensor was tripped while the 
technician was replacing ceiling tiles, possibly due to a defective sensor.  Investigation 
indicates that the thermal detector that senses a fire and activates the halon system was 
not properly installed (it was placed above the ceiling tiles instead of protruding through 
it).  It also appears that the detector was defective.  In addition, investigation revealed that 
the sensor was inappropriately relocated to a new position above the ceiling tile at some 
time in the past as part of an unrelated maintenance activity.  About 8.6 kg of halon were 
discharged.  The subcontractor apparently was not injured in this event (ORPS CH-PA-
PPPL-PPPL-1992-0023). 
On October 20, 1992, at approximately 1550 hours, it was discovered that an individual 
had apparently exceeded the PPPL TFTR radiation exposure limit of 25 mrem/day 
(0.25 mSv/day).  The individual operating the crane had received a dose of 39 mrem 
(0.39 mSv), as determined by the individual’s digital dosimeter, within a two hour time 
period.  The individual receiving the dose was assisting a team of technicians in the 
installation of the alpha charge exchange analyzer.  The other technicians involved in the 
work task did not exceed the administrative limit.  The direct cause for this event 
involved failure to follow established requirements for access to the Test Cell with 
respect to calculating stay times and monitoring of the self-reading dosimeter.  A 
contributing cause was determined to be the content of the previously administered 
radiation safety training (for the 25 mrem/day [0.25 mSv/day] administrative limit).  
Although this requirement had apparently been discussed in training sessions, it was not 
formally included in the course material.  Another contributing cause was determined to 
be the fact that a radiation survey was not performed of the crane area to determine the 
dose rate in the elevated portion of the Test Cell.  The root cause was the inadequacy of 
the administrative procedure used to control access to the Test Cell following high power 
operations (ORPS CH-PA-PPPL-PPPL-1992-0028). 
On December 7, 1992, an electrical deficiency caused a minor fire in a computer 
connection cabinet.  Four circuit boards burned.  An electrical duplex outlet was found to 
be defective.  Other units in 150 offices were inspected and modified as needed.  When 
the Walker box (a junction box) was swiveled to allow outlets to be accessible, the 
120 Volt ac hot wire insulation was damaged and contacted the Walker box wall, putting 
the case at 120 Vac.  This voltage was applied to the personal computer and to the 
communication electronics in the room, resulting in the fire.  No one was injured in this 
fire (ORPS CH-PA-PPPL-PPPL-1992-0032).   
On January 15, 1993, a subcontract employee was assisting the vendor in a test of TFTR 
tritium seal dampers.  The individual attempted to close fire damper within a duct and 
became entrapped in the inspection port due to its size (~20 x 30 cm).  Confined space 
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procedures were violated.  The PPPL Emergency Service Unit (ESU) responded.  The 
victim freed himself from the duct work before the ESU arrived.  ESU personnel 
evaluated the victim.  The individual refused medical treatment.  Work inside of the ducts 
was stopped until the event was evaluated.  The individual had entered the confined space 
without a hazard evaluation and a confined space permit by the Industrial Hygienist.  
There was a lack of adequate supervision of the individual performing the work.  His 
supervisor did not acknowledge safety responsibility for the individual who entered the 
confined space (ORPS CH-PA-PPPL-PPPL-1993-0002). 
On Friday, April 2, 1993, a custodial staff member stepped over a yellow safety rope with 
a danger sign in the PPPL C-Site Motor Generator Building and approached to within 
approximately 30 cm of a 50-kV hipot machine.  Hipotting of ground sticks was in 
progress at the time, although the machine was not energized at the time of the 
occurrence.  (note: hipotting is a ‘high potential difference’ voltage test, a type of 
electrical insulation test, performed every 2 years as per 29CFR1910.269)  Test 
operations personnel intercepted the custodian and escorted him out of the area.  The 
custodian was counseled on the hazards of ignoring the safety barriers (ORPS CH-PA-
PPPL-PPPL-1993-0011). 
On April 20, 1993, during work to activate a new modular building at the PPPL C-Site, a 
subcontract technician entered a confined space [a telephone manhole] and was not 
confined space trained.  The individual entered momentarily (after explicitly being told 
not to enter the confined space by a PPPL Industrial Hygienist) to retrieve a roll of fish 
line used to pull cable for utility installation.  The subcontract technician and the 
Facilities Engineering Representative were strongly reprimanded on the failure to obey 
instructions (ORPS CH-PA-PPPL-PPPL-1993-0017). 
On June 30, 1993, a subcontractor employee of a construction company was discovered 
working without fall protection on the RF stair tower.  The subcontractor was completing 
outstanding construction work on the stair tower.  The work consisted of placing flashing 
on the edge of the top surface.  Upon discovery that the individual was working without 
fall protection, the work activity was terminated.  General terms and conditions of the 
contract call for compliance with OSHA regulations and PPPL safety standards.  In this 
case the employee willingly chose to disregard both as an act of convenience to complete 
his portion of the work scope.  Apparently, he rationalized the potential risk of working 
without fall protection.  Obviously, it is a safety requirement that should not be 
rationalized away.  The contract agency was immediately notified that the employee was 
in violation of PPPL policy and OSHA regulations and he was further requested to 
immediately and permanently remove the employee from the project site.  The contract 
agency complied with this request.  No one was injured although the potential for a 
serious accident existed (ORPS CH-PA-PPPL-PPPL-1993-0022). 
On August 11,1997 a 480 Volt three-phase electrical line was cut during mechanical 
cutting operations of a 35 cm concrete floor in D-Site Mock-Up Building East.  The floor 
cut was being made to install a jib crane foundation.  Although a Digging Permit had 
been obtained for the cutting operation, an obvious discrepancy existed, because the 
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drawing utilized to issue the permit indicated no conduit traversing the area.  The 
alternating current power group did not participate in the permitting process due to 
limited available staff.  On his own cognition the operator wore rubber boots, leather 
gloves, and had insulating handles on the saw.  When the building lights went out during 
the cut, he stopped work.  No injuries occurred during this incident, although the 
potential for injury was present (ORPS CH-PA-PPPL-PPPL-1997-0002).
On August 28, 1997, work to disassemble a glovebox was in progress.  A piece of copper 
pipe with a valve and a cap, which was determined to be clean (external) by a tritium 
technician was carried out of the Tritium Area by another technician to a shop for rework.  
The copper pipe was not surveyed by a health physics technician.  The tritium technician 
took the copper pipe to a welding area and soldered a coupling to the pipe.  Next, he took 
the pipe to the vacuum prep area to test leak tightness.  After that he took the pipe to the 
neutral beam machine shop where he performed other work.  Then he was called away 
and he left the pipe in the machine shop.  The health physics technicians stated that they 
had requested the technicians to “hold all line breaks” until they could finish other tasks 
in other parts of the facility and return to the Tritium Area.   The tritium technicians 
determined that they could continue with some tasks despite the lack of health physics 
technicians.  When the next shift began, the new health physics technician noted that 
there was tritium contamination in the area due to the open end of the copper pipe.  The 
pipe end was covered and ‘elephant trunked’ while the pipe piece was located.  
Subsequent surveys have determined that the piece of pipe that was carried out of the 
area was contaminated with tritium (15.5 million dpm/100 cm2 internal).  No personnel 
and no areas were surface contaminated, but the leak detector coupling was 
contaminated.  The health physics manager evaluated the radiological data for the event 
and determined that there may have been some personnel contamination, particularly on 
the technician who soldered the pipe.  Bio-assays performed on the individuals involved 
in this incident indicated a maximum individual dose of 1.1 mrem (11 microSv), a 
minimal worker exposure (ORPS CH-PA-PPPL-PPPL-1997-0004).   
On July 31, 1998, four PPPL personnel were making preparations for the removal of a 
mechanical pump from the Neutral beam Vacuum Pumping system in the TFTR Test 
Cell Basement.  TFTR was in a caretaking mode at that time, and the pump was being 
removed permanently.  Due to the configuration of the pump and hardware system, the 
workers found it necessary to reposition the horizontal section of flexible corrugated hose 
that led to the blower pump, still attached a tee, to allow them access to attach blank 
flanges.  In the process of repositioning the corrugated hose in the exhaust line of the 
pump, an estimated 50 cm3 of contaminated oil dripped out from a horizontal section of 
the exhaust line where oil had accumulated.  The oil dripped onto the pump and an oil 
pan below the pump.  The tritium vapors from the contaminated oil set off the room’s 
area monitor, at which time the pump and exhaust line openings were blanked off.  The 
workers then proceeded to clean up the oil until instructed by a health physics 
representative to go to the Safety Check Area.  The workers were swiped by health 
physics personnel and it was determined that they were contaminated at levels between 
approximately 5,900 and 11,300 dpm/100 cm2.  The basement was put into full purge 
mode, the area was decontaminated and then secured.  The workers were 
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decontaminated.  Workers must be retrained on the response required when a tritium 
alarm is activated (ORPS CH-PA-PPPL-PPPL-1998-0006).   
On January 28, 1999, a maintenance worker entered a water utility pit to complete work 
that had started the day before.  This entry into a confined space was done with a 
confined space permit, which had expired the previous day.  In addition, the worker 
entered the confined space without using the full body harness and retrieval gear 
specified by the permit because the Emergency Services Unit was unable to locate this 
gear the day before.  The task to be performed was simple and brief, plugging in a cord, 
and the worker believed that the process of finding the appropriate personnel and 
equipment, the necessity of entering the space to have enough clearance to don the 
harness, then donning the gear, was more time consuming than the task itself.  He did 
follow the atmosphere monitoring procedure before entering the pit.  He was counseled 
on following the rules and all maintenance workers were informed that if they have 
disputes with the rules that they need to discuss them with their supervisor for resolution 
instead of violating the rules (ORPS CH-PA-PPPL-PPPL-1999-0001). 
On June 22, 2000, a health physics technician was identified as having exceeded the 
contamination level of 10,000 dpm/100 cm2. The level was identified through routine 
smears required by the Radiological Work Permit.  The contamination was identified on 
the technician’s face.  This incident was caused by the technician accidentally touching 
his face after touching the equipment that was being worked on.  The technician was 
wearing personal protective equipment (PPE), but was not wearing the appropriate PPE 
to contact the equipment.  The manager conducted a review of the work practices 
associated with the incident.  Upon review of the data from the smears on all personnel, 
along with the bioassay results, and interviews of the three technicians working in the 
containment tent, it is believed that this incident was isolated and caused by a direct 
action of the technician touching the equipment being worked on and then inadvertently 
touching his face.  At the time the technician was wearing PPE, but not the correct PPE 
that would have allowed him to contact the equipment directly.  There was no health 
consequence of this short duration contamination exposure.  The technicians were 
reminded to use caution when doffing their PPE to avoid skin contamination (ORPS CH-
PA-PPPL-PPPL-2000-0005). 
On August 15, 2000, three employees were assigned a task to cut a 20-cm diameter pipe 
in the TFTR building.  After trying two other methods, the employees selected a 
hydraulically operated cutting tool (a pincer type tool) in an attempt to cut the pipe.  The 
pipe was too large to fit completely between the cutting jaws of the tool.  The workers 
then tried to cut the pipe by working inward through the pipe.  They used the tips of the 
tool jaws to compress the pipe, enabling the cutter to reach further onto the pipe.  During 
this process, the cutting tool was continuously twisting due to side loading of the blades.  
During the second cut of this pipe with the cutting tool, the continual side-loading of the 
blade caused the tip of the blade to fracture, propelling it approximately 6 m across the 
room until it impacted a tool chest.  The cause of this incident was that the individuals 
operated the equipment without the required practice or hands-on experience with the 
equipment.  In addition, closer supervision should have been provided to ensure that the 
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employees did not try to operate equipment with which they had limited experience or in 
a manner inconsistent with manufacturer’s recommendations.  No one was injured by the 
cutter blade (ORPS CH-PA-PPPL-PPPL-2000-0007). 
On August 22, 2000, two technicians, and one HP technician, were in the process of 
removing RF antenna feedthroughs in the TFTR Test Cell area.  At one hour into the job, 
routine nasal and facial samples were taken from each worker.  The results of the analysis 
determined that the results for one technician was 11,696 dpm per 100 cm2 by nasal 
sample.  All other smears were significantly less than 10,000 dpm per 100 cm2 for all 
other workers in the area.  The workers in the area were consistently observed by an HP 
Technician and were in full compliance with the approved radiation work permit.  The 
job was immediately stopped.  The employee was decontaminated, and bio-assay samples 
were collected.  The cause of this incident could not be positively verified.  It appears that 
all requirements were met, and the radiological work permit was in compliance with 
expected environment in the area.  The logical conclusion for this incident appears to be 
that the individual inadvertently touched his nose when removing the mask; however, this 
could not be validated.  There was no health consequence due to this contamination event 
(ORPS CH-PA-PPPL-PPPL-2000-0008). 
On December 5, 2001, while placing a concrete-filled TFTR Vacuum Vessel Segment in 
a Type "A" shipping container, the lid (approximately 681 kg), which was leaning against 
the container, was pushed over when the Vacuum Vessel Segment came in contact with 
the lid.  A health physics technician stopped to watch the lowering operation; then when 
the vessel segment appeared to be in the shipping container, the technician moved into 
the immediate area.  The lid then fell in the vicinity of the health physics technician.  
Workers yelled and he quickly moved to evade the lid.  The lid struck the toroidal field 
coil holding/disassembly fixture.  The job was stopped and the lid was laid on the ground.  
A few days earlier, the container had been placed in the test cell and the lid removed.  
There was not enough open floor space available to lay the lid on the floor.  The bottom 
of the lid was fastened to prevent it from sliding out, but the top of the lid was not 
fastened.  When the vessel segment was being lowered into the container, the segment 
had to be repositioned.  During repositioning, the segment contacted the lid, which 
resulted in the lid falling over.  No one was injured in this event.  Procedures were 
changed to better control the lifts (ORPS CH-PA-PPPL-PPPL-2001-0006).   
On March 26, 2002, at approximately 0920 hours, the Laboratory Site Protection 
Division received a call, via the Emergency Notification System, that a subcontractor had 
been injured while working in a trench.  Upon arrival the Emergency Services Unit 
determined that the individual was pinned, and the PPPL Mutual Aid Agreement was 
activated.  The local fire company and ALS medical unit responded to the scene, and the 
county trench rescue team was automatically placed on stand-by, but was not required to 
respond to the incident.  Upon arrival at the scene it was determined that a dense mass 
composed of clay, stone, soil, and sand had broken loose from the sidewall of the trench 
and fell onto the lower leg of a subcontractor working in the > 1.5 m deep trench.  The 
weight of the mass pinned the individual in the trench.  The individual was removed from 
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the trench by rescue personnel and transported to the local medical center.  The scene was 
secured, and an investigation of the incident commenced.  The victim was then ground 
transported to the local medical center emergency room.  Subsequently, it was learned 
that the patient sustained fractures to both the tibia and fibula of the right leg.  Surgery 
was performed on the evening of March 26.  The work in progress in the trenches was to 
replace canal water lines throughout the complex.  Trenches were dug to ~2 m and 
backfilled with ~30 cm of sand to use as a bed for the new piping.  Workers had to enter 
the trenches whenever the trenching operation encountered other buried services.  The 
pinned worker was a foreman who was checking for a potential path around other 
services.  Workers had noticed water accumulations and trickling water on the trench 
walls, but neither the contractor nor PPPL had the required competent person at the 
worksite to receive such a report.  Part of the trench wall gave way at the foreman’s 
location, and even over such a short distance struck him with enough force to fracture 
both leg bones.  Management did not verify that the contractor was in compliance with 
OSHA regulations (ORPS CH-PA-PPPL-PPPL-2002-0001). 
The DOE formed safety and environmental audit teams, referred to as Tiger Teams, in 
the early 1990’s.  These teams of professionals visited DOE sites to observe and audit all 
types of work activities.  The PPPL was visited in late 1990 and early 1991 (DOE, 1991).  
The Tiger Team found a number of violations of occupational safety and health 
administration (OSHA) regulations.  The break down of the violations were: 46% 
electrical, 23% machine guarding, 7% hazard communication, 5% walking and working 
surfaces, 4% egress, 3% hand tools, 3% personal protective equipment, 3% welding, and 
7% other issues.  One of two important safety findings was that PPPL was not 
administratively controlling the Kirk keys (safety interlock keys) for engineered safety 
systems.  Late returns of keys were being allowed, which presented a possible 
electrocution hazard.  The other important safety finding was that PPPL did not have the 
ability to provide a timely and effective response to protect personnel in the event of an 
emergency requiring electrical isolation.  PPPL also acknowledged that they had 
determined in a self-assessment that their confined space safety program was deficient; 
they worked to improve the program.  In a US fusion experiment, the tokamak interior, 
the neutral beam lines, the motor-generator equipment accesses, and any equipment wells 
or underground tunnels are typically confined spaces and must be treated according to US 
safety regulations. 
These occurrences have shown that most of the industrial safety concerns at PPPL are the 
same concerns shared by many DOE facilities and even those in other industries – the 
safety issues and concerns discussed in this section are not unique to fusion.  
Subcontractors do not always follow the DOE or OSHA safety rules although their 
contracts state that they will comply, temporary workers unfamiliar with the facility can 
make errors that jeopardize their own safety, and that facility management does not 
always verify that the subcontract personnel are meeting all aspects of their contractual 
obligations.  Events of working without fall protection and without confined space 
 16
permits, falls from height, severed underground lines, trench wall collapse, small fires, 
and crane events have occurred.  The Tiger Team found that the staff was not always 
following OSHA safety rules, but PPPL has made efforts to improve their compliance. 
2.2  Other Fusion Machines 
This section presents some of the industrial safety-related events that have occurred at 
other fusion experiments in the US.  These events serve to illustrate several safety-related 
issues, including the energies utilized in fusion experiments, the operating practices used 
at fusion facilities, and the nature of non-obvious hazards.   
On November 13, 1978, six employees and one visiting scientist working on a direct 
energy conversion experiment at a magnetic fusion energy research facility in Livermore, 
California, were exposed to an unmonitored source of x-ray radiation.  The direct 
conversion experiment produced intense x-rays, which had not been predicted by the 
experimenters or by the Hazards Control Group.  The exposures occurred after several 
changes in the experimental equipment inadvertently eliminated inherent shielding.  
Three individuals did not observe the radiation source during the experiment, their 
dosimeters indicated low levels within permissible limits.  The dose estimates for the 
eyes of the other four experimenters were 15, 5.7, 3.1, and 2 rem (0.15, 0.057, 0.031, and 
0.02 Sv) (DOE, 1980b).   
On January 24 and 26, 1980, earthquakes struck near the Lawrence Livermore National 
Laboratory (LLNL) (Becker, 1982).  The first earthquake measured 5.5 on the Richter 
scale, and the second measured 5.8.  The first earthquake had aftershocks of 5.2 and 4.2 
on the Richter scale at 53 and 97 s after the initial earthquake.  Laboratory employees 
responded well, sought cover under furniture or in doorways.  They evacuated buildings 
and trailers without any panic.  Of the 65 reported injuries to personnel, 46 injuries were 
caused by falls or falling objects (note: Becker stated that there were a number of falling 
objects, including light fixtures, books and materials stored on shelves, etc.).  Other 
injuries were back injuries, lacerations, sprains, contusions, and other minor injuries.  The 
earthquakes did trip electrical circuit breakers and broke fuses, so most portions of the 
site were without power.  The laser facilities appeared to have suffered damage, but it 
was mostly cosmetic damage that was easily repaired.  There was slight optics damage 
and some structural damage.  The laser was back in operation after a month of repairs.  
The Engineering Test Accelerator was misaligned by the earthquakes.  Realignment and 
other repairs required several weeks at a cost of ~$200k.   
On June 12, 1980, the Elmo Bumpy Torus fusion experiment at Oak Ridge National 
Laboratory experienced damage to six of the 24 copper magnet coils.  The fusion 
experiment was located in the Y-12 plant, and was adjacent to a US Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission experiment.  While separate, the two experiments shared the same power 
supply.  The Elmo Bumpy Torus was shut down, with safety interlocks in place to 
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preclude operation.  Apparently, the electrical safety interlocks failed while the other 
experiment was in operation; as a result the Elmo Bumpy Torus magnet coils were 
energized by the shared power supply.  The magnet cooling system was not in operation.  
The coils overheated and six coils were so badly damaged that they required replacement.  
The Elmo Bumpy Torus was expected to be out of service for two months while the 
replacement was made.  Fortunately, no employees were injured during this unexpected 
magnet power-up event (DOE, 1981). 
On February 13, 1992, a scientist visiting a US fusion experiment at Livermore, 
California, was rendered unconscious by inhaling nitrogen gas used to cool a diagnostic 
device.  The scientist was trying to align optics on a laser-assisted particle probe 
spectroscopy diagnostic.  As he looked through a hole at the top of a port to the fusion 
experiment, room light interfered with his work.  He placed a black cloth over his head to 
block out the room light.  Nitrogen coolant gas was slowly leaking from the device and it 
accumulated under the cloth.  Other workers noticed that the scientist had passed out and 
summoned aid.  He was transported to the hospital.  The scientist was revived from the 
oxygen deficiency event.  An accident investigation was held, and a number of factors 
were identified.  The staff changed from nitrogen to dry air for experiment cooling 
(ORPS OAK--LLNL-LLNL-1992-0018). 
On March 20, 1992, three technicians moved approximately 450 lead bricks to provide 
shielding from x-ray production on the Experimental Test Accelerator II (ETA-II) at 
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.  It was decided to use the opportunity to 
measure the exposure to lead and/or lead oxide dust during such operations, and to 
establish data on such operations.  The technicians were therefore fitted with air samplers 
for the entire duration (90 minutes) of the move.  The air sampler results were reported as 
much higher than expected.  Following subsequent corrections, the exposures averaged 
for an eight-hour day for the three technicians were: 104 (plus or minus 12) Pg/m3, 90 
(plus or minus 11) Pg/m3, and 30 (plus or minus 4) Pg/m3.   Two of these results were 
above the OSHA permissible exposure limit (PEL) of 50 Pg/m3 averaged over an eight-
hour day.  However, serious concerns were raised about the quality control on the 
measurement, both in the laboratory analysis of the samples and in possible 
contamination of the sample by the technicians involved (e.g., by dust from their gloves).  
The LLNL Medical Department was consulted.  They advised that a one-time exposure at 
this level is not a hazard to health.  The exposed workers were informed that a possible 
exposure had occurred.  They were offered medical advice and tests if desired.  A 
planned movement of 400 additional bricks on April 13, 1992 was used as an opportunity 
to make more careful measurements.  Supervisory personnel were used as brick movers 
("Handlers"), in protective gear to ensure that they were not exposed.  Each wore two 
samplers.  The person controlling the samplers ("Sampler") wore one, and an Area 
Sampler was placed 1.5 m from the lead pile and 1.5 m from the floor.  The personnel 
were given careful instructions on preventing contamination of the sample.  Bricks with 
visible oxidation were used, although they may not have been as heavily oxidized as the 
initial set of bricks.  A third party reviewed the data and analysis.  The results of the more 
careful measurement were (outside of the respirators worn by the lead brick handlers): 
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Handler #1 -  8 hour averaged exposure was 42 (plus or minus 5) Pg/m3
Handler #2 -  8 hour averaged exposure was 58 (plus or minus 7) Pg/m3
Handler #3 -  8 hour averaged exposure was 50 (plus or minus 6) Pg/m3
Sampler - 8 hour averaged exposure was 12 (plus or minus 1) Pg/m3
Area Sample - 8 hour averaged exposure was 17 (plus or minus 2) Pg/m3
The quality assurance procedure was completed on April 16, 1992 at 1015 hours.  It was 
concluded that the initial exposures on March 20 were probably in excess of OSHA 
standards, even though some contamination of the samples cannot be excluded.  It was 
expected that the moving of lead bricks in the amount handled would not expose the 
workers to lead levels in excess of the OSHA limits.  There was no information known to 
the program to indicate that conditions (e.g., lead oxide dust from brick surfaces) could 
be such as to permit exposure.  These data have indicated a need for a re-evaluation of 
possible controls on handling lead (ORPS OAK--LLNL-LLNL-1992-0041). 
On June 15, 1993, two contractor employees were repairing a cathode tip from the 
Particle Beam Fusion Accelerator experiment at Sandia when the cathode tip fell about 
~2 m to the floor.  The cathode tip missed the two workers and there were no injuries.  
The cathode tip weighs about 159 kg and was situated on a lift platform.  A working 
stand was above the cathode tip.  One worker began using a chain fall and crane to 
remove the working stand, the other worker began pushing the lift platform toward the 
elevator so the cathode tip could be re-installed on the machine.  The chain fall’s hook 
caught the cathode tip as it went past and the cathode tip fell to the floor.  It was not 
damaged.  The incident was discussed and the procedure was rewritten (ORPS ALO-KO-
SNL-1000-1993-0008).
On April 10, 1995, a technician received an electrical shock to his left thumb while 
working at the Particle Beam Fusion Accelerator.  He was working on a temporary RF 
power generator, tracing cables to verify proper system configuration during pre-
operational testing.  As he grasped a cable while physically tracing its route, the cable 
detached from its connector, leaving the direct current center conductor exposed.  The 
outer braid of the cable was at ground at all times due to the connection at the far end of 
the cable.  The center conductor came into contact with the technician’s thumb and he 
received an electrical shock.  The power supply was immediately de-energized.  The 
technician reported to medial, was examined, observed, and released to return to work.  
Cable examination revealed that the connector had not been adequately crimped, so when 
the technician grasped the cable, the cable and connector parted.  The incident was 
discussed with the staff and the defective cable was replaced (ORPS ALO-KO-SNL-
1000-1995-0006).
A summer student was testing the electrical insulation of cables for the field reversed 
configuration experiment at Los Alamos on June 1, 2004.  He was using a ‘megger’ type 
crank-operated insulation tester.  He placed his left hand on a shelf unit for balance while 
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he cranked, and he received an electrical shock.  After applying the leads and properly 
discharging the tester from a previous test, he cranked the tester for about two seconds, 
heard the clutch slip once and then felt a vibration through his arms and chest.  He let go 
of the handle and the rack immediately.  It took him about ten seconds to realize he had 
been shocked.  He felt a slight muscle contraction along the path the current had taken, 
but there was not any significant reflex action or bodily jerk.  He experienced slight 
cramping in the muscles in the palm of his left hand, where it had been touching the 
grounded instrument rack.  The principal investigator determined that while there could 
have been 1,000 V in the wire, there was not enough energy (less than 2 Joules), charge 
(0.001 Coulomb), current (0.2mA steady, 2A pulsed), time duration (400 microsecond 
pulse), and effective capacitance to cause a safety concern.  The principal investigator, 
and the task leader, concluded that the cable connected to the Megger had a ground shield 
that was touching or arcing to the screen room ground, and student was completing the 
circuit.  The event was discussed, and the megger was removed from service to be 
dismantled so that it could be determined if the unit was malfunctioning (ORPS ALO-
LA-LANL-PHYSCOMPLX-2004-0001). 
There have been a few other events of concern to fusion.  Cadwallader (1994) noted that 
a 1.5-m long high vacuum chamber at the Skeats High Power Lab, operated by General 
Electric in Philadelphia, suffered a window implosion on September 11, 1986.  A 
technician, who was standing in front of the window, was partially drawn into the 
vacuum chamber by the inrushing air.  He died from asphyxia and chest injuries.  This 
accident with a modest sized chamber caused fusion experiments, with very large 
vacuum reservoirs, to review and strengthen their approach to vacuum window safety.  
Plexiglass barriers were placed in front of windows, exclusion areas were re-affirmed for 
windows that could not accommodate plexiglass, and fusion personnel were briefed on 
the Philadelphia event. 
2.3  Summary 
The initial assumption at the beginning of this analysis was that fusion experiments 
would be maintained and operated very well because they are unique and expensive 
machines, and that any personnel injuries would be atypical events associated with 
failures of the exotic equipment used in fusion research.  The data review has shown that 
PPPL has had staff injuries and also subcontract workers not wearing fall protection, 
workers not using confined space permits, occurrences of small fires, subcontract and 
staff worker fall hazards, spurious halon discharges, staff worker radiation 
overexposures, underground lines cut during excavation, crane-related events, and even a 
trench collapse.  A valuable insight from all of these event reports is that fusion 
experiments rely on their “conventional facilities” for all the needed support functions of 
electric power input, water cooling, gas handling, etc.  Fusion experiments operate many 
systems that are very similar to other industrial concerns, so the safety concerns in other 
industries are shared by fusion experiments.  Aside from the radiation exposure, the 
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industrial accidents and events in this chapter are recognized as typical industrial safety 
problems faced by many industries.  Tables 1 and 2 give actuarial data on US industrial 
safety problems that show falls, being struck by an object, and fires are important, nation-
wide industrial hazards that create many injuries each year (NSC, 2003).  Confined 
spaces, of which fusion has many, have averaged over 80 fatalities per year, with about 
one-fourth of those being co-workers attempting rescue (Suruda, 1994).  Fortunately, 
there have not been any fatalities in fusion confined spaces.  The other fusion events 
discussed in this chapter were radiation overexposure, inadvertent magnet power up, 
oxygen deficiency, chemical overexposure, dropped crane load, and electrical shock.  
Other than the radiation exposure, these events are also typical of many industrial 
environments.  From the plots given in Figures 1 and 2, the PPPL staff injuries are higher 
than other DOE operations, but the injuries have not been debilitating.  PPPL has been 
able to operate fusion experiments (the basic machines and their diagnostics), even a 
successful D-T campaign, safely.  It is also positive that PPPL has not experienced any 
fatalities in the operation of their machines, and that they have made strides to increase 
the effectiveness of their occupational safety programs after the DOE Tiger Team audit in 
1991.  PPPL has not had many accident investigation reports filed with the DOE, which 
indicates that there have been very few accidents of high consequence.  The 
subcontracted workers are suffering injuries of concern around fusion experiments.  For a 
large future machine (such as ITER) that may subcontract hundreds of support 
employees, proper oversight of the subcontracted workers will be very important for 
occupational safety. 
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Table 1.  Occupational Safety Data for US Industrial Workers 
Event or Exposure 
Private Industry 
Count of Nonfatal Cases  
for 2001 
All Industries
Count of Fatalities
between 1992-2001 
Contact with object or 
equipment
400,033 9,969 
      Struck by object 199,855 5,649 
      Struck against object 101,177 147 
      Caught in object,
      equipment, or material 
68,048 4,137 
Fall to lower level 96,359 6,078 
Fall on same level 182,641 584 
Slips and trips 50,269 16 
Overexertion 409,011 67 
      Overexertion in lifting 227,291 40 
Repetitive motion injuries 65,162 -- 
Exposed to harmful 
substance
68,269 5,623 
Transportation accidents 66,803 25,891 
Fires, explosions 3,711 1,948 
Assault or violent act 23,694 11,190 
      Violence by person 17,215 8,702 
      Violence by another  
      person 
6,480 2,488 
All other events or 
exposures
17,615 458 
There were 115,933,000 people employed in private industry in the US in calendar year 
2001 (NSC, 2003).
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Table 2.  Occupational Safety Data for the Electric, Gas, and Sanitary Services in the US  
Event or Exposure 
Electric, Gas, and  
Sanitary Services 
Count of Nonfatal Cases  
for 2001 
Electric, Gas, and  
Sanitary Services 
Count of Fatalities
between 1992-2001 
Contact with object or 
equipment
2,858 153 
      Struck by object 1,324 81 
      Struck against object 910 -- 
      Caught in object,
      equipment, or material 
474 72 
Fall to lower level 1,122 64 
Fall on same level 1,223 6 
Slips and trips 678 -- 
Overexertion 3,083 -- 
      Overexertion in lifting 1,437 -- 
Repetitive motion injuries 470 -- 
Exposed to harmful 
substance
775 304 
Transportation accidents 1,007 463 
Fires, explosions 63 82 
Assault or violent act 194 50 
      Violence by person 54 23 
      Violence by other  
      person 
140 27 
All other events or 
exposures
2,398 8 
Standard Industrial Classification code 49.  Employment in this code totaled 852,000 in 
calendar year 2001 (NSC, 2003). 
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3.0 PARTICLE ACCELERATOR SAFETY 
Particle accelerators have several features and issues in common with magnetic fusion 
experiments.  Both use large amounts of electricity and cryogens.  Also, high vacuum is 
required for both types of machines.  Both have radiation concerns, including ionizing 
radiation and non-ionizing radiation (e.g., RF heating).  Shielding is needed to protect 
against radiation exposure.  Constructing a new accelerator that could be several 
kilometers in circumference is a major construction project, perhaps smaller than, but 
similar to, the ITER construction activity.  Both types of machines operate in campaigns, 
followed by maintenance outages; however, the accelerators generally tend toward 
operating for more calendar time per year than fusion experiments.  Examining 
accelerator operating experiences for occupational safety is not only wise from the 
facility similarities, but also offers potential insights into possible issues for a fusion 
experiment that operates with higher availability than the present fusion experiments.   
3.1  Stanford Linear Accelerator Center 
This accelerator was planned in the early 1960’s and construction began in June 1962 
(Neal, 1965).  Construction was completed in 1966; the electron accelerator began 
operating the same year.  The accelerator has operated since that time, thus the original 
accelerator lifetime is approaching 40 years.  Other facilities have also been constructed 
at the Stanford site, including a synchrotron in 1973.  Parts of the descriptions of these 
machines have come from the Stanford Linear Accelerator Center (SLAC) web site.  The 
Positron Electron Project (PEP) was completed in 1980, and is a 9 GeV storage ring; it 
has been recently rebuilt as PEP-II.  It is part of the B Factory, with “B particles” being 
made from d-quarks and anti-b-quarks.  The “CB particle” is called B-bar, and it is made 
from an anti-d-quark and a b-quark.  In 1999, a detector was built for the B Factory, it is 
the B/CB detector, called “BaBar”.  SLAC employs about 1,200 people (about 150 are 
doctoral-educated researchers) and annually hosts about 2,500 to 3,000 visiting 
researchers from around the world.  About 900 technical papers are produced annually at 
SLAC.  The annual SLAC budget is about $170M.  In comparison, the PPPL has only 
about 400 employees.  ITER is tentatively expected to be somewhere between these 
employment levels. 
Several sources were surveyed to obtain information on accelerator personnel and 
operational safety.  These reports include the Atomic Energy Commission operational 
accident reports, DOE reports, and DOE databases on operational events.  The accidents 
and events of industrial safety concern are described here.   
One of the initial events cited for SLAC was an apparent radiation overexposure.  The 
accelerator worker’s film badge indicated 150 rem (1.5 Sv) over several weeks; however, 
since the employee had only been performing his routine duties, the film badge was not 
trusted (WASH, 1975).   
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On December 26, 1965, a construction worker was fatally crushed and another was 
seriously injured with a six-ton concrete plank that fell at the SLAC site (WASH, 1975).   
Over the three months of January to March, 1966, an employee received an estimated soft 
x-ray exposure of 300 rem (3 Sv) to his foot (at < 35 keV).  There was no evidence of 
erythema on his foot.  The employee had been tuning an RF circulator during that time. 
On June 8, 1967, a spectrometer magnet was severely damaged by coil overheating.  The 
magnet had been connected to the wrong power supply.  The cost to repair the magnet 
was $17k (WASH, 1975).  Fortunately, no one was injured in that event. 
On December 7, 1971, two bombs were detonated in the injector sector of the SLAC 
accelerator, one in the main trigger generator and one in the master oscillator.  There was 
no damage to the main accelerator tunnel and the scheduled startup date for this 
equipment was not affected.  The damage was estimated to be $45k.  The bombs were 
attributed to student unrest (WASH, 1975). 
A fire ignited in the west interaction pit of the Stanford Positron-Electron Asymmetric 
Ring (SPEAR) facility on March 16, 1975, when a thyratron (a high energy switch that 
controls high voltage and high amperage) malfunctioned.  Four thyratron pulsers, their 
high voltage power supply, and related cables were either severely damaged or destroyed.  
Significant damage was sustained by the SPEAR muon chamber in the west pit and also 
the pit roof.  Operation of the ring facility was interrupted for eight days.  Operation of 
the magnetic detector and muon chamber in the west pit was interrupted for 
approximately four weeks (DOE, 1980). 
A construction worker suffered serious burns on July 5, 1978.  The worker was steadying 
a load for a crane operator on the SLAC PEP site.  The crane boom came into contact 
with, or within arcing distance of, a 60 kV power line.  The worker’s clothing ignited 
from the flow of current to ground.  He suffered 1st, 2nd, and 3rd degree burns over 90% of 
his body.  His lost workdays while recovering from the burns were recorded as a SLAC 
occupational injury (DOE, 1980a). 
The earliest entry into the Department of Energy Computerized Accident/Incident 
Reporting System (CAIRS) was March 1977.  The initial report was a cryptic description 
of a chemical explosion that did not injure any employees but did result in $5k damage to 
the facility.  The other data in CAIRS is summarized in the lost work day and lost work 
case plots given in Figure 3, and the injuries are summarized in Figure 4.  In Figure 3, 
lump construction is construction contracted on a lump sum fee basis.  The construction 
work is the same regardless of the type of construction contract.  Service contractors can 
be support services, such as technicians, computer support, custodians, laundry, food  
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note:  There were no fatalities at SLAC in the 1993-2003 time frame. 
Figure 3.  Plots of SLAC Industrial Safety Performance from 1993-2003. 
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Figure 4.  SLAC Industrial Injury Distributions from 1981-2003. 
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services, laborers, and other workers.  The results show a cyclic trend of decreases and 
then increases.  Reasons for these varying results are not known.  Figure 4 shows that the 
‘other injuries’ category is large; it includes issues such as skin irritation, insect bites, 
puncture wounds to fingers, carpal tunnel syndrome, dermatitis, mental illness, and 
“injuries not otherwise specified”.  As seen with PPPL, the SLAC technicians suffer the 
highest number of injuries, which indicates that again, the technicians are the people who 
interface most directly with the machine and its subsystems, the work is similar between 
the two types of facilities.  A surprising result is the high number of injuries among the 
other occupational groups, mainly the administrative staff and the engineers/scientists.  
The injuries were typically not severe, generally they were small lacerations, falls to the 
same level (i.e., slipping and tripping), and carpal tunnel syndrome.  Nonetheless, the 
numbers of injuries appeared to be high for the administrative people in traditionally low 
hazard office occupations.  The scientists and engineers probably are injured due to 
spending time working with the machine and its diagnostics rather than designing, 
analyzing data, etc.  Data similar to that presented in Figures 3 and 4 were prepared for 
SLAC for the 1985-1990 time period (Lyon, 1991); the earlier data very comparable. 
A DOE Tiger Team reviewed SLAC in 1991 as a single-purpose laboratory dedicated to 
high energy physics (DOE, 1991).  In the area of worker safety, a total of 259 
noncompliances were found in working conditions related to occupational health and 
safety.  The findings indicated serious deficiencies in the areas of electrical safety 
standards, hazard communication program, monitoring for regulated chemicals, machine 
guarding, electrical lockout/tagout, storage of flammable and combustible liquids, 
emergency egress, confined space entry, and fire protection.  The assessment did not 
uncover any evidence of disciplinary procedures being enforced when workers breached 
mandatory safety and health regulations.  Lyon (1991) reported that the late-1980’s 
SLAC total recordable case rate was about the same as the DOE rate, the lost work case 
rate was almost double the overall DOE rate at the time, and the lost work day rate was 
double the overall DOE rate.  The reasons for the differences were not clear, but it was 
obvious that SLAC was having high lost work case and lost work days per accident case. 
The DOE ORPS database was searched for events at SLAC.  There were 198 off-normal 
events from 1990-2003.  Many were not industrial accidents, they were noncompliances 
with environmental regulations, missed test intervals, false alarms, procedure 
noncompliance, equipment failures that did not affect personnel, etc.  The events 
pertinent to industrial safety are described below. 
On October 17, 1990, an operator noted that if the rolling radiation shield blocks for 
section 19 of the positron vault of the accelerator were moved, there was no personnel 
safety interlock if people were to enter through the opening made by displaced shielding 
blocks.  The issue was reviewed and then the system scheduled to have a personnel safety 
interlock added in the November 1990 shut down (OAK--SU-SLAC-1990-0006). 
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On November 27, 1990, workers were removing an ion chamber assembly from the beam 
switch yard.  An arc occurred when they cut a coaxial cable.  The high voltage equipment 
was not locked out and tagged out per procedure.  The employee believed that there were 
no live conductors in the cable bundle he was cutting, and he had not verified zero energy 
or lockout-tagout.   The worker was not injured but will receive additional training in 
lockout-tagout (ORPS OAK--SU-SLAC-1990-0011). 
On November 27, 1990, during removal of control circuits for rolling concrete blocks in 
the Final Focus area, wiring technician cut into live 480 V ac cable and drew an electrical 
arc.  The technician had disconnected and tagged the disconnect switch, but by mistake, 
he cut into incoming line.  The technician should have followed the Lock & Tag 
procedure by locking or disconnecting an additional circuit & checking for voltage before 
cutting.  No one was injured in the arc (ORPS OAK--SU-SLAC-1990-0012). 
On December 14, 1990, an employee received an electrical shock to his left hand and 
arm.  He had been testing an energized wire mover assembly in the vacuum building, but 
he was not following the specific procedures for this type of test.  He was exposed to 
~900 Volts.  The employee was examined by the SLAC medical office, his 
electrocardiogram was normal and he suffered no physiological damage from the shock.  
The employee was counseled about following proper procedures and was given 
additional electrical safety training (ORPS OAK--SU-SLAC-1990-0014). 
On December 27, 1990, an electrician was cleaning components in substation 7 in 
accelerator sector 14.  He received burns to his arms and head, apparently from electrical 
power in the cabinets he was cleaning.  He was taken by ambulance to the Stanford 
hospital for treatment.  The accelerator was down for maintenance at the time of this 
accident.  An investigation committee recommended that the electricians be given better 
instructions for tasks in their written job orders, wear flame retardant clothing, and 
improve procedures (ORPS OAK--SU-SLAC-1990-0016). 
On January 3, 1991, the plating shop staff smelled nitric acid fumes and they evacuated 
the plating shop.  The shop was externally ventilated and the staff safely re-entered in 
2 hours.  The shop ventilating system for exhausting fumes from metal finishing 
operations had suffered fan belt failure.  There was no periodic fan belt inspection in 
place at the time.  The fan belts were replaced and a periodic inspection interval was 
established for the shop (ORPS OAK--SU-SLAC-1991-0017). 
During a search of the Damping Ring Intersection Point (DRIP) on February 1, 1991, the 
operators discovered a problem with the personnel safety system.  They determined that it 
was possible to enter the DRIP via sector 2 or sector 1 doors without safety system 
actuation (i.e., without dropping the search presets).  This lack of actuation would allow 
unsuspecting personnel to enter the DRIP after searchers had exited, so it was 
conceivable that personnel could be inside the DRIP tunnel when the searchers secured 
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the doors for operations.  The access control system will be modified to remove this 
design flaw OAK--SU-SLAC-1991-0022).  It is notable that accelerator safety personnel 
place a great deal of confidence in the personnel access control systems to maintain 
personnel safety from machine radiation, yet there are instances where these systems do 
not protect personnel as required. 
On March 4, 1991, a fire occurred in a modulator at test station #3 in the klystron test 
laboratory.  The plexiglass cover used for personnel electrical protection in the modulator 
caught fire and the fire destroyed some of the internal components of the modulator 
power supply.  Personnel extinguished the fire.  The staff changed the Test Lab to use 
lockable disconnects on each modulator feed and they have modified the modulator 
interlocks so that the cabinets cannot be accessed without first locking out the disconnect, 
so that the flammable plexiglass cover is no longer needed as a safety shield from the 
internal circuitry (OAK--SU-SLAC-1991-0025). 
On May 1, 1991, a North Damping Ring (NDR) distributed ion pump (DIP) high voltage 
power supply interlock was bypassed.  This would have allowed the power supply to be 
turned on with the NDR in permitted access.  The incident revealed a lack of familiarity 
on the part of some personnel with hazardous equipment interlocks, from both the design 
and operation point of view.  It was also a reminder that non-standard and inadequately 
documented systems are difficult to troubleshoot and maintain, and that they can 
contribute to potentially hazardous situations (ORPS OAK--SU-SLAC-1991-1006).
On June 23, 1991, the SSRL Booster to storage ring extraction kicker failed and started a 
fire.  A short circuit in the pulse forming cable caused a resistor to overheat.  The root 
cause was inadequate design safeguards to prevent overheating of the resistor in question.  
The pulser box directly below the kicker magnet caught on fire.  After getting access to 
the area, Palo Alto Fire Department entered the booster enclosure and extinguished the 
burning/smoldering components.  No one was injured in the fire.  Engineering safeguards 
to prevent fire must be incorporated into the design (ORPS OAK--SU-SLAC-1991-
1014).
On October 4, 1991, employees heard a “bang” emanating from the End Station A (ESA) 
area.  The accelerator was operating and an experiment was in progress in the ESA.  
Employees entered the area and made a brief visual inspection, but they did not find any 
reason for the noise.  On October 6, other employees entered the ESA and noticed that an 
aluminum sphere portion of the 3PC3 collimator had ruptured, and pieces were found up 
to 6 m away from the unit.  The collimator had ruptured due to lack of cooling water.  A 
faulty flow switch had given a false reading that water was flowing but the cooling water 
was not turned on.  The collimator failure resulted in the loss of 3 days of experiment 
data taking.  No one was injured in this explosion (ORPS OAK--SU-SLAC-1991-1026).
On October 10, 1991, four vacuum system metal bellows on a mobile test cart in the 
klystron lab were found to have induced radioactivity.  The contact dose rate was 
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8 mrem/h (80 PSv/h) and the dose rate at 30 cm was 1 mrem/h (10 PSv/h).  Apparently, 
radioactive materials were removed from a radioactive materials management area 
without proper sign-out and labeling procedures.  Workers were refamiliarized with 
proper procedures.  The bellows were labeled as activated material and moved to a 
storage area (ORPS OAK--SU-SLAC-1991-1028). 
On October 11, 1991, the hydrogen gas feed system for the furnaces inside the pit furnace 
developed a leak.  The leak was on the hydrogen dryer inside the shack attached to 
building 025.  The leak vented 1.43 MPa (200 psig) hydrogen gas into the shack.  The 
hydrogen low pressure alarm sounded.  No furnace operators were present at the time.  
An estimated 283 cubic meters (10,000 standard cubic feet) of hydrogen vented.  The 
hydrogen feed was eventually turned off at the tank pad.  The hydrogen release was 
caused by a failure of an elastomeric pressure seal on the body of a particulate filter 
located in the hydrogen supply circuit of the Pit Furnace.  An independent engineering 
review after the incident showed the cause of the filter failure to be system overpressure, 
which was caused by regulator failure.  The gas did not ignite and no one was injured 
(ORPS OAK--SU-SLAC-1991-1029). 
On October 24, 1991, contract workers were seen in the restricted area of the Beam 
Dump in the ESA during accelerator operations.  Work was stopped.  Radiation surveys 
showed no significant amount of radiation in the area.  The radiation padlock keys had 
been distributed too widely to persons who were not familiar with the access schedule.  
Workers were allowed to enter while the beam was running.  Fortunately there was no 
radiation exposure to these workers (ORPS OAK--SU-SLAC-1991-1032). 
On October 21, 1991, a vacuum technician received an electrical shock when he touched 
an exposed feedthrough on an operating vacuum ion pump.  The technician was 
examined and was found to be uninjured.  The vacuum technician was unfamiliar with 
the way in which this rebuilt pump was connected.  Furthermore, he did not follow a 
procedure that requires checking high voltage connections for shorts and as a result 
received a shock  (ORPS OAK--SU-SLAC-1991-1033). 
On November 1, 1991, a worker was injured while moving material just inside the Final 
Focus Test Beam (FFTB) tunnel.  Two other workmen were in the tunnel at the time but 
neither saw the accident.  The worker was moving a section of 30 cm (12 inch) channel 
approximately 1 m long in the FFTB tunnel toward the sump hole.  He hit a small 
protrusion on the floor and flipped over the piece of channel, landing on his left arm and 
breaking it.  At the time of the report, doctors believed he would require an operation 
(ORPS OAK--SU-SLAC-1991-1034).
On February 28, 1992, an Industrial Hygienist was called at request of technical 
supervisor to measure the solvent concentration during an epoxy mixing operation in 
building 28 of the magnet fabrication area.  General room air concentration was measured 
at 500 ppm of trichloroacetic acid (TCA).  The OSHA permissible exposure limit (PEL) 
is 350 ppm, and the OSHA short term exposure limit (STEL) is 450 ppm.  In a cleaning 
operation, the TCA concentration in the worker breathing zone measured at 
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approximately 1000-1050 ppm, slightly exceeding the 1000 ppm Immediately Dangerous 
to Life or Health (IDLH) limit.  There are no written procedures concerning worker 
health and safety specifically approved for the Kicker Room in addition to, or integrated 
with, technical procedures necessary to assemble and/or repair Epoxy Kicker magnets.  
Management did not react to the change in materials required by the development of 
epoxy-based kicker magnets as the established production gradually transitioned from 
room temperature vulcanizing-based instruments.  Procedures will be created, and the 
mixing tank and epoxy tool cleaning operation will be moved to an area with better 
ventilation (ORPS OAK--SU-SLAC-1992-0009).
On March 10, 1992, a worker was observed standing on the handrail of a platform for the 
Stanford Large Detector.  The worker was not wearing a safety strap even though the 
distance to the floor was 7.6 m.  The worker was accessing an electronics cabinet.  The 
worker safely stepped down from the railing after being given a verbal cease and desist 
order.  The worker stated that he was standing on the railing since it was the most 
convenient position to access the components being installed in the top of the racks of the 
cabinets at that location.  The worker thought that it was inconvenient to obtain a safety 
strap belt from the tool crib, so had not done so.  Management must be involved to stress 
the importance of adhering to safety policies and practices (ORPS OAK--SU-SLAC-
1992-0011).  It is notable that while this is clearly a violation of fall protection, the 
incident also serves to illustrate that designing for maintainability and ease of access to 
the electronics cabinets will preclude many of these near-miss events.  As ITER in-room 
equipment and systems are laid out, attention to personnel accessibility can promote 
operational safety. 
On April 29, 1992, an RF transmitter in the Klystron Gallery caught fire.  The smoke 
from the fire actuated the smoke detectors.  The Fire Department responded and 
extinguished the fire.  No one was injured in this fire.  A transformer initiated the fire.  
The 22-year-old transformer had suffered from degradation of the insulating material, 
which led to arcing and flames.  The firefighters used mono-ammonium phosphate (dry 
powder) extinguishing agent, which added time to the cleanup process.  This compound 
is caustic to electrical parts and must be cleaned up promptly to avoid damage.  (Note: 
The firefighters may have preferentially used dry powder if insulating oil had been 
present in the transformer).  The total down time was 12 hours of accelerator beam time 
lost (ORPS OAK--SU-SLAC-1992-0016).
On May 22, 1992, the klystron 6-7 modulator unit sent a fire alarm signal to the control 
room at 0030 hours.  Operators verified that it was a real event rather than a spurious 
alarm.  The Palo Alto Fire Department Engine 7 (the SLAC fire department) was then 
called to respond.  At 0035 hours, the power was cut to the unit, but it continued to burn.  
The fire department extinguished the fire at 0041 hours, using two portable carbon 
dioxide fire extinguishers.  The fire ignited due to an electrical arc on top of a divider in 
the modulator cabinet.  The arc was probably caused by a combination of dust collecting 
on top of the divider assembly and an overvoltage condition caused by a voltage regulator 
failure.  The arc set fire to other components in the cabinet, including a 5 kV driver, a 
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pulse cable, and other wiring.  SLAC will make attempts to clean the cabinets of dust on 
a regular basis, as operating constraints and personnel reductions allow.  No one was 
injured in this event (ORPS OAK--SU-SLAC-1992-0017).
On October 16, 1992, a SLAC electrician came into contact with a 12 kV line in the 
Stanford Synchrotron Radiation Lab (SSRL).  The electrician involved received burns to 
his right hand and knee, and a lesser burn to his left knee.  He was hospitalized for two 
days.  His co-worker was exposed to an arc flash from the short circuit, but sustained no 
significant injury.  The cause of this accident was the failure of the electrician concerned 
to follow existing procedures and training in using a high voltage "Hot Stick" voltmeter 
to determine if there was voltage present before he entered a high voltage cubicle.  He 
read the tags on the switch handle mechanism and apparently assumed that the fuse side 
of the disconnect was de-energized.  He also failed to read two signs on the front of the 
switch door that warn personnel of the "bottom fed" hookup of this switch.  In addition, 
he had not been instructed to work in sub-station 507 where the event occurred; his 
assigned work was downstream of the disconnect switch at substation 514.  A 
contributing cause was a defective door interlock on switch A5D, which did not prevent 
the door from being opened while the switch was in the cubicle.  The SSRL and Stanford 
Positron Electron Asymmetric Ring (SPEAR) were both in a shutdown at the time of this 
event.  Power was lost to the complex for about 2 hours (ORPS OAK--SU-SLAC-1992-
0028).
On January 21, 1993, vacuum technicians were filling a cryogenics bucket with liquid 
nitrogen (LN2) from a 100 liter dewar in the accelerator tunnel.  The valve on the dewar 
froze in the open position, so the technicians could not stop the nitrogen flow.  Shortly 
after the cryo bucket overflowed, the oxygen deficiency alarm system activated and the 
tunnel was promptly evacuated.  Upon arrival of the Engineering Operator In Charge 
(EOIC) and the Fire Department, the EOIC requested the Linac tunnel be evacuated from 
the collider injector development (CID) to S-4.  The Fire Department and the EOIC 
entered the tunnel and cleared the area.  No one was found in tunnel.  When the 100 liter 
dewar had emptied, the EOIC checked the area with a portable oxygen monitor and could 
find no regions less than 20% oxygen, including near the floor.  The EIOC reactivated the 
oxygen monitoring system and declared the area safe for entry.  The direct cause of the 
event was the liquid nitrogen dewar "freezing" in the open position.  The root cause of 
the valve sticking was water getting into the valve body and freezing when liquid 
nitrogen flows through the valve.  The dewar was stored outside and prior to being used 
there had been heavy rains that soaked the valve.  The lesson learned is that the dewar 
valves are susceptible to water contamination which can result in the valves "freezing" 
when liquid nitrogen cools the valve (ORPS OAK--SU-SLAC-1993-0001). 
On December 3, 1993, workers were disassembling a polarized gun.  A cold trap was 
placed in a cabinet during the disassembly.  The cold trap evolved nitrogen trifluoride as 
it warmed to room temperature.  Nitrogen trifluoride (NF3) was not typically condensed 
in the trap, it was present due to a cryosorption pump containing NF3 being processed.  
The building was evacuated as a precaution.  The root cause was the lack of a procedure 
for cleaning a cold trap that might be contaminated with material other than the normal 
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atmospheric gases encountered in typical operations.  The NF3 could pose a health threat, 
but only 400 cubic centimeters at atmospheric pressure were released.  Four workers 
were examined by the medical department as a precaution, but no injuries were reported 
(ORPS OAK--SU-SLAC-1993-0015). 
On February 19, 1994, the reset button on some water pumps for magnet cooling faulted.  
The faulted button caused the pumps to trip off line.  The magnet continued to operate 
and overheated, causing the epoxy to melt.  No one was injured in this event, but the cost 
to repair the magnet was $13k (ORPS OAK--SU-SLAC-1994-0002). 
On February 10, 1996, a fire started in a cable junction box.  The fire spread along pump 
power distribution cables, causing about $200k in damage to the facility.  The direct 
cause of the fire was breakdown of insulation in a high voltage terminal cabinet, which 
was caused by the entry of rainwater run off into the cabinet.  Heavy rains had saturated 
the ground and water was coming in to the SLAC buildings.  No one was injured in this 
fire event, but employees were exposed to smoke from the fire, and the accelerator had to 
be shut down for two weeks to conduct repairs (ORPS OAK--SU-SLAC-1996-0003).   
On March 6, 1996, a brazing retort in the Precision Assembly Shop malfunctioned and 
resulted in an explosion.  The retort shell was propelled to the roof and then fell back to 
the floor.  The operator had failed to properly evacuate the retort and backfill it with 
nitrogen.  The hydrogen purge was shorter than the specified 20 minutes.  The retort 
housing and shell were damaged but no employees were seriously injured; one of the two 
employees closest to the retort had temporary hearing loss and a minor shoulder injury 
(ORPS OAK--SU-SLAC-1996-0005).
On August 6, 1996, one of two electricians working for an electrical contractor sustained 
a broken leg and lacerations to the back of the head when a motor control cabinet that 
they were installing in a klystron alcove overturned.  Paramedics took the injured man to 
the local hospital.  The men were attempting to reposition the cabinet on a pallet jack by 
rotating it 90 degrees so they could move it through an aisle way.  As they rotated the 
cabinet, the pallet jack rocked and tilted; one edge of the cabinet slipped off the fork and 
it started to overturn.  The men tried to steady the cabinet but could not.  The electrician's 
pant leg got caught and trapped under the falling cabinet and he was knocked to the floor.  
Some damage did occur to the motor control cabinet but the damage had not been 
assessed at the time of the ORPS report.  The event did not disrupt SLAC beam line 
operations (ORPS OAK--SU-SLAC-1996-0008).
On March 26, 1997, an engineer was testing a prototype modulator design in a high 
voltage test cage in building 15 at SLAC.  Two other workers were present.  After turning 
off the high voltage the engineer neglected to actuate the shorting device used to 
discharge storage capacitors.  Because he had neglected to attach a test probe to the 
device he rushed to attach the probe.  While using two hands to secure the probe he 
discharged a capacitor through his hand to the other side of his body.  He also injured one 
hand by cutting it on the modulator chassis as he removed it.  He was examined by a 
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medical staff and was determined to have no injury except to his hand.  The root cause of 
this accident was failure to use proper safety procedures.  Safety procedures were not 
followed due to pressures to complete testing and design in a timely manner.  The test 
program was shut down for three hours as a result of this event (ORPS OAK--SU-SLAC-
1997-0005).
On April 24, 1997, a painter working for the Plant Engineering Department (PED) Paint 
Shop received minor injuries when he fell from a scaffold while painting the exterior wall 
of an electrical substation.  The painter had finished painting the east wall and was 
attempting to step from the scaffold platform on to an adjacent step ladder while still 
holding his roller extension in one hand.  As he placed his foot on the next-to-the-top step 
of the ladder, the ladder rocked and shifted causing the painter to loose his balance and 
fall to the pavement below, about 1.5 m.  Three electricians working in the next building 
heard the painter fall, one called the emergency phone number while the others went to 
the painter's aid.  The painter received first aid at the scene from SLAC Fire and Medical 
personnel and was then taken by paramedics to Stanford Hospital Emergency for 
treatment.  The painter suffered a bump on the head, sore left knee and ribs, and a sore 
right wrist.  He was released from the hospital at around noon the same day.  He missed 
one and a half days of work as a result of the accident.  The painter had failed to follow 
standard practice for the safe use of scaffolds and ladders (ORPS OAK--SU-SLAC-1997-
0007).
On January 27, 1998, a contract worker was pulling a cable into an energized 480 V 
Motor Control Center (MCC) unit for the B-factory BaBar detector in the Infrared 2 
support building 625.  The wire-way in the MCC, where the cable was being pulled in 
had been inspected by the foreman on the previous day, but he had failed to notice the 
energized bus bars and thought it was safe.  The worker, a journeyman electrician, was 
using a metal fish tape to pull the wire.  The metal fish tape touched the energized bus at 
480 V.  That caused an electric arc and tripped the main 480 V breaker.  The worker 
received an arc flash in his eyes.  He was wearing UV safety glasses and leather gloves.  
He was not injured, and was sent to the SLAC medical unit for examination as a 
precaution.  The B-Factory Safety Officer and the ES&H Electrical Safety Engineer 
reviewed the mishap.  The work was stopped.  The root cause of this occurrence was 
inattention to details.  The foreman checked the job a day before and did the job planning.  
Then he gave the job briefing to the electrician.  But he failed to notice the exposed hot 
bus underneath the cluster of wires.  If he had looked carefully with a flashlight, 
reviewers believed he would have noticed the hazard.  Then adequate precautions could 
have been taken and the incident would have been precluded.  The journeyman 
electrician also took for granted that there was no hazard, and was not paying attention to 
the work (ORPS OAK--SU-SLAC-1998-0001).   
On April 23, 1998, a subcontract employee reported that he was ascending a fixed metal 
ladder with a tool belt slung over his left shoulder and a laptop computer handle held 
between his left thumb and forefinger.  While holding onto the ladder with his left hand, 
he grasped the next rung with his right hand.  As he lifted his right foot, the weight of the 
tools and laptop shifted.  He lost his balance and grip on the ladder rung.  The individual 
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shed the tools and laptop, to no avail.  He fell 2 m (6.5 feet) from the ladder and sustained 
a fracture to the right femoral bone and a hairline fracture to the L2 disk in his lower 
back.  At 1058 hours on April 23, 1998, a 911 Operator received a call requesting 
medical assistance at SLAC Building 120 of the SSRL.  The subcontractor stopped work.  
The employee was released from the hospital on April 28, 1998 at 0930 hours.  The 
employee knew climbing a ladder in this manner was not safe and against procedures, but 
he had climbed with this same equipment many times without accident, so he believed it 
was a low risk act (ORPS OAK--SU-SLAC-1998-0002).  It is notable that this event 
typifies the issue of worker risk-taking attitudes.  The worker in question believed that he 
was not taking a great risk since he had climbed the ladder improperly many times 
without any adverse results.  Since there seemed to be no adverse consequences to his 
ladder climbing with tools and laptop computer, he had adopted an unsafe, time-saving 
approach as his standard approach, and in this instance he experienced the hazard of 
falling.  He dropped the laptop computer and tools so that he could try to stop himself 
from falling, and we realize how desperate the worker must have been to allow a 
computer he was responsible for to drop ~ 2 m.  With any new facility startup, there is the 
opportunity to ingrain proper work attitudes.  Perhaps training and enlightenment, or 
enforcement, or both, are needed, but the new ITER facility should start operation 
without any worker risk-taking habits. 
On May 19, 1999, high radiation was noted around a klystron.  During a routine radiation 
survey in the Klystron Test Lab on May 19, 1999, an Operational Health Physics 
representative encountered a high radiation reading near the collector of a new 5045 
klystron, operating in Test Stand 9.  After checking instrumentation, the radiation level 
was found to be greater than 2 rem/h on contact.  The stream of radiation was 
approximately 2.3 m (7.5 feet) off the ground and the direction of the stream was towards 
the West wall of the Test Lab away from the walkways.  The high radiation level was the 
result of a missing piece of lead shielding (known as the horseshoe) on the klystron 
where the cooling water exits the collector.  The test stand was shut down, the shielding 
put into place, a new survey showed normal radiation levels and processing continued.  
The klystron had been installed on May 14, 1999 and processed in voltage per Klystron 
Test Note number 5 at a 1 microsecond pulse width.  On May 18th the testing reached 
350 kV at 180 Hz.  The test technician performed a radiation survey at this time.  His 
survey showed no unusual radiation dose rates around the klystron.  The test technicians’ 
primary dosimeter readings were less than the minimum detectable.  The direct cause of 
the radiation field hazard was a missing horseshoe shaped piece of lead shielding (painted 
yellow to stand out).  The shielding had been overlooked during installation of the 
klystron.  There were no injuries, the two test technicians at test stand #9 had personal 
dosimetry, and those dosimeters read no whole body exposure for this time period (ORPS 
OAK--SU-SLAC-1999-0003). 
On September 16, 2000, a smoke alarm sounded in a section of the PEP-II storage ring 
(PR04) while the colliding beam program for the BaBar detector was operating.  The 
stored beams were dumped and the region was put into controlled access.  The 
firefighters were escorted into the ring tunnel by the chief operator on duty.  After a 
couple of minutes of searching, they found a small fire on some isolated cables that 
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service the Longitudinal Feedback Kicker (LFBK) for the Low-Energy Ring (LER).  The 
fire was put out with a hand-held carbon dioxide extinguisher.  There was some ancillary 
damage from the fire to a water hose.  The hose was replaced shortly after discovery. 
There was no other damage to the accelerator or other support systems.  The fire was 
caused when an RF coupler box overheated, igniting the coaxial cable.  Installing the 
very early smoke detection apparatus (VESDA) system proved to be very valuable in 
alerting personnel to this small fire before more damage could occur.  No one was injured 
in this fire event (OAK--SU-SLAC-2000-0005). 
On July 12, 2001, the Area Radiation Monitor in Building 44 actuated, causing an 
audible alarm.  The Test Stand #2 (TS2) operator helped the person working on test stand 
3 (TS3) by surveying a Research & Development (R&D) device being tested on TS3.  
The TS2 operator found excessive X-ray output (~1.9 rem/h [19 mSv/h] at 30 cm from 
the collector) when the tube voltage was at 150 kV.  The person working on the TS3 was 
an engineer from a company involved in the design of the R&D device.  He had a visitor 
badge and had been operating the device by himself without escort.  The operator asked 
the engineer to stop the operation.  Meanwhile, the Klystron Radiation Safety Officer 
(KRSO) was informed about the event. It was noticed that no lead shielding was in place 
around the collector at TS3.  The operators later stacked lead bricks around the collector.  
During that work, the KRSO informed the responsible physicist for TS3 that the test 
could not be restarted without first getting the safety documents completed and approved 
by the KRSO.  However, no further administrative control measures were taken and at 
this point the engineer from the company still was not properly informed of the relevant 
safety procedures.  The next day, Friday July 13, the engineer was again operating on the 
test stand when the Operational Health Physics Field Operations Group Leader came by 
around 1500 hours in his walkthrough of the Building 44.  The Group Leader found that 
the engineer was not trained and qualified to operate the TS3.  The Group Leader 
immediately asked him to stop the testing and obtained both his dosimeter and the area 
dosimeter to check their accumulated doses (fortunately, both were found to be zero).  
The testing was halted until a full review could be completed.  There were both specific 
violations of procedures, and inadequate procedures for administrative control of the 
Klystron Test Stand modulators.  There was also a lack of communication and 
enforcement of existing policies (ORPS OAK--SU-SLAC-2001-0003).
On August 28, 2001, an employee of a subcontractor to SLAC was using an electrical 
grinder with an abrasive wheel to grind on a concrete shielding wall.  The grinding 
operation generated a heavy cloud of dust. A SLAC Industrial Hygienist (IH) conducted a 
twenty-minute area sample for particulate materials, and crystalline components of the 
concrete dust.  The area sample results indicated that the area near the worker exceeded 
the Occupational Safety Health Administration (OSHA) Permissible Exposure Limit 
(PEL) for total silica particulates by a factor of four times with an estimated job length of 
fifty minutes.  Based on the twenty-minute area sample it is likely that the worker may 
have been overexposed to silica dust.  The worker was wearing a disposable dust mask 
respirator.  While the Prework Hazard Analysis did provide for the subcontractor to wear 
dust masks, there were no details with respect to the sanding of concrete as a step in the 
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work process.  The root cause of the incident was inadequate work planning for sanding 
of concrete on the part of the subcontractor.  The Pre-Work Hazard Analysis lacked 
sufficient definition of the work, and the safety procedures defining the personal 
protective equipment (PPE) were not appropriate to the hazard of the work process.  
Long-term exposure to silica dust can cause a variety of respiratory diseases including 
silicosis, pulmonary fibrosis, and emphysema. Short-term exposure to silica dust has not 
been found to produce significant adverse health effects. If an overexposure occurred 
(since an area sample was taken and not a personal air monitoring sample the exposure to 
the employee can't be established precisely), it is believed that it occurred over a 
relatively short period of time (while the length of exposure can not be established 
precisely, best information is that it was on the order of hours) (ORPS OAK--SU-SLAC-
2001-0004).
Between 0840 and 0847 hours on June 18, 2002, a SLAC subcontractor employee 
sustained a left elbow compound fracture and right knee hematoma after falling off an 
extension ladder.  It is estimated that the individual fell approximately six and one-half 
feet to the ground.  The individual was seen lying on the ground at approximately 0847 
hours by a SLAC Technical Division employee.  The SLAC employee spoke with the 
individual and then called an Emergency 911 Operator called at approximately 0851 
hours.  The individual was transported to Stanford University Medical Center by the Palo 
Alto Fire Department.  The individual was released from the hospital on June 20, 2002.  
While preparing to apply yellow paint to a Jib crane at Sector 20 of the SLAC Klystron 
Gallery, the subcontractor employee placed the top rails of a 4.8 m (16-foot) extension 
ladder onto the web (mid-section) of the crane's boom.  The boom was in its full electric 
stop position next to the Gallery wall.  Even with the boom in this location, sufficient 
force can be applied to move the boom closer to the wall and beyond the ‘electrical 
disconnect closed’ position.  In this incident, force was applied to the boom causing the 
boom and mast to rotate towards the Gallery wall.  The force was supplied by the 
individual's ascent.  When the individual's upper body approached the top of the ladder, 
sufficient force was generated to make the boom move closer to the wall.  The individual 
stated that he realized that the rails had slid off the boom.  The ladder fell towards the 
ground, striking the wall.  The individual rode the ladder down approximately four feet 
until he fell off the ladder and struck the ground.  The root cause was ruled to be 
inattention to detail (ORPS OAK--SU-SLAC-2002-0004). 
At approximately 0905 hours on August 20, 2002, a SLAC employee sustained a right 
shoulder dislocation and fracture after tripping and falling forward into a fixed ladder 
access opening within the Region 4 Positron Electron Project (PEP) utility shaft 4BU.  
The individual's right shoulder struck a landing, which is located next to the access 
opening, and his left foot caught the rungs of the ladder.  The individual fell 
approximately four feet and did not fall completely through the opening.  The injured 
employee was observed in the aforementioned position by a coworker who had just 
turned around after the incident occurred.  The coworker helped the injured employee out 
of the opening and drove him to the SLAC Medical Department, who in turn contacted 
the Palo Alto Fire Department for transportation to Stanford University Medical Center.  
The individual was treated and released from the hospital on August 20, 2002.  He was 
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instructed to return to the hospital on August 22, 2002 to have a metal plate inserted in 
his shoulder.  The individual was required to stay overnight for this procedure and was 
released from the hospital on August 23, 2002.  The course of events before the accident 
were that after assisting another employee with changing light bulbs within the Region 4 
PEP utility shaft, the SLAC employee took a broom and reached overhead to sweep away 
cobwebs that had accumulated within the shaft.  As the employee swept, he also walked 
around the confines of the landing.  The employee stated that he tripped and fell towards 
the fixed ladder access opening.  There were no objects on the floor that contributed to 
the fall.  The fall was on a level surface.  The direct cause of this incident was due to an 
inadequate work environment.  As defined by OSHA, a fixed ladder access opening shall 
be guarded by a standard railing with toe board on all exposed sides (except at the 
entrance to the opening), with the passage through the railing either provided with a 
swinging gate or so offset that a person cannot walk directly into the opening.  The fixed 
ladder access opening in PEP utility shaft 4BU was not equipped with a swinging gate 
nor was it offset.  If a gate had been present, the employee would not have fallen to the 
floor nor entered the fixed ladder access opening.  A contributing cause of this incident 
was inattention to detail.  While performing work overhead and looking up, the employee 
was walking.  If the employee had been standing still while performing the overhead task, 
then it is unlikely that he would have tripped.  The root cause of this incident is that the 
OSHA standard was not brought to the attention of management prior to, or during, the 
construction of the PEP utility shaft (ORPS OAK--SU-SLAC-2002-0009).  
At approximately 1700 hours on September 16, 2002, a SLAC employee and a Stanford 
University student experienced a near miss incident after a 1.04 by 1.8 m (41 by 72 inch) 
by 0.32 cm (one-eighth inch) thick masonite (a type of wood fiber board, like plywood) 
window covering fell 6 m (20 feet) to the floor.  The covering landed on the floor and 
within 30 cm (one foot) of the SLAC employee.  There were no injuries sustained in this 
incident, which is described as a near miss incident.  The masonite was held in place over 
a window with wood screws that had been screwed through the masonite and into the 
aluminum window frame.  Over time, the screws had loosened and eventually the 
masonite fell to the ground.  The staff resolved to use sheet metal screws on aluminum 
window frames in the future (ORPS OAK--SU-SLAC-2002-0010).   
On July 9, 2003, at 0006 hours, a fire broke out in the Next Linear Collider Test 
Accelerator (NLCTA) Station 1 klystron high voltage modulator.  The fire was caused by 
an electrical failure inside the pulse forming network cabinet.  The interlock system de-
energized the unit within a few minutes, but the fire continued to burn.  Within 5 minutes, 
the fire alarm signaled the fire department.  They responded to the fire.  By 0120 hours, 
the fire was extinguished.  All of the equipment inside the pulse forming network cabinet 
was destroyed.  Some support equipment and cables above the modulator were damaged.  
During the fire, a nearby water hose was ruptured from the heat and 0.75 m3 (200 
gallons) of water spilled into the 2.5 m3 (650 gallon) oil tank and the associated 
secondary containment tank upon which the modulator sits.  Approximately 0.37 m3 (100 
gallons) of displaced oil spilled onto the floor around the modulator.  The oil remained 
confined in the building.  The repair of Station 1 was estimated to require about 2 
months.  During this time, one of the other NLCTA modulators will be used to provide 
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Radio Frequency (RF) for accelerator structure development, minimizing the 
programmatic impact.  The cost of the repair is expected to be about $30k.  No one was 
injured in this event (ORPS OAK--SU-SLAC-2003-0002). 
On August 20, 2003, at approximately 1615 hours, a transformer failed in Variable 
Voltage Substation 11 (VV11), causing a loss of power to 16 klystrons in the linac and an 
interruption to the scheduled accelerator program.  A SLAC security guard reported 
seeing smoke coming from the Sector 21 Klystron Gallery alcove that houses the 
transformer.  The on-site Palo Alto Fire Department crew and SLAC electricians 
responded to the scene.  After the electricians had confirmed that all power was off to the 
substation, the transformer cabinet was opened, revealing that the insulation was burning 
at the top of the coils.  The fire crew extinguished the flames.  Approximately seven 
hours later, accelerator operations resumed at a reduced beam energy, using only the 
remaining VVS's to power the linac.  On August 23, a replacement transformer was 
installed and full power operation was restored.  The transformer that failed had been 
installed specifically to test whether the long-term performance of a dry-type, fixed-ratio 
transformer would be satisfactory in the SLAC linac application, and whether others of 
this kind should be procured for use as replacements in other aging linac substations.  
This incident demonstrated that this dry-type transformer lacked the robustness required 
for long-term reliability in this application.  The klystrons in the SLAC linear accelerator 
are powered by sixteen variable-voltage substations (VVS's), which were installed more 
than 25 years ago as part of the original accelerator project.  The VVS's are distributed 
along the Klystron Gallery, one for each sector-pair, plus an additional one for the 
injector area.  Each VVS transforms 12 kV input power to approximately 600 volts, and 
distributes this power to the klystron modulators.  As the name implies, the output 
voltage is variable and can be remotely controlled through the accelerator control system.  
In January 2001, the original variable-ratio transformer was removed from VV11 to 
replace a failed transformer in another sector-pair that was considered more critical to the 
accelerator program at the time.  A refurbished fixed-ratio transformer, which had 
previously been procured as a candidate for replacing variable transformers, was then 
installed in VV11.  The fixed-ratio transformer was chosen because it would provide a 
practical test of whether satisfactory accelerator operation could be achieved with a less 
expensive fixed-ratio transformer without the variable-voltage feature.  The fixed-ratio 
transformer was a dry-type design, in contrast to the original transformers, which are 
housed in oil-filled tanks.  Dry-type, fixed ratio transformers of this kind cost 
substantially less than the oil-filled variable type, but the long-term reliability of the dry-
type design had not been demonstrated.  The accelerator has been operated at 30 Hz for 
most of the 31-month period since the dry-type transformer was installed.  At the time of 
the failure, the accelerator was operating at 120 Hz and all sixteen klystrons were running 
at full power.  This transformer had been run in this full-load condition for a cumulative 
total of about eight months before it failed.  Although the exact failure mechanism is 
unknown, it appears likely that a turn-to-turn short appeared while the transformer was 
running at full power this would have caused intense local heating, leading to ignition of 
the insulating material between the windings.  This experience suggests that a more 
conservatively rated transformer is needed for reliable 120 Hz operation in the future.  No 
one was injured in this event, but if the guard had not provided such timely notification, 
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the fire would have burned longer and produced more smoke that would have increased 
the hazard to plant staff and firefighters (ORPS OAK--SU-SLAC-2003-0003). 
The DOE accident investigation reports were also surveyed for any severe accident 
events that might have occurred at SLAC.  Two events were found in the recent past.  
These events are described below. 
On January 28, 2003 at approximately 0930 hours, a SLAC systems engineer received 
head injuries requiring hospitalization after falling from an A-frame, 3.6-m-tall fiberglass 
stepladder in building 514 of the SSRL.  The employee had been searching for nitrogen 
leaks on the equipment in building 514; leaks were believed to be the cause of excessive 
nitrogen blanketing gas usage in the klystron transformers (nitrogen is used instead of air, 
to reduce moisture buildup in the ullage above the transformer insulating oil).  The 
engineer had walked past two electricians as he entered the building.  Less than a minute 
later, the two electricians, who were nearby on unrelated work, heard a ‘thud’ and found 
the engineer on the concrete floor between the ladder and the power supplies.  The 
employee was transported and admitted to the hospital.  SLAC immediately stopped 
work at the immediate location of this incident.  The stop work did not affect activities 
related to the accident investigation or operation of a variable voltage transformer.  There 
were no eyewitnesses to the accident and the systems engineer does not remember any 
events related to the fall.  The Board concluded from the results of its limited engineering 
evaluation that the Systems Engineer could have moved from the ladder while attempting 
to access the top of the variable voltage transformer (VVT) section of the old Radio 
Frequency High Voltage Power Supply (RFHVPS) or that the Systems Engineer 
encountered circumstances that caused him to move off of the ladder while climbing up 
or down (ORPS OAK--SU-SLAC-2003-0001).  The accident investigation report stated 
that the original design of the RFHVPS could develop a problem that could cause the 
variable voltage transformers to overheat and violently disassemble, posing a shrapnel 
hazard to nearby personnel.  The RFHVPSs were fenced to maintain a personnel 
exclusion area, keeping personnel at a safe distance.  The cause of the problem was 
identified and controlled to prevent recurrence.  While the problem has been controlled, 
the exclusion area remained in effect.  The systems engineer was working alone and there 
were no eyewitnesses.  The Board concluded that based on the evidence the engineer lost 
his footing when he stepped from the step ladder to the elevated surface of the RFHVPS.  
The ladder was not inspected before use, it was not in good condition, and the engineer 
stepped sideways off the ladder (DOE, 2003).   
On October 11, 2004, a subcontractor electrician was injured at SLAC (DOE, 2004).  The 
electrician was installing a 30 ampere circuit breaker in an energized 480 V electrical 
circuit breaker panel in the A sector of the klystron gallery.  During the installation, an 
electrical arc flash occurred at 1115 hours.  The arc flash ignited the electrician’s clothing 
and the pressure blew him away from the electrical panel.  A laborer, who was present to 
assist the electrician, was standing behind the electrician.  The laborer was knocked to the 
ground by the arc flash pressure burst.  A nearby electrician, who was working on an 
unrelated task, rushed to assist the electrician.  He smothered the flames on the man’s 
clothing.  When the laborer revived, the rescuer electrician sent him to call for help.  The 
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Palo Alto fire department emergency medical services personnel arrived at 1120 hours, 
stabilized the victim, and transported by ambulance him to a burn center hospital [a 
helicopter was sought first, but the closest available helicopter was too distant; the 
ambulance offered the shortest travel time].  The injured electrician had third degree 
burns on his face, chest, and legs, and second degree burns on his arms; approximately 
50% of his body was burned.  This accident was analyzed by an investigation board.  The 
normal working procedure would be to mechanically connect the new circuit breaker, 
then make the electrical connections.  The electrician was making the electrical phase 
connections first; he had screwed down two of the electrical connections and was making 
the third connection, to phase A, when the accident occurred.  Apparently the third screw 
was not threading and the electrician pushed the screwdriver with extra force.  Under the 
extra force, the phase A bus jumper bar was moved toward the phase B stabilizing clip, 
compressing the jumper bar’s rubber insulation.  This reduced distance and compressed 
insulation allowed a phase-to-phase short circuit and arc flash.  The injured electrician 
was not using insulated, voltage rated tools, nor was he wearing fire retardant clothing, 
natural fiber (non-melting) underwear, safety glasses, or a switching hood with face 
shield.  These are the protective clothing items, along with voltage-rated gloves, that are 
specified in the US National Electrical Code for working on energized systems.  The 
accident investigators could not determine why the subcontractor employees were 
working without proper personal protective equipment, without a pre-work hazard 
analysis document, without an electrical hot work permit, and without a job hazard 
analysis and mitigation analysis document.  The board concluded that unsafe conditions 
and operations had become an accepted part of the everyday way of doing business at 
SLAC.  Some divisions and departments at SLAC were not following the DOE Integrated 
Safety Management approach; operations concerns were placed above safety concerns.  
SLAC management placed high emphasis on the need to show scientific achievement in 
their competition with other high energy physics laboratories for funding from the DOE.  
This upper management emphasis translated to employees as ‘just get the job done’ 
(DOE, 2004).  The author notes that blemished safety records and flagrant violation of 
the DOE safety directives are detriments when seeking DOE funding.  In general, the 
DOE community responds to safety issues with replacement of the operating contractor 
or the senior management of a facility or site. 
These ORPS and accident investigation events have demonstrated that there are hazards 
specific to the type of facility, such as cryogens, and electrical shock and arcs from the 
many uses of electricity at the accelerator (particularly the klystrons).  Other events were 
a number of fires, mostly electrical in origin, personnel exposed to chemicals, a few 
explosions, and several events outlining that strict rules regarding radiation safety are not 
always adhered to at the facility.  There were several falls discussed, and a one event of 
being struck by an object, and nearly being struck by a falling object.  The accelerator 
personnel are noted to not always follow procedures and subcontract personnel do not 
always follow procedures nor recognize the hazards of the facility.  The subcontractors 
also do not always follow industry good practices, and sometimes do not exhibit ‘skill of 
the craft’ knowledge that would prevent accidents.  The permanent staff members do not 
always provide adequate oversight of the subcontract work. 
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3.2  Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory 
Parts of this description of the Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory (FNAL) have 
come from the history page of the lab’s internet site.  FNAL is located near Batavia, 
Illinois, outside of Chicago. Initial construction began in December 1968.  The original 
accelerator was composed of several sections.  Protons are first accelerated by a 183-m 
linear accelerator that sent 200 MeV protons into a Booster ring (287-m circumference), 
which accelerated the protons to 8 GeV.  Then the proton batches entered the 6.4-km 
circumference Main Ring synchrotron, where they were accelerated to 150 GeV.  These 
accelerators are situated on a 6,800-acre site and were the original segments of the 
laboratory, completed in 1971.  As a later addition, some of the protons from the Main 
Ring could be sent to a metal target to produce anti-protons.  The anti-protons are stored 
in a magnetic accumulator.  In 1983, the Energy Doubler, later named the Tevatron, was 
completed (Johnson, 1987).  This is another 6.4-km ring, situated in the same tunnel 
below the Main Ring.  The Tevatron was the first accelerator to use superconducting 
magnets; the original Main Ring used resistive magnets.  The Tevatron accepted 
150 GeV protons and the anti-protons, counter currently accelerating them to 
~1,000 GeV (1 TeV) and allowed the two types of particles to collide in the region of a 
collider detector.  The Main Injector ring is tangent to the Tevatron; it is another 6.4-km 
ring that was completed in 1998 and became operational in 1999.  The Main Injector was 
a 6-year, $230M construction project.  The Main Injector accelerates protons into a nickel 
target to create anti-protons.  Above the Main Injector is another ring, the Anti-proton 
Recycler, which stores anti-protons from the Tevatron for reuse.  The Main Injector sends 
both protons and anti-protons to the Tevatron, where the countercurrent beams are 
collided.  The Main Injector and the Tevatron magnets are liquid helium cooled, so 
FNAL has a very large helium cryogenic plant on site.  That plant is called the Central 
Helium Liquefier and it is one of the largest cryogenic plants in the US.  FNAL employs 
a total of about 2,100 staff members and has an annual budget on the order of $300M.  It 
is one of the largest accelerator facilities in the world, and the largest in the US. 
FNAL was searched in the DOE CAIRS and ORPS databases.  The data in CAIRS is 
summarized in the lost work day and lost work case plots given in Figure 5 and injury 
graphs in Figure 6.  In Figure 5, lump construction is construction work contracted on a 
lump sum fee basis, and cost construction is contracted on an actual cost-plus award fee 
basis.  The actual construction work is the same for either type of contract.  The 1990’s 
peaks in construction work were likely due to initiation of the Main Injector construction 
task.  The reason for the peak in the 2000’s is probably the construction work for 
additions to the Main Injector.  The FNAL permanent staff graph shows an overall 
downward trend over the time period.  Reasons for service contractor peaks in 1998 and 
2002 are not known.  Service personnel can be technicians, computer support, custodians, 
laundry, food services, laborers, and other workers.  It is possible that the construction 
work required more on-site support services.  The total for all scientific research in the 
DOE is presented later in this chapter and comparisons show that FNAL has modest or 
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Figure 5.  Plots of FNAL Industrial Safety Performance from 1993-2003. 
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Figure 6.  FNAL Industrial Injury Distributions from 1981-2003. 
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similar rates compared to the totals for all DOE research and development work.  FNAL 
did not have any work-related fatalities in the 1993-2003 time period, nor were any 
fatalities noted in the previous DOE operating experience documentation. 
Some accelerator operations issues that relate to safety have been discussed in the 
literature (Mau, 2001; Cossairt, 2000).  The Tevatron’s superconducting magnets have 
small cross sectional current flow paths, yet over 4 kA current flows through each 
magnet.  If a magnet transitions to normal resistance (i.e., the magnet quenches due to 
beam scraping, liquid helium interruption, etc.), the magnet experiencing normal 
resistance heating from this high current can result in magnet destruction.  A magnet 
takes about one week to replace.  The replacement is a time-consuming maintenance task 
and is costly.  Magnet replacement also places workers in the accelerator tunnel, where 
they are at risk due to cryogen leaks from other magnets that are depowered but not 
warmed during the replacement outage.  Because of the sensitivity of the magnets to 
quenching, the staff has installed quench protection and beam abort systems.  The quench 
protection system depowers a magnet if the magnet begins to warm up from cryogenic 
temperature, and the beam abort system quickly sends the accelerator beam to a beam 
dump if the beam has scraped a wall so that perhaps the magnets near the scrape location 
will not receive too much heating.  These active systems are used to limit magnet 
damage, which in turn limits personnel exposure to the accelerator tunnel.  If personnel 
must enter the tunnel, the tunnel has been equipped with oxygen deficiency hazard 
(ODH) alarms in the form of fixed oxygen monitors.  These monitors are located 
throughout the beam enclosures.  Each worker who enters the tunnel is required to take a 
personal oxygen monitor that will alarm if the oxygen concentration drops below 19.5% 
by volume.  Each worker is also required to carry a small tank that will give them 
5 minutes of breathing air, to be used for escape in case of a cryogen leak.  Workers must 
also follow a mandatory FNAL two-man rule for all tunnel accesses.  All workers must 
be certified for tunnel work, with appropriate training and medical approvals to use 
breathing air tanks.  Any heavy work, such as moving magnets, in the tunnel has strict 
procedures to avoid impacting and rupturing vacuum or cryogenic lines.  In addition, the 
tunnel staff and the Fire Department have been trained in proper response to an ODH 
emergency.  Zinkann (2001) echoed the cryogenic safety concerns, noting that cryogenic 
lines of helium and nitrogen are routed through occupied work areas and the lines carry 
large quantities of cryogen.  A cryogen release from a pipe break presents both an 
asphyxiation hazard by displacing air and also an egress hazard.  The egress hazard 
comes from condensation in the room air becoming so dense that people cannot see 
escape routes through the fog.  Zinkann noted that escape lanes have been painted on the 
floor at his facility to assist in guiding people to exits.  There are also room ODH 
monitors connected to an alarm system; if an ODH condition is measured then loud 
claxons and flashing lights will alert personnel to evacuate the area.  Cadwallader (2003) 
has noted that sometimes false alarms occur with oxygen monitors, so voting logic 
among monitors will preclude most false evacuations. 
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Mau (2001) also discussed some other worker safety issues at FNAL.  The main tunnel is 
6.4-km circumference, it is too long to walk, especially when carrying tools and 
equipment, or replacement parts, etc.  Too much time is consumed for transporting 
equipment or for an operator to reach an interlock, especially when the experimenters are 
waiting for beam.  Therefore, operators, technicians, and craftsmen use electric golf carts 
to drive in the ring.  FNAL performed a safety analysis regarding cart usage.  Fixed 
bumpers were added at vulnerable areas to prevent golf carts from colliding with 
cryogenic and vacuum lines.  This was a wise precaution because of the potential 
frequency of occurrence.  Cadwallader (1997) has cited some lift truck operator failure 
rates on the order of 1E-03/demand for a collision during a lift truck task.  A golf cart has 
some advantages over a lift truck, such as the operator has direct line of sight forward, the 
cart is more maneuverable than a lift truck, and it is likely that the light weight cart can 
stop more easily than the much heavier lift truck.  If lift truck experience can be used, to a 
first approximation, as an upper bound for golf cart performance, and lift trucks in 
industrial environments (warehouses, manufacturing plants, etc.) experience monthly 
collisions, then collision barriers are an absolute necessity in the accelerator tunnel to 
protect sensitive equipment and cryogenic pipe lines.  While golf carts have better 
visibility than lift trucks, and the tunnel is a single, more predictable path than warehouse 
aisles or a factory floor, cart drivers can still be distracted by communication devices, 
pedestrians, parts or equipment placed in the aisle, condensation fog from venting 
cryogen, time pressure from tight schedules, etc.   
Mau (2001) discussed another worker risk issue, the satellite cryogenic stations that cool 
and pump liquid helium to parts of the Tevatron.  These satellite stations are necessary to 
provide cryogen where needed, but these stations present an operations challenge because 
they add more rotating equipment in the form of compressors and expansion engines that 
require constant attention and maintenance.  Thus, the maintenance teams spend 
significant time near the cryogenic equipment for adjustments and repairs.  When the 
workers are in proximity they are at risk of cryogen exposure.  Another issue for the 
operators is that FNAL is very susceptible to power glitches and outages.  If the Central 
Helium Liquefier equipment is not restarted within ~30 minutes of a site-wide power 
glitch or outage, then the accelerator is down for a week to purify and recool the ring.  
Thunderstorms – often accompanied by lightning that can cause power interruptions – 
have a significant operational impact on FNAL.  Zankann (2001) also echoed the cryogen 
production system susceptibility to power glitches.  If the cryogenic equipment is not 
operating to re-condense boiloff vapor, the pressure in the cryogenic system quickly 
increases and pressure relief valves lift to vent the vapor to protect the system from 
overpressure.  While necessary to protect the system, losing cryogenic gas is costly and 
impacts the operational availability.  There are also personnel safety concerns with 
venting.  If a pressure relief valve fails to operate or develops a freeze plug, the cryogen 
vapor overpressure could breach the system and possibly vent in occupied areas.  If the 
pressure relief valve operates correctly but the prevailing wind at the time of the release 
moves the cryogen to building air intakes, the gas could displace oxygen in a building.  
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Air intakes should be located away from loading docks, truck and rail receiving areas, the 
cryoplant, and any emergency power generation equipment.  The noise of venting is also 
significant; workers need ear protection if they must remain near the high noise 
environment of venting stacks. 
Cossairt (2000) discussed some of the ‘ordinary’ and ‘novel’ occupational hazards of a 
new muon facility at Fermilab.  The ordinary hazards included high current electrical 
circuits for the magnets; these require means to effectively lock out power supplies so 
that the electrical hazard is controlled.  RF generation and distribution equipment is 
extensively used, so engineering and administrative controls to limit exposures would be 
required.  Large numbers of cables in cable trays would be used, so the fire protection 
concerns are large.  Long tunnels present egress concerns, medical response concerns, 
and fire response concerns.  Moving and aligning large, heavy components presents a 
need to include design considerations that facilitate ease of movement and prevention of 
injuries.  The novel occupational hazards were the large scale use of cryogens in a deep 
underground facility, requiring a provision to release cryogen to the surface both in 
normal operations and in the event of magnet quenches.  Engineering practices should 
eliminate the concern for ODH.  Another novel hazard is that liquid hydrogen was chosen 
for the coolant of a neutrino source; the use of a flammable cryogen poses additional 
hazards than the magnet coolant.  Bubble chamber experts were called upon to enhance 
the safety of the cooling system design.  Other novel hazards were the depth and slope of 
the muon tunnel.  The egress points were at the ends of the tunnel; one egress was 
ordinary and the other was much deeper, so the design called for an emergency egress 
shaft with an elevator.  A ‘safe room’ was also planned to provide a safe haven in case 
workers could not reach an exit shaft.  The steep slope presents unique hazards.  Design 
consideration was given to making the floor surface sufficiently rough to provide good 
traction for workers.  Gutters were provided to drain seepage water to the sump pits at the 
lower end.  Some type of “speed bump” or other means to retard the downhill movement 
of rolling items, such as unrestrained equipment, was to be included in the design.  
Regular tie-down points for heavy items of equipment were provided.  Using gutters in a 
spiral design had been considered, so the gutters drain water and regularly cross the 
tunnel, serving to direct any rolling items toward the tunnel walls.
FNAL has suffered some large losses and injury events over its 35-year lifetime.  Atomic 
Energy Commission and DOE documents were searched to compile the major 
occupational injury events.  Brief descriptions of these events are given below.   
On June 16, 1969, a construction carpenter was fatally injured when he fell 3.5 m through 
a floor opening to a concrete floor the next level down.  The carpenter fell through an 
opening that was to be the site of a future stairwell.  The temporary cover had been 
positioned over the opening, but responders noted that it had been removed.  No one in 
the area had seen the cover removed, nor did anyone see the carpenter fall.  The carpenter 
died from basal skull fracture on impact (WASH, 1975).  Another carpenter fell from 
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height on April 9, 1970.  A barn at the laboratory site was being converted into storage 
space for construction materials and equipment.  A ceiling of Styrofoam panels was being 
constructed on the underside of the joists in the barn.  A carpenter fell from the second 
floor joist level through the Styrofoam ceiling to the barn’s concrete floor 2.75 m below.  
The carpenter died approximately 11 hours later from brain injuries and hemorrhage 
resulting from the fall (WASH, 1975). 
On January 10, 1973, a subcontractor employee was fatally injured.  The employee was 
attempting to start an earth compactor located in a trench at the FNAL site.  A four-wheel 
drive vehicle was driven to the edge of the excavation trench to provide a jump start for 
the earth compactor.  After the jumper cables were attached, the vehicle rolled forward 
into the trench and pinned the employee against the earth compactor.  The employee died 
approximately 6 hours later from his injuries (WASH, 1975).   
On June 15, 1973, a roof fire occurred.  A fuel oil and tar fire occurred during 
construction of the East Tower of the Central Laboratory and high rise office building.  
Roofers were preparing to start up an oil-fired roofing tar kettle when vapors from an oil 
leak in one kettle ignited and the fire spread to the other tar kettles and across the newly 
installed 195 m2 roof surface.  Fortunately, no one was injured.  The contractor was 
responsible for repairs to the roof (WASH, 1975). 
On December 26, 1973, a fire began in polyurethane foam insulation in a beam tunnel 
that was under construction (WASH, 1975).  The fire caused $163k in damage to the 
Meson Line Detector building.  The cause of the fire was probably a spark or slag from 
welding operations in a corrugated metal tube that ignited the insulation outside of the 
tube.  The burning insulation produced much smoke and there was concern that the 
smoke had damaged electrical equipment in the building.  Fortunately, there were no 
personnel injuries. 
A severe thunderstorm occurred on September 12-13, 1978 and caused a lengthy power 
outage.  The sump pumps in underground facilities were inoperable due to the power 
outage and consequent flooding resulted in extensive equipment damage.  The storm 
wind and lightning also caused other damage, with a damage total of $140k (DOE, 1980).  
No one was injured. 
There were several industrial safety events in 1982.  On January 10, there was a period of 
unusually cold weather, below – 40°C.  A propane heater that was being used to provide 
supplemental heat stopped working because the fuel froze.  The cold then damaged two 
vacuum pump casings, cracking them.  No one was injured.  On February 20, the cooling 
water to a vacuum pump froze because the building’s heating, ventilating, and air 
conditioning unit overheated and then failed.  The pump’s cooling water froze and the 
vacuum pump motor burned out.  On August 30, 1982, a magnet lift was under way at the 
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lab.  The crane’s choker strap was off center during the lift and a magnet was dropped.  
There was $3k in damage but no one was injured (DOE, 1984).   
In 1987, perhaps the most consequential fire in FNAL history occurred.  The fire in the 
Wide Band Laboratory resulted in a property loss and cleanup cost of greater than $1M, 
and a programmatic delay of several weeks while amelioration activities were carried out 
(DOE, 1987).  On October 3, 1987, at approximately 0145 hours, a fire was discovered in 
the Wide Band Laboratory; the accelerator was not operating.  The fire involved four 
particle detectors, the hadron calorimeter, the inner electromagnetic calorimeter, a 
hodoscope, and a proportional wire chamber.  A misaligned ribbon cable connector in the 
dynode sum box of the inner electromagnetic calorimeter caused an overcurrent in the 
ribbon cable, which in turn led to overheating and ignition of the cable insulation.  The 
dynode sum box fire spread to several cable runs and to the other three diagnostic 
detectors.  Five automatic fire sprinklers near the ceiling activated; they did not 
extinguish the fire but did prevent fire spread.  The Wide Band lab was being used to 
study quarks.  The FNAL proton beam was to bombard a target to produce a high energy 
electron beam.  The electron beam was to pass through strips of lead in the Wide Band 
lab and produce a large energy spread of GeV photons (i.e., a wide band of photon 
energies) that impinge on a beryllium target to produce quark pairs.  After the beryllium 
target, silicon strip detectors identify and  locate the quark states and the quark decay into 
particles.  The wire chambers track electrically charged reaction and decay products.  The 
calorimeters detect photons, pi mesons, and electrons.  There is also a uranium 
calorimeter used on this experiment.  The inner electromagnetic calorimeter used 
4,090 kg of lead in an aluminum frame, and 1,136 kg of poly methyl methacrylate 
scintillator strips.  Thus, the fire spread of toxic materials was a serious concern to the 
staff and firefighters.   
A scientist was examining the gate logic associated with the dynode sum box, which 
involved going to the experiment hall and disconnecting certain cables.  This is the 
normal procedure for isolating channels of signal.  Then the scientist went to the counting 
room to observe the affected gates.  He turned on the voltage and got a signal; this act 
was per standard operating practices.  At about 0120 hours, he returned to the experiment 
hall (called “the pit”), and he noticed an odor that he described as ‘sour milk’.  Nothing 
appeared to be out of the ordinary; he disconnected some ribbon cables and returned to 
the counting room.  In the counting room, he could not get a signal from the gates.  He 
began to examine various systems to identify the problem.  During that activity, another 
scientist left the counting room and entered the pit to inspect wall outlet power, which 
had tripped earlier in the evening.  He saw white smoke and a glow emanating from the 
pit.  He yelled that there was “fire in the pit”.  A third scientist called the operation center 
to alert them of the fire, then all four scientists in the area went to the pit to determine the 
severity of the fire.  The smoke density made breathing difficult and flames were visible, 
so the four evacuated the building.  Once outside, two of the scientists secured gas 
supplies (which included methane gas) to the pit and the other two re-entered the building 
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and went to the pit to shut down high voltage power supplies to the detectors.  After 
securing power, they again evacuated the building.  Several of the detectors were heavily 
damaged.  All vertical cable insulation was consumed in the fire, and a vertical cable tray 
had warped and fallen into the debris.  Most of the cabling near the detectors was 
destroyed.  The polymethyl methacrylate in the calorimeter melted and burned like 
flammable liquid; some of the lead in the calorimeter also melted.  Aluminum support 
frameworks melted in the fire; a steel I-beam was also noticeably deformed.  The 
detectors that were held above the floor fell when their aluminum frames lost strength 
due to the heat.  The dense smoke from the fire deposited heavy soot on the building roof 
and interior surfaces.  The sprinkler discharge water on the floor was pumped out; this 
water contaminated the soil outside the building.  No one was injured, although two 
scientists did re-enter the pit to deenergize electrical power supplies and consequently 
received additional exposure to the dense, toxic smoke. 
The automatic fire sprinklers were about 13 m above the experiment hall, and from the 
estimated time of fire ignition about 19 minutes elapsed before the sprinklers actuated.  
This is to be expected of sprinklers so far above the seat of the fire, enough hot smoke 
and combustion products must accumulate at the sprinkler head to warm it sufficiently 
for actuation.  However, the sprinklers did perform well despite the distance by limiting 
the spread of the fire.  There were no nearby smoke detectors in that portion of the 
experiment hall, so the fire had early propagation without any intervention until by 
chance the situation was noticed by a scientist.  The investigators noted that there was no 
fuse or current limitation on the affected power supply that would have prevented 
overloading of the ribbon cable.  They also noted that the flammability of the cable 
insulation and the vertical cable runs allowed rapid fire propagation. 
In 1992, A Tiger Team visited FNAL, inspecting their compliance with DOE regulations 
(DOE, 1992).  In the worker safety area, there were 161 noncompliances found at the 
site.  The findings indicated serious noncompliances in the areas of electrical standards, 
hazard communication, respiratory protection, machine guarding, lock and tagout 
procedures, confined space identification and entry, and storage of flammable and 
combustible gases.  Other concerns included noncompliances with walking/working 
surfaces, welding, means of egress, and hazardous/toxic substance handling.  The 
Fermilab safety and health program was judged by the Tiger Team to not understand the 
then-current safety and health requirements as adopted by the DOE.  The fact that 
workers were not recognizing or inspecting for safety and health issues in their 
workplaces was evidenced in a video often presented to general visitors to the laboratory; 
the Tiger Team noted several examples of unsafe work practices, all OSHA 
noncompliances, in that public relations/visitor orientation video.  The previous chapter 
described the Tiger Team findings at PPPL, and the previous section described the Tiger 
Team findings at SLAC.  In the DOE Tiger Team summary (DOE, 1992a), this 
comparison of numbers of major findings was given: 
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Key discipline PPPL SLAC FNAL 
ES&H planning 0 1 1 
Formality of 
operations
2 0 1 
ES&H program 
commitment 
4 0 1 
When considering these data in view of the operations since the early-1990’s Tiger Team 
visits, it appears that PPPL has strived to address their ES&H issues, SLAC has suffered 
several events that has led the DOE to question if they have maintained their already-
adequate programs, and FNAL has worked to address their ES&H issues, although they 
have experienced some electrical injury events. 
Several more events of interest came from the DOE CAIRS database.  On September 30, 
1993, some resistors in the circuit for a transformer overheated when the transformer was 
being started up, and the resistors caught fire.  The fire cost about $3k in damage, but 
fortunately no one was injured in that fire event.  On October 15, 1993, a power supply 
filter overheated and misfired, then ignited.  That fire was controlled and no one was 
injured.  On July 7, 1994, a cable in a pulse-forming network sparked and burned its 
polyethylene covering.  No one was injured, but employees may have been exposed to 
the smoke from the burning polyethylene.  On July 26, 1994, a compressor motor 
overheated and burned out.  The fire detection system actuated to alert the staff of the 
fire; again employees may have been exposed to smoke from this motor fire. 
In 1997, two subcontractor electricians at FNAL received serious flash burns as a result 
of an electrical fault and subsequent electrical arc blast while working on a 480 V ac 
motor control center.  At approximately 1210 hours on October 22, 1997, the two 
subcontractor employees were attempting to provide temporary power for lighting and 
heat from motor control center cabinet #4 in the RF gallery F-Zero compressor room.  
The two electricians were removing the upper bus bar cover that shields the line side 
connections in the electrical panel.  The cover was being removed to connect the neutral 
line associated with the temporary power connection.  While attempting to remove the 
cover, it contacted the “C” phase of the bus bar, causing a short to ground and a 
subsequent arc blast.  The two electricians did not understand that there were energized 
components behind the cover; they believed that the entire building was de-energized and 
they did not perform a zero energy check.  When the cover movement allowed an arc, 
one electrician was on a step ladder and his hands were exposed as he held the cover 
plate, and the other electrician standing on the ground and was exposed to most of the 
arc, whose energy was directed out and down by the cover plate.  The first electrician’s 
hands received second degree burns and the other electrician received second and third 
degree burns to his face and hands; his hard hat did prevent some facial and forehead 
injury.  When the two electricians recovered their sight after the brilliant flash of the arc, 
they went outside.  Three laborers saw the electricians come out of the building and the 
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three laborers proceeded to the nearest building to call for an ambulance.  The 
electricians were transported by ambulance to the local hospital.  The electrician with 
burned hands was treated and released on October 22, and the more seriously burned 
electrician was also treated and was released on October 27.  The investigation board had 
several findings, including that Fermilab did not have a comprehensive electrical safety 
program, there was no work documentation and no engineering drawings of the system.  
Fermilab did not ensure that an adequate integrated safety management system was in 
place for electrical work.  The investigation board found that Fermilab managers did not 
understand their responsibilities for electrical safety (DOE, 1997). 
An unusual type of industrial accident occurred at FNAL on September 4, 1998.  The 
laboratory had contracted to have the concrete floors of several kitchen storage rooms in 
Wilson Hall repainted.  The contractor began the work using a non-flammable cleaner to 
clean the floors and remove any grease or other foreign materials that would interfere 
with the painting.  The foreman for the job was instructed by his management to use 
muriatic acid, if needed, to clean the floor.  He was later instructed that if the acid was 
insufficient then to use methyl ethyl ketone.  The foreman ordered ‘muriatic acetone’ 
instead; the FNAL chemical supply room staff gave him acetone since they did not know 
what ‘muriatic acetone’ was.  When the foreman and two painters were applying the 
acetone and water to the floor, vapors were collecting in this unventilated room.  Just as 
the foreman had left the room to empty a mop pail, the acetone vapors must have reached 
the lower flammable limit (2.5%) and were ignited by a floor buffing machine one of the 
painters had actuated.  One painter received first and second degree burns over 20% of 
his body, and the other painter received second and third degree burns over 33% of his 
body.  The foreman received minor burns.  The first painter and the foreman were 
transported by ambulance to a hospital, and the second painter was flown by helicopter to 
a burn center.  After skin graft surgery, the painter was released from the burn center on 
September 19, 1998.  The investigation board found that Fermilab did not perform a job 
safety analysis for the contract services, and while Fermilab personnel did visit the work 
site on the day of the job, they did not closely check what chemicals were in use (DOE, 
1998).
As part of the Neutrinos at the Main Injector project at Fermilab, new accelerator tunnels 
were being excavated.  On June 21, 2001, a construction subcontractor employee 
received a serious head injury when he was struck by part of a drilling rig (DOE, 2001).  
The drill was being used to make six exhaust air ventilation shafts and survey risers for 
this project.  The driller and his helper were bringing drill pipe up to remove the lower 
portions of the drill assembly.  They were opening the jointed between drill pipe sections 
by using a “tong” (a 0.8-m long steel bar used to torque drill pipe).  The tong is connected 
to a hydraulic system via a wire rope sling, eyebolt and the mechanical connection to the 
hydraulic piston cylinder.  The hydraulic system applies force to the drill pipe sections.  
A field weld had been made in 1999 to repair the eyebolt at the end of the hydraulic 
piston cylinder.  The repair weld failed during operations on June 21 and the eyebolt 
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parted, allowing a release of the torque energy that had been imparted onto the drill pipe.  
The tong was attached to the drill pipe joint and it rotated with the pipe.  The tong struck 
the right side of the driller’s head, just below his industrial helmet, as he was standing 
near the drill pipe to disconnect the pipe joint.  The drilling company did not have records 
of their repair weld; in fact, the injured operator was the person who had made the repair 
weld in 1999.   Fermilab personnel did not verify that the drilling company was operating 
up to OSHA requirements, and they did not inspect the drilling equipment nor observe 
the work for any significant amount of time. 
FNAL is the largest particle accelerator in the US and is among the largest accelerators in 
the world.  FNAL has not had any staff or subcontractor fatalities in operations, but the 
site has experienced construction fatalities.  The staff injury values are the same or 
slightly higher than the DOE averages for research and development facilities, but many 
of the injuries are not severe (contusions, lacerations, etc.).  FNAL has experienced a 
number of electrical fires, most resulting in only small damage and no injuries.  The 
accident investigation reports have shown that FNAL has had a number of severe 
occupational accidents, and the investigation boards have pointed out both the good 
practices FNAL has and its deficiencies in procedures, supervision, and oversight of 
contractors.
3.3  Jefferson Laboratory 
A consortium of schools, called the Southeastern Universities Research Association, 
manages and operates the Continuous Electron Beam Accelerator Facility (CEBAF).  
CEBAF was renamed the Thomas Jefferson National Accelerator Facility in 1996.  The 
facility is now generally referred to as Jefferson Laboratory or “Jlab”.  The facility is 
located outside Newport News, Virginia.  The site was selected in 1984 and construction 
began in 1987.  First electrons were generated in this superconducting linac in 1994.  The 
full design energy (4 GeV) electrons were delivered to the experiment halls in 1997.  A 
free electron laser was built and had first light in 1998; in 2000 a 6 GeV electron beam 
was delivered to the experiment halls.  In 2001 an upgrade project began to increase the 
free electron laser to 10 kW, the upgrade was completed in early 2004.  Also in 2004 the 
DOE approved an increase in Jlab electron energy to 12 GeV.  The upgrade is under way 
as of this writing.  Jlab employs about 550 people directly and subcontracts some of their 
support and construction work.  The Jlab annual operating budget is on the order of 
$70M.
The Jlab occupational safety data are presented in Figures 7 and 8.  These data are similar 
to the other facilities already presented.  The Jlab plot annual values are below the DOE 
research and development values.  The staff peak in 1994 was probably due to 
experiment commissioning tests, and free electron laser upgrade in 2001-2002 may be 
responsible for the peaks in those years.  The pie charts in Figure 8 show that once again, 
technicians are the leading group for industrial injuries.   
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Figure 7.  Plots of CEBAF Industrial Safety Performance from 1993-2003. 
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Figure 8.  CEBAF Industrial Injury Distributions from 1988-2003. 
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There have been several events of importance at Jlab.  The DOE ORPS had 41 reports 
filed by Jlab between 1991 and 2003.  The ORPS reports of occupational safety concern 
are summarized here.   
On October 16, 1991, a helium gas recovery compressor in the central helium liquefier 
system began leaking compressor oil.  The estimated ~378 cm3 (~0.1 gallon) of oil 
impinged on hot parts of the compressor rig and began smoking, but there was no fire.  
No one was injured in this event (ORPS report ORO--SURA-TJNAF-1991-1002).  The 
compressor fault caused the electrical substation to trip off line and the set of 
compressors shut down; the compressors were restarted and the damaged compressor was 
repaired in the next scheduled maintenance outage.   
On November 11, 1992, a four-man team of electronic technicians was connecting 
vacuum rack power supplies and ion pump power supplies to newly-installed 
cryomodules in the accelerator tunnel.  The technicians were working in two-man teams.  
The technicians were to test the power supply cables prior to beginning physical 
installation.  A subcontract technician was utilizing a high voltage probe and multimeter 
to check cables.  Assuming that the high voltage power supply was off, the technician 
inserted a male connector into the cable female connector to conduct the tests.  The 
power supply was in fact on; the technician received a shock.  He was transported to the 
local hospital but he had no physiological symptoms of electrical shock, so the technician 
was released.  The technician did not follow the established procedures, but the root 
cause was found to be inadequate definition and distribution of procedures and policies 
(ORPS ORO--SURA-TJNAF-1992-0004). 
On January 29, 1993, a cable termination in a transformer failed and arced.  This fault 
tripped a 15,000 Volt electrical system and caused $3.7k in damage, fortunately no one 
was injured (ORPS ORO--SURA-TJNAF-1993-0001).   
On September 8, 1993, personnel were restarting a large (4160 V, 2,250 horsepower) 
compressor in the Jlab central helium liquefier.  A ball bearing in the compressor suffered 
a material failure during this startup; the ball bearing seized.  The compressor motor 
began to smoke and the compressor was secured from operations.  No one was injured, 
but employees were exposed to the motor smoke.  Investigation revealed the bearing fault 
and the compressor was replaced, which required about a week of downtime.  The helium 
system ran at 2/3 capacity until the new unit was brought into service (ORPS ORO--
SURA-TJNAF-1993-0002).   
Accelerator Division Operations Department staff noted at approximately 1030 hours on 
December 21, 1993 that an RF system interlock had been previously defeated as a portion 
of a test.  This unlogged, defeated interlock allowed RF power to be provided to the 
North Linac cryomodule, with personnel in the Accelerator Tunnel.  Sufficient RF levels 
to the cryomodule have the potential for producing significant ionizing radiation fields 
(i.e., field emission x-rays).  Two staff members had entered the accelerator tunnel for a 
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limited duration activity and had been near the cryomodule.  They had used a radiation 
survey instrument in accordance with existing procedures and had not noted any radiation 
levels of significance.  When the defeated interlock was discovered, all systems were shut 
down.  The staff verified that no personnel were in the area close to the RF source when 
RF power levels were high.  The two staff member’s dosimeter badges showed that they 
had not received any significant radiation exposure from that event.  After a thorough 
review, accelerator commissioning activities were resumed (ORPS ORO--SURA-
TJNAF-1993-0003).
On May 24, 1994, at approximately 1330 hours, an Accelerator Division technician 
received an electrical shock while working in the CEBAF Test Lab Building (Bldg. 58).  
The technician was working in the vacuum cleaning area of the Test Lab mezzanine.  The 
technician was attempting to disconnect a portable transducer from an ultrasonic power 
cabinet.  The technician received an electrical shock while she was holding a 
disconnected connector on the cable leading to the fifth transducer (of the ultrasonic 
cleaning station).  At this same time, the technician was touching the high voltage 
connector on the back of the No. 3 high frequency generator in the ultrasonic power 
cabinet.  The technician reported the event to a nearby coworker in an adjacent building 
and she complained of pain in her right arm and shoulder.  She briefly described to a 
coworker her activities leading up to the electrical shock prior to being transported to the 
CEBAF Medical Clinic for evaluation.  After evaluation at the CEBAF Medical Clinic, 
she was transported to a local hospital for further observation.  The technician was 
subsequently admitted as an inpatient at the local hospital.  No significant physiological 
effects were identified.  The initial investigation failed to reveal any readily apparent 
electrical shock hazard.  A Type B accident investigation was conducted, and personnel 
from the Langley safety office of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
were asked to investigate the equipment.  Only three possible explanations were thought 
plausible; stored electrical charge in the transducer, failure of the ultrasonic unit’s 
electrical contactor to switch off power when the main power switch was turned off, and 
possible inadvertent contact with an energized 277 Volt or 110 Volt wire in the cabinet.  
The technician returned to work, and electrical safety training was emphasized for all 
personnel (ORPS ORO--SURA-TJNAF-1994-0001).   
On March 28, 1995, at approximately 1115 hours in CEBAF Experimental Hall A, a 
CEBAF Physics Division subcontractor employee was struck by a falling tubular steel 
handrail section.  The 26.8 kg (59 pound) handrail section had fallen approximately 
14.3 m (47 feet) from a stator crane service platform.  The employee (a millwright) was 
conducting calibration testing of alignment equipment with two other coworkers.  A 500 
ton stator crane had been erected overhead to assist in experimental equipment assembly.  
At the time of the accident, this crane had been previously tagged and locked out of 
service. Also in the overhead area of Experimental Hall A was a 20 ton polar crane, this 
crane was being positioned for an upcoming lift at the time of the accident.  The polar 
crane positioning movement dislodged the handrail section from the 500 ton stator crane.  
The dislodged handrail section fell and struck the millwright on the right side of his head, 
shoulder, and back.  The impact of the falling handrail section knocked the millwright to 
the floor, where he remained conscious.  A CEBAF staff member initiated the 911 call 
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and the CEBAF emergency response plan.  The millwright was transported by a City of 
Newport News medical services ambulance to a local hospital for evaluation. At 
approximately 2:15 pm, he was transported to another local hospital, Riverside Hospital 
in Newport News, for further evaluation.  At approximately 1800 hours, he was 
transported to Norfolk General Hospital in Norfolk, Virginia.  There he was operated on 
for scapular and back injuries.  The operation was successful and the millwright went to 
intensive care as a stable patient.  He was moved out of the intensive care unit on April 
16, 1995 and was discharged from the hospital on April 22, 1995.  He then began 
undergoing physical therapy.  Investigation revealed that probable direct cause was that 
the operator of the radial crane maneuvered the 20 ton trolley of the radial crane so that it 
struck the handrails of the stator crane 500 ton trolley.  Procedures were augmented to 
account for crane interference in all aspects of Jlab operations.  About a week of time was 
lost to the experiment equipment installation schedule (ORPS ORO--SURA-TJNAF-
1995-0002).
At approximately 1345 hours on Monday, April 3, 1995, a CEBAF Accelerator Division 
staff member experienced a close call (near miss) electrical incident.  The CEBAF staff 
member had been tasked to clean-out a utility trench in the floor of the CEBAF Test Lab 
(Building 58) high bay area.  The CEBAF staff member was attempting to remove a 
section of what he believed was inactive water pipe.  This apparent pipe was actually 
metal conduit containing an electrical conductor (480 volt, 3 phase AC) for a welding 
receptacle.  The CEBAF staff member attempted to cut the conduit with a pair of bolt 
cutters.  An electrical arc flash resulted and the circuit breaker on the high bay area wall 
tripped.  The CEBAF staff member immediately contacted a CEBAF Accelerator 
Division EH&S specialist and his supervisor.  The worker was taken to the CEBAF 
Clinic and examined by the CEBAF Physician.  The examination did not note any signs 
of electrical shock or any other type of injury.  The worker was released for normal duties 
(ORPS ORO--SURA-TJNAF-1995-0003). 
Jefferson Lab Personnel Safety System (PSS) Group personnel were beginning routine 
testing of the Oxygen Hazard Deficiency (ODH) monitoring system at approximately 
1700 hours on January 15, 1997.  The accelerator at Jefferson Lab is a superconducting 
RF accelerator and uses cryogenic helium in several areas.  These areas are equipped 
with ODH monitoring sensors to note decreased oxygen levels in the event of helium 
release.  The PSS personnel noted that the alarm did not activate during the test.  The 
circuit breaker that supplies power to the monitors was found tripped.  Investigation 
revealed that electrical maintenance work from late 1996 caused the ODH system to 
switch to temporary power, and this power transient caused the circuit breaker to open.  
A power alarm was installed to alert operators if power to the ODH monitors is lost 
(ORPS ORO--SURA-TJNAF-1997-0001). 
At approximately 0820 hours on October 7, 1998, Accelerator Division Survey and 
Alignment Group staff members reported that a survey tripod had struck the Hall C 
experimental target vacuum window, rupturing the window.  Hall C was evacuated until 
an evaluation was made by the Hall C Machine Control Center and Radiation Control 
Group staff.  No personnel injuries resulted from this event, however the potential for 
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personnel injury did exist.  Radiological surveys showed that no contamination was 
released when the chamber was breached.  The direct cause of this event was determined 
to be the steel survey tripod being inadvertently drawn into the uncovered target window 
by an inappropriately energized air core magnet (ORPS ORO--SURA-TJNAF-1998-
0004).  Note that this event is not unique to accelerators.  Fusion experiments and 
magnetic resonance imaging magnets have had magnetic field induced missiles as well 
(Cadwallader, 1991). 
The Jefferson Lab Radiation Control Group was notified at approximately 1600 hours on 
Friday, August 17, 2001, that a radiation monitor in the Vertical Test Area (VTA) was in 
alarm.  The VTA had been processing a component with one of the eight dewars units in 
operation.  The VTA has eight dewars that provide liquid helium cooling of 
superconducting RF and other cryogenic components used in the production of 
accelerating structures.  RF energy is created testing accelerator superconducting RF 
(SRF) components.  A byproduct of this RF energy is field emission X-ray generation.  
Operators were testing components at higher and higher power levels, and noted the area 
monitor alarmed.  When it would not reset, they notified the radiological staff and the 
VTA primary operator.  The Operator arrived and noted that the radiation shielding door 
was open.  He then stopped the test.  The shielding door was closed and the test resumed.  
Four personnel had been previously working in the VTA area at the time of the area 
monitor alarm.  Film badges were processed and fortunately, no employees had received 
any exposure from this event.  An undocumented modification to the wiring to 
accommodate a special test had been miswired to dewar #8 contacts instead of dewar #7 
contacts, so the dewar #7 interlocks were bypassed.  This is why the operators did not 
realize that the shielding door was partially open during the test.  The wiring was returned 
to proper positions.  A safety stand-down was performed.  A procedure was written for 
performing interlock alterations when special tests are needed (ORPS ORO--SURA-
TJNAF-2001-0003).
On August 14, 2001, an accelerator SRF component lifting device (a hoist) failed when 
its chain broke and the hoist fell from its own weight.  The special hoist that Jefferson 
Lab designed and fabricated was located in the Production Chemistry Room, Building 58 
(Test Lab).  The hoist was installed for handling larger accelerator SRF components of up 
to 90 kg (200 pounds) maximum weight.  As the chain broke, the hoist fell approximately 
four 1.2 m (4 feet) and landed on the lid of an ultrasonic tank.  A Production Chemistry 
Room technician was approximately 1.8 m (6 feet) away from the hoist at the time of the 
hoist chain failure.  The technician was not injured by the falling hoist.  Preliminary 
review tentatively noted that the hoist's chain and the chain sprocket did not align 
properly.  This misalignment possibly stressed the chain, by placing a bending action on 
the chain, and may have been the direct cause of the hoist chain failure (ORPS ORO--
SURA-TJNAF-2001-0004). 
On Monday, December 10, 2001, an Accelerator Division technician (a journeyman 
electrician and mechanical fabrication technician) received an electrical shock at 
approximately 1345 hours in Building 98.  The electrical shock resulted when the 
technician clipped a welding machine's spring-loaded ground lead to the worktable (the 
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worktable is grounded to the Building 98 steel frame).  Earlier in the day, the technician 
had repaired the 480 V welding receptacle wiring (which feeds the welding machine) 
following the discovery of a welding machine problem.  This repair resulted in a wiring 
mistake that the following electrical circuit verification did not disclose, resulting in the 
electrical shock.  The exact mechanism of the shock path that caused the electrical shock 
is under investigation.  The technician was sent to the Jlab clinic and was referred to an 
outside physician.  The technician received medical treatment (a prescription pain 
reliever) and medical work restrictions for several days.  No permanent physiological 
injury is expected from this electrical shock event (ORPS ORO--SURA-TJNAF-2001-
0005).
At about 1340 hours on Monday, Feb. 4, 2002, an Accelerator Division, Free Electron 
Laser Instrumentation & Controls Group supervisor received an electrical shock to her 
left hand.  The shock resulted when her index finger came in contact with a 50 M-ohm 
resistor that was connected across two terminals of an energized 10 microfarad/4,000 V 
capacitor.  She and an Operations Group technician were performing checks of new ion 
pump power supplies because some similar units had a history of workmanship problems.  
The supervisor said that she had briefly left the immediate work area and when she 
returned to the work area was unaware that the power supply was still energized.  The 
supervisor received an electrical shock to her left thumb and index finger.  She was taken 
to Jefferson Lab Medical Services and was referred to the Riverside Regional Medical 
Center's emergency room.  She received medical treatment for second degree burns to her 
thumb and second and third degree burns to her index finger.  The supervisor had ten 
restricted work days, and volunteered to brief personnel about the event (ORPS ORO--
SURA-TJNAF-2002-0002). 
A rented temporary cooling tower at Jlab suffered a major loss of function when the unit's 
fan blades were ejected.  There were no personnel injuries or significant damage to other 
Jlab structures or equipment.  The temporary cooling tower was rented in December 2001 
as a result of a cooling water piping failure at the accelerator site.  A single replacement 
tower was planned and ordered to be installed.  The temporary cooling tower is located 
between Bldg. 102, the End Station Refrigerator Building, and the Experimental Hall A 
truck ramp.  Lab staff noticed debris upon return to the work area on the morning of July 
5, 2002, following the 4th of July holiday.  A subsequent review of temperature recording 
information indicated that the event occurred about 1045 hours on July 4, 2002.  The fan 
unit’s gearbox had torqued and pulled two bolt fasteners through the base plate.  All of 
the fan blades had sheared off at the fan hub.  The fan shroud, screen cover and blades 
were found around the fan unit.  Some fan blades were an estimated 36 m (40 yards) from 
the fan.  Fortunately, no personnel were at that location when the fan blades failed (ORPS 
ORO--SURA-TJNAF-2002-0004).  
A subcontract electrician at Jlab discovered on July 24, 2002 that a lockout/tagout device, 
that the electrician had installed a few weeks earlier, was not in place when he returned to 
that area to perform work involved with that circuit, which had since been energized.  It 
is believed that the lockout/tagout device (designed for use on a double breaker), that had 
been used to close off two adjacent single circuits, had fallen off the panel.  The LO/TO 
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device was not a perfect fit to the equipment being locked out and may have fallen off if 
it was brushed by passersby.  There was no injury from this incident due to the diligence 
of the electrician who verified the circuit status before performing any work (ORPS 
ORO--SURA-TJNAF-2002-0005). 
At about 1800 hours on Tuesday, April 29, 2003, subcontractor electricians were 
beginning work on the Test Lab high bay lighting replacement.  The overhead crane was 
moved without observing the position of the hook.  The crane hook struck an equipment 
cabinet where two electrical conduits were severed, and continued moving until striking 
stacked radiation shielding blocks and an installed radiation monitor.  The subcontract 
electrician (Worker #1) who was operating the crane had moved the crane without 
observing the crane hook's position.  Worker #1, who was a qualified Jefferson Lab crane 
operator, stated that he had found the crane in the same position that he had left it in the 
previous night.  He stated that he assumed that the crane hook was in the same position 
and started moving the crane without checking the hook location.  The second 
subcontract electrician (worker #2), who had been assigned to be the safety watch, stated 
that he left the area of the crane hook and was preparing to load materials.  The crane 
hook struck the equipment cabinet and extensively damaged two conduits that were on 
the cabinet's top.  One conduit contained eight control cables and the second conduit 
contained a 120 Volt, 20 Ampere control power circuit.  The crane hook then struck 
several masonry shielding blocks and an installed radiation monitor for the Test Cave 
located below.  No hazardous or radioactive materials or radiation producing activities 
were associated with this event (ORPS ORO--SURA-TJNAF-2003-0001).  No one was 
injured in this event, but perhaps the controls put in place after the March 28, 1995 crane 
hook event above have either eroded or have not been as effective as possible. 
A Jlab technician was exposed to a mixture of sulfuric and hydrofluoric acids when he 
was removing an acid container from a Test Lab Building electropolishing cabinet.  The 
event occurred on Friday morning, June 13, 2003.  The electropolishing cabinet is used 
for accelerator superconducting radiofrequency component processing.  Investigators 
believe that the worker inadvertently wiped his unprotected face with his protective 
gloves still on his hands; the gloves had contacted droplets of the acid mixture while he 
was removing the full container.  The worker, after rinsing off at a safety shower and 
applying calcium gluconate, drove to the Jefferson Lab Medical Services building, where 
he received initial treatment for facial skin blistering.  The worker had no respiratory 
problems or symptoms at this time.  The worker was transported by ambulance to a local 
hospital for further evaluation on Friday morning.  He was discharged from the hospital 
on Friday afternoon and returned to work on Monday June 16, 2003 without any work 
restrictions.  There was no evidence of any skin blistering upon his return to work on 
June 16th.  It was identified that no follow-up medical evaluation was needed (ORPS 
ORO--SURA-TJNAF-2003-0002).   
At about 1430 hours on July 23, 2003, the crane was positioned for a lift of a vacuum 
pump to an adjacent cold box.  The crane control box for radio-controlled crane operation 
was hanging from the strap around the crane operator's neck.  The crane began – 
unplanned – movement southward, where the crane hook contacted and damaged several 
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water pipes before the crane came to rest.  The pipes were dented and bent by the impact.  
There were no personnel in this area and there are no injuries associated with this event.  
Property damage to the piping has been estimated at $2k.  It is not clear to Jlab 
management if there was a crane operator error or a crane malfunction that resulted in 
unplanned crane movement (ORPS ORO--SURA-TJNAF-2003-0003).
Although the Jlab has not operated as long as other accelerators, it has suffered some of 
the same types of events.  Mechanical and electrical equipment fires, personnel receiving 
electrical shocks, a person struck by a falling object, a hoist failure, unplanned crane 
movement events leading to equipment damage and hazards to personnel, fan blade 
ejection, employee chemical exposure, and people in areas being exposed to radiation or 
RF energy.  Jlab had a ferromagnetic object (a camera tripod) drawn by magnetic fields. 
3.4  Relativistic Heavy Ion Collider 
Much of this description came from the facility web pages at the bnl.gov web site.  The 
Relativistic Heavy Ion Collider (RHIC) began operation in the summer of 2000 
(Trbojevic, 2001), after a ten-year planning and construction interval.  The RHIC total 
cost was $616M.  The accelerator is located at Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) 
near Upton, New York.  The RHIC is supported by several other facilities at BNL, 
including a tandem Van de Graaff accelerator to initially accelerate ions to 40 MeV, a 
853-m Tandem-to-Booster beamline, a linear accelerator from this beamline to accelerate 
ions into the Booster synchrotron.  The Booster imparts more ion energy and then sends 
the ions to the Alternating Gradient Synchrotron (AGS), where the ions are accelerated to 
99.5% of the speed of light, hence the ‘relativistic’ description.  Then the ion beam is 
taken down to another beam line called the AGS-to-RHIC (ATR) transfer line.  The 
transfer line has a “Y” intersection, where beam ions directed left enter the ‘x’ or ‘blue’ 
clockwise ring of the RHIC and beams directed right enter the ‘y’ or ‘yellow’ 
counterclockwise ring of the RHIC.  Both RHIC rings are 3.8 km circumference.  The 
RHIC accelerates the ions even faster, to 99.995% of the speed of light, and controls 
countercurrent beam interactions at up to six interaction points between rings.  The RHIC 
can accelerate heavy ions such as silicon and gold.  Some experiments have included 
deuterium-gold collisions.   
Some descriptions and industrial safety information from the AGS and BNL are given 
here.  A preliminary fire protection analysis in 1988 of the AGS Target Halls indicated 
that there are loss potentials over $1M.  The fire protection professionals noted a shift by 
the experimental physics community toward large, high valued detectors.  The 
accelerator experiments typically use flammable gases, combustible signal cables, plastic 
scintillating materials, and are closely arranged in the experiments.  The Target Halls are 
equipped with conventional heat or smoke detection at ceiling level.  Early fire detection 
is not expected due to the very high ceilings (over 21 m).  Localized spot detection is 
provided in some areas.  The building's combustible Class II roof is not expected to be 
involved in a fire, unless large quantities of combustibles burn (as in a trailer).  Strict 
housekeeping policies have been adopted to reduce the risk.  The number of trailers have 
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been reduced inside the building.  Local protection has been provided over and above 
localized concerns (BNL, 1988).  A VESDA system was scheduled for installation in the 
target halls in stages over a period of a few years.
The RHIC and AGS did not have individual listings in CAIRS, so no safety performance 
plots were available for just the accelerator portions of the BNL site.  Any plots would 
have included the nuclear fission reactors and other operations being conducted at BNL, 
and as such are not strictly comparable to the other figures presented in this report, so 
they have been omitted here. 
From 1991 to 2003 there were 57 AGS/RHIC ORs in the DOE ORPS database.  Some of 
these were environmental issues, such as transformer oil leaks, some were procedural 
noncompliances, some were unplanned halon fire suppressant gas actuations, and some 
events were equipment failures that did not endanger any personnel.  The industrial-
safety related events on the AGS and RHIC are summarized below since the AGS is 
connected to the RHIC.   
A Westinghouse molded case circuit breaker is installed in the 480 Vac input line of a 
300 kW power supply as line protection.  A line contactor is used for operational on/off 
control.  The Bakelite handle of the circuit breaker had a metal extension to aid the 
manual operation.  The extension and part of the Bakelite handle broke off on April 5, 
1993.  The next day, a technician tried to reset and close the breaker by manually 
operating the remaining part of the handle.  He received a shock in his right hand to his 
grounded left hand.  A metal rod was found to be exposed by the broken handle.  Voltage 
at this rod was measured to be 287 Vac to ground.  The technician was not seriously 
injured; he was not burned or have any other injuries.  The threaded rod in the breaker 
handle was found to be connected to the load side B phase of the breaker.  The breaker 
was reassembled with a new handle that did not have a metal rod (ORPS CH-BH-BNL-
BNL-1993-0009).
On January 23, 1995, two electricians needed to identify a circuit breaker that supplied 
power to an RHIC building addition that had been completed in 1993.  The two 
electricians requested help from two towerline electricians who had a generic work 
permit for working on live lines.  The four electricians looked at the breakers and decided 
that the breaker having a new-looking feed cable would be the one that powers the 
building addition.  One of the towerline electricians began to remove the back cover of 
the distribution panel.  The towerline electricians were only in the area to drop off some 
equipment and they were not fully prepared with proper equipment to perform work 
around live lines.  The towerline electrician used a non-insulated screwdriver to remove 
hexagonal screws, and then a screwdriver blade in an electricians knife to remove a 
slotted head screw.  He inadvertently dropped the knife, which slide into the distribution 
panel via an adjacent cable tray.  The uninsulated knife caused a short circuit that ignited 
an electrical fire.  The four electricians were able to move away from the fire but were in 
a dead end corridor.  Flames obstructed their primary path of egress and a deadlocked 
door obstructed their secondary path.  The towerline electrician kicked open the 
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deadlocked door, injuring his leg in the process.  The four electricians escaped the fire 
unharmed (except for the one man’s injured leg).  Causes were inadequate labeling of 
electrical equipment, inadequate electrical drawings, and electricians not following 
procedures of working with proper tools and equipment (ORPS CH-BH-BNL-PE-1995-
0002).
On March 27, 1995, a low-background gamma survey was being performed on 
equipment near the B Test Beam.  The owners, who are called AGS Users, planned to 
return this equipment to their university.  The measurements showed that levels on the 
equipment were about 20 microrem/h, which was about twice background.  Ten days 
prior to finding the high radiation level, on March 17, 1995, the B5 target broke during a 
high intensity run and the failure was thought to be due to repeated thermo-mechanical 
stresses from the pulsed beam.  Following this, it was discovered that the gate leading to 
B5 target was contaminated at about 80,000 dpm/100 cm2, but the nearby B Test Beam 
Area was found to be clean.  The levels outside this gate had been 200 to 1000 dpm per 
100 cm2 routinely due to deposition of short-half-life (20 to 30 minutes) air- activation 
products since early January, and the location had been roped-off as a Contamination 
Area.  A plastic barrier had been installed to prevent significant air-flow from the beam-
line toward experimental areas.  Periodic-air and daily-contamination surveys had been 
and continue to be taken in order to ensure contamination is not spreading.  The B5 target 
was replaced, and the surface areas outside the gate were cleaned-up to the prior low-
levels of air-activation products.  A second barrier was installed at the gate to help 
prevent the spread of short-lived (i.e., several months) residual contamination from the 
broken target.  The normal, high residual dose-rates inside the unoccupied target area are 
such that decay was determined to be the best method of contamination reduction as 
opposed to a clean-up for this particular area.  A replacement target was installed on 
March 30.  Use of the target was allowed after establishing a lower intensity-limit and 
installing five-interlocking thermocouples on the platinum target to help ensure the new 
B5 target would not be damaged.  Since Users' equipment is not normally activated, it 
was immediately thought on March 27 that the radiation from the equipment was due to 
contamination from the March 17 incident.  However, the standard, daily beta-emitter 
surveys taken since March 17 did not show beta contamination on this equipment.  
Subsequently, a nuclide analysis indicated that the radiation from the equipment was due 
to the decay of 95-day Osmium-185 and 53-day Beryllium-7, which do not emit beta 
radiation.  The 20 Prem/h (200 nSv/h) from osmium-185 and beryllium-7 is not readily 
distinguishable from the 'sea' of gamma radiation normally measured in the experimental 
areas. Levels are typically 2,000 to 50,000 microrem/h (20 to 500 PSv/h) during running 
periods, and 300 to 400 microrem/h (3 to 4 PSv/h) when all beam lines are off.  The four 
Users who owned the equipment were examined in the whole-body counter and found to 
have 50 to 90 nanoCuries (1,850 to 3,330 Bq) of Osmium-185 and Beryllium-7 in their 
bodies.  This may be interpreted as a committed dose of up to 4 mrem (40 PSv) 
depending on the internal dose model used to interpret the whole-body counting results.  
Other personnel involved in the target replacement and clean-up were whole-body 
counted and no intake was found as of the morning of March 28, 1995.  Whole-body 
counting continued past March 28, and about 30 individuals had been counted as of April 
12.  No significant body burdens were detected (ORPS CH-BH-BNL-AGS-1995-0002).   
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At about 1030 hours on June 14, 1995, a 0.43-mm-thick Kevlar and 0.127-mm-thick 
Mylar window on a vacuum decay-tank in the B5 beam line in Building 912 broke 
suddenly.  The window measured 0.86-m by 1.87-m.  This failure caused air to rush 
violently into several hundred cubic feet of space inside the decay-tank.  No one was 
injured, but experimenters reported the explosion noise and dust cloud to the main control 
room.  About $20,000 in damages were initially estimated to experimental detectors 
downstream of the window and tank.  The labor to repair the equipment was initially 
estimated to be four person-months.  The Kevlar (for strength) portion of the window was 
torn free of the frame on both sides, the bottom, and 40% of the top, and the Mylar 
(vacuum seal) portion of the window was obliterated.  The failure occurred quickly.  The 
tear in the Kevlar, once started, went around the window quickly until the window 
flapped open allowing a large slug of air to enter the chamber bringing with it the 
adjacent detector equipment.  A 0.8-mm speck of metal or dirt was found jammed into 
the Mylar frame on the low-pressure side of the window.  From the inspection it was 
clear that when the window is under pressure, this speck rested on the metal frame and 
was pushed into the Mylar and Kevlar.  The tear is 0.8-mm away from the speck.  It is 
possible that the speck caused a localized increase in stress that started the tear.  Noted 
also was that the tear in the Kevlar went about the same distance on either side of the 
speck.  Further analysis of this area is being performed.  The window was assembled in 
the middle of Building 922, which is a mechanical equipment shop.  There are metal 
cutting and machining tools in proximity to the assembly area.  Because of the size of the 
window, an overhead crane must be used in order to lower the window clamp onto the 
window plate.  These operations could have resulted in the speck of debris, which was 
found under the window as previously described.  All other Kevlar windows have been 
removed from service at AGS.  There was some concern that the failure might also have 
been age-related.  The solution to longer lasting windows (i.e., decades) appears to be in 
using a greater number of Kevlar yarn fibers per square inch in the weave.  This window 
used Kevlar fabric with about 50% fewer fibers per 645 square millimeters over that used 
by other accelerators even though the window thickness could be the same (ORPS CH-
BH-BNL-AGS-1995-0003).   
The Pulsed Power Group Leader entered the H-10 house on June 26, 1996 and caused an 
electric discharge to occur by pushing an expanded metal cabinet wall approximately 
1.5 mm to gain clearance.  The metal wall touched live conductors; the capacitors in the 
power supply discharged and melted a hole in the expanded metal wall about 25 mm in 
diameter.  Molten aluminum was sprayed onto the eyeglasses of the Group leader.  Four 
persons were present and were exposed to the electrical arc flash, but no one was injured.  
The Bump Power Supply enclosure will be re-designed and modified to result in an 
improved electrical hazard barrier, and prevent inadvertent contact with the high-current 
conductors and stored energy (ORPS CH-BH-BNL-AGS-1996-0001).
On December 19, 1996 an experiment user from Experiment 896 received an electrical 
shock while assembling a detector near the beam line.  The user was holding a flexible 
metal vacuum hose attached to a vacuum pump and received a shock when he attempted 
to connect the hose to the grounded magnet vacuum chamber.  The pump skid was 
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plugged into a 208 V ac outlet.  The user reported the shock was not severe and he did 
not experience any symptoms of injury.  He continued to work.  Investigation revealed 
that the pump skid plug was missing a connection to the neutral pin in the connector.  The 
extension cord that was attached to this improperly-wired pump cord was also improperly 
wired.  It was a 4-wire extension cord with no ground connection to its connector shell.  
The AGS standard is to use 5-wire for a 3-phase extension cord and to have the ground 
on the cord's connector shell.  The AGS policy for proper grounding was not being 
enforced (ORPS CH-BH-BNL-AGS-1996-0004).   
On April 12, 1997, an AGS HP technician was performing a routine radiation survey near 
the B5 beam line.  He discovered the southeast corner of the orange radiation barrier had 
been taken down.  This allows access to the top of the shield blocks near the B5 line.  
This area is a High Radiation Area With Beam On and was posted as such.  The fence 
was re-established.  An inquiry was begun.  An initial report by an E935 experimenter is 
that another E935 experimenter, who just left BNL for the west coast, had cut the fence 
down to more easily access detectors in the beam line.  When this was learned, the B5 
beam line was shut down and an investigation begun.  The beam line remained shut down 
until further notice by AGS management.  An experimenter willfully circumvented safety 
rules at AGS and placed himself - and his colleagues - in jeopardy of significant radiation 
exposure.  On several occasions, the experimenter removed straps from a "High 
Radiation Area With Beam On" barrier and created an opening in the fence in order to 
improperly access detectors in the B5 beam line.  In addition to willfully violating AGS 
safety rules, the experimenter allowed the opening in the fence to remain after he left the 
beam line.  Thus, the experimenter created a potentially hazardous situation for others 
whenever beam was on.  The User’s March 1997 dosimeter badge was located after a 
collaborator searched a shared on-site apartment on April 13 (this was another poor 
practice to take the dosimeter to the apartment and to not turn it in for processing at the 
end of the time interval).  The badge was immediately processed and indicated 43 mrem 
(430 PSv).  A phone interview with the E935 user in question on April 14, 1997 at 1400 
hours established the following: The user stated that he obtained a Visitor's badge and 
was assigned an escort for the period March 13 to March 25, 1997.  He stated that he cut 
the fence straps on multiple occasions.  After creating a way through the fence, he stated 
that he left it open since he knew he needed to return.  On one or more occasions of 
return, he would find the barrier repaired.  The User stated that he always wore his TLD 
badge when he broke through the fence.  He stated that he always checked to see if the 
gate to B5 beam line was open before crossing the shield top and reaching into the beam 
line.  He felt this was the easiest and safest way to access his detectors.  He 
acknowledged that he knew the rules about not violating a radiation barrier.  He felt that 
this barrier was not a radiation barrier.  He stated he kept his March badge with him until 
the day he left, April 11, since it was only a few more days past the due date of April 5.  
The User's statements appear to be contradictory in that he checked to see if the B5 gate 
was open before crossing the barrier, yet he felt the barrier was not a radiation barrier.  
AGS User Training makes users aware that they must enter beam lines through a gate 
because gates have interlocks that inhibit beam.  Thus, an open gate always eliminates the 
potential for an in-beam radiation hazard.  AGS User Training emphasizes one "Golden 
Rule" which is "never climb over or defeat a radiation barrier or fence."  Users are 
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explicitly tested on this rule, as was this User.  The user in question correctly answered 
several questions on his exam, which dealt with barrier violation, but in practice he did 
not follow the rule.  The user is indefinitely debarred from entry to the BNL site (ORPS 
CH-BH-BNL-AGS-1997-0002). 
On June 2, 1998, a Controlled Access period began at about 0830 hours for the AGS 
Ring.  Controlled Access requires personnel to sign-in and sign-out at a single gate to the 
AGS Ring.  As lunchtime approached, the personnel began to stop their tasks and sign 
out to go to lunch.  The Operations Coordinator conferred with the Gate Watch person.  
Believing that all persons were out of the ring, the Operations Coordinator placed the 
machine on a beam-enabled state, which interlocks the gate and prevents entry.  This new 
state allowed the Gate Watch to leave for lunch as well.  The Operations Coordinator did 
not have a sweep of the AGS ring performed since there was no intention to initiate a 
beam.  When the machine was switched to beam-enabled state, a technician still working 
in the ring noted the lights dimming as a sign of the enabled state and he reported to the 
gate since he believed that a beam was going to be started.  The gate watch did not 
understand that some other employee had erroneously entered a name in the location 
where the technician would sign out on the log sheet.  The name had been crossed out, 
but at first survey of the form the gate watch believed that all persons were accounted for.  
The Operations Coordinator was counseled that the safety procedures are to be followed 
explicitly and are not open for interpretation or deviation for operational convenience 
without a specific review and management consent (ORPS CH-BH-BNL-AGS-1998-
0003).
On July 16, 1998, four technicians were riding an electric cart.  The cart exited a dirt road 
and slid sideways upon entering the paved surface, causing the cart to go up on two 
wheels.  One of the occupants fell from the vehicle.  The fallen cart occupant complained 
of back pain, and he was sent to a local hospital as a precaution.  The injured person was 
transported to a local hospital for examination.  He reported that the doctor indicated that 
he had a sprained back and bruised soft tissue.  He was then sent home.  The employees’ 
behavior in operating the vehicle in such an unsafe manner (taking it off the paved road 
of the RHIC construction site and speeding) is not condoned by RHIC management.  The 
employees involved were suspended for 10 working days without pay (ORPS CH-BH-
BNL-BNL-1998-0018).
On November 5, 1998, an AGS Mechanical Services Technical Supervisor (MSTS) 
entered the AGS Ring, which is a High Radiation Area, after discussion with the 
Maintenance Coordinator and the Associate Head of the Accelerator Division, to look for 
an argon gas leak in the Radiation Loss Monitor System.  The AGS was in a shut down 
condition and the MSTS entered this locked area after his self-reading dosimeter and 
training record were checked by the gate watch.  The MSTS discovered the location of 
the leak and took it upon himself to repair the leak without proper work planning.  Upon 
completion of the repair, the MSTS noticed a posting in the area indicating 7,400 mrem/h 
(74 mSv/h) at 30 cm.  He immediately left the AGS Ring and reported to the 
Maintenance Coordinator.  His self-reading dosimeter was pegged at 200 mrem (2 mSv).  
A Radiological Control Technician then surveyed the area where the work was 
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performed.  The survey indicated that the radiation level in the area was 5,000 mrem/hr 
(50 mSv/h).  Based on the results from the MSTS's dosimeter badge and on a subsequent 
dose investigation, the exposure of the MSTS was better estimated to have been 
180 mrem (1.8 mSv) due to this unplanned task.  Since the daily AGS Administrative 
Control Limit is 100 mrem (1 mSv), the event was further investigated as an off-normal 
occurrence.  The AGS Policy was not clearly defined and as a result not enforced.  This 
task was not classified as a job.  As a result, it was unclear to the Accelerator Division 
leadership chain that this task needed formal review for hazards.  Thus, the AGS 
procedure titled "Enhanced Work Planning," was not invoked prior to authorizing a job.  
A contributing cause is stress due to a tight schedule.  Investigation revealed that the 
maintenance coordinator, the MSTS, and the Associate Head of the Accelerator Division 
had all discussed finding the argon leak and had decided to turn up the argon flow so that 
the hissing of escaping gas would allow quick identification of the leak.  But they did not 
enter the task into the work control system.  As a result of this event, the staff now has to 
be equipped with pencil dosimeters and alarming (“chirping”) personal dosimeters when 
working in radiation fields, the staff will be retrained on using the work control system, 
and the management involved will be counseled for planning a job in a high radiation 
field and not performing a hazard analysis (ORPS CH-BH-BNL-AGS-1998-0004). 
At 0849 hours on May 11, 1999, gas pressure in the RHIC cryogenic system had to be 
manually relieved to lower the pressure.  The Cryogenic Shift Supervisor determined that 
a 7.6 cm (3 inch) manual ball valve should be opened to reduce pressure below the 
setpoint for automatic venting.  Because of the unique set of circumstances, the initial 
startup of the systems and the time pressure to vent the gas, personnel were not fully 
aware of the potential hazards and the controls to minimize hazards.  In the process of 
opening the manual valve the Operator slipped and got partially in the path of the gas 
exiting the valve.  The valve is about 1.27 m (50 inches) above the ground and vents 
horizontally.  A large break-away torque was required to begin to open the valve.  The 
noise from escaping gas caused the Operator to reclose the valve and quickly obtain 
hearing protection.  When he re-opened the valve, the required torque was much less than 
he expected and he lost his balance as the valve quickly and easily re-opened.  The 
Operator slipped into the escaping gas stream.  He was propelled into a nearby helium 
storage tank by the high velocity exhaust gas, causing a minor laceration to his head.  At 
0906 hours he was transported by ambulance to the hospital for observation.  Following 
examination and treatment, the Operator returned to work by 1500 hours that same day.  
A second Operator was at the scene during the valve operation in order to satisfy the two-
person staffing rule.  The second Operator called for help on the radio and a third 
Operator from the Cryogenic Control Room (CCR) went to the scene.  Radio 
communications were poor due to the high noise caused by the venting helium gas.  The 
third Operator had the CCR call for an ambulance.  Meanwhile, the second Operator 
helped the victim away from the scene.  The valve was shut at 0915 hours when the gas 
pressure was stabilized.  After the event, a vent pipe extension was installed on the 
7.6 cm ball valve that will direct the escaping helium to a point ~4.5 m above the ground 
where any effects to the operator will be minor (ORPS CH-BH-BNL-BNL-1999-0012).
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On February 10, 2000, a technician cutting electrical cables with an insulated cable-cutter 
saw a flash of light when he cut through a cable.  The employee was cutting and 
removing cable in the Slow Extracted Beam experimental area encompassed by Building 
912.  This area is under long-term renovation, and has not been operating since 
September 1999.  The employee was wearing leather gloves but was not wearing safety 
glasses.  He was brought to the Clinic after complaining about a blind spot in the corner 
of his right eye.  After an examination showed no damage to the employee's eye, the 
Clinic released the employee back to work without restriction and the employee returned 
to work at 1600 hours.  Cable cutting was stopped and the power to these cables and lines 
were retraced.  The electrical flash was determined to be from two phases of a 208Y/120-
Volt, 60 Hz power source that had not been isolated.  Work planning was not adequate to 
protect the workers in this case (ORPS CH-BH-BNL-AGS-2000-0002). 
At 0050 hours on October 4, 2000, a Collider-Accelerator Support (CAS) Watch entered 
Building 930 for a routine check of equipment running at Linac.  He found a smoke-filled 
building and pulled a fire-alarm box.  He went outside and noticed no alarms, nor did the 
Fire Department respond.  He went back into Linac Control Room in Building 930, a 
location where he noticed no smoke and called extension 911.  The on-duty Fire/Rescue 
Officer told the CAS Watch to pull another fire-alarm box and to go out to the road to 
guide the responding unit.  The CAS Watch pulled a box near the Linac Control Room 
and left the building.  This pull box caused the discharge of the halon fire-protection 
system and activated local audible alarms, however this pull box also failed to alert the 
Fire Department.  First-arriving Fire Department staff found a moderate smoke condition.  
They searched the facility but did not find the source of smoke.  Linac personnel arriving 
at 0120 hours found a damaged Motor Control Center (MCC) with burned trash-bag 
material in front of the MCC panels.  The fire burned itself out and smoke was vented 
without incident.  The area was sprinkler protected but the fire heat was insufficient to 
actuate the sprinklers.  The cause of the electrical failure was likely a high resistance in 
the supply from the buss.  The resulting heat from the resistance most likely damaged the 
insulation of the conductors within the compartment.  Since there was no indication of 
arcing to compartment walls, a phase-to-phase short would have occurred and fuses 
destroyed.  The resulting arc over would have over-pressurized the compartment with the 
flash.  There were bulges in the door indicating overpressure.  The shower of sparks 
would have ignited the plastic bag directly under the compartment.  Short-circuit current 
was limited to about 30,000 amperes for this MCC by upstream over-current protection.  
The fire alarm panel was also investigated.  A 2-amp fuse blew on the fire alarm panel in 
Building 930.  The cause of the blown fuse is not clear.  It may have been blown since 
the last time PM was performed, or blew coincident with this event.  With this particular 
fuse blown, it puts the fire alarm panel in a "sleeper" mode.  That is, for this type of 
failure, there is a loss of all alternating current and backup direct current power to a 
portion of the fire alarm panel.  Better preventive maintenance will be performed on 
electrical distribution systems, and upgrades to fire alarm panels will be scheduled to 
remove units that have these single point failures (ORPS CH-BH-BNL-AGS-2000-0004).
On October 18, 2000, a technician, accompanied by an engineer, was checking the status 
of a beam instrument package near a beam pipe in an accelerator tunnel.  This instrument 
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package had been recently relocated to this area.  The technician, on his knees during the 
inspection, was preparing to stand up.  He put one hand on the instrument package 
cabinet and the other hand on a column that supports the beam pipe.  His right hand, on 
the beam pipe support, contacted a cut coaxial cable causing a shock at approximately 
1155 hours.  The technician reported to the Clinic, was examined and given an 
electrocardiogram; nothing abnormal was noted.  He was observed to have a small wound 
on his right hand where the cable contact was made and a small contusion on his shoulder 
from backing into a wall in reaction to the shock.  After being examined at the BNL 
Clinic, he returned to work.  The cut cable was energized at about 6 kV and was not 
related to the instrument being inspected.  It was quickly determined that the cut coaxial 
cable was connected to a DC power supply for two beam line ion vacuum pumps.  The 
power supply is located on the second floor, remote from the ion pumps.  The output 
voltage varies as the direct current varies.  The DC output is about 1 mA at 5 kV, 100 mA 
at 2.5 kV and 200 mA at 21 Volts.  The direct cause was an improperly exposed 
conductor.  Previous work had incorrectly identified matching equipment powered from a 
common source.  There was incorrect post-work testing to verify the final configuration 
of the wiring and confirm ion pump operability (ORPS CH-BH-BNL-AGS-2000-0005).
On August 3, 2001, at 1259 hours, a smoke detector alarm from building 928 (the Motor 
Generator Building) was received at the Brookhaven National Lab (BNL) firehouse.  
This alarm was followed by other fire detection alarms in the building.  The BNL 
Fire/Rescue Group responded and found smoke coming from the building.  The fire 
alarms caused the evacuation of building 928 and a contiguous building 929.  When the 
fire department arrived, it was assumed that there was a working fire in the building.  In 
accordance with the BNL Emergency Plan, the Incident Commander declared an 
Operational Emergency at 1325 hours.  On receipt of the alarm, motor-generator (MG) 
Operators, present in building 928, returned to the MG set control room within the 
building to determine the cause of the alarm and the status of the MG set.  This MG set 
powers the AGS main magnets via transformers, rectifiers, switches and filters.  The MG 
set was found tripped, the electrical motor brake was on and there was no smoke visible 
in the MG room.  The MG room is adjacent to the MG control room.  The two operators 
entered the basement to determine the cause of the alarm.  Upon seeing smoke in the 
basement, they called the accelerator complex Main Control Room to report that the 
alarm was real, verified that there were no injured personnel in the building and 
evacuated to await arrival of the BNL Fire/Rescue Group, who arrived at 1303 hours.  
Firefighting personnel connected their fire truck pumper to the building fire-standpipe 
and pressurized the system in preparation to fight a fire.  The MG set operators entered 
the building with firefighters to determine the source of the smoke.  Upon entering the 
basement, they found a cracked fire-standpipe drain line, causing water to spray near 
equipment.  The standpipe was depressurized, and water and electrical power to the 
building were isolated.  When the building electrical power was isolated, the MG set 
forced air ventilation ended.  Smoke began to collect in the MG room.  Eventually, when 
the smoke cleared, the operators visually inspected the internals of the MG set through 
view ports.  Debris was visible on the bottom of the stator at the exciter (south) end of the 
generator.  The Fire Department did not have to apply water.  The AGS shut down, and 
consequently the RHIC also shut down.  Investigation revealed that the recently 
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refurbished MG set had been given a new retaining ring but that the ring was inadequate 
to handle the service stresses.  A ring with 65 ksi yield strength was used, when in reality 
the service stress for the retaining ring is between 95 and 130 ksi for the MG set.  The 
retaining ring failed after eight weeks of operation.  When the retaining ring yielded, ring 
material contacted the stator windings and iron core, which resulted in a catastrophic 
failure of the retaining ring, the shorting ring, and the stator windings.  The consequent 
electrical arcing and hot debris caused the smoke that actuated the building fire alarm.  
No one was injured in this event (ORPS CH-BH-BNL-AGS-2001-0001). 
On May 15, 2002, the Mechanical Service Group (MSG) released approximately 1 liter 
of water to the floor of the AGS Ring (Building 913) in the location of a water-cooled 
magnet during maintenance repair of a cooling water hose.  Radiological Control 
Technicians (RCTs) covering the job measured beta contamination at a level of 6,000 
dpm on the surface of the sole of the shoes of the MSG Technician as he exited the 
Radiation Area.  The magnets and magnet bus in the AGS are supplied by the Cooling 
Tower 1 water system, it provides water at about 200 psi.  In the past, the water in this 
system has not been significantly activated.  Approximately four months ago, at the end 
of the RHIC run in which this line was last in service, the magnet appeared to have 
developed a cooling water leak.  The magnet’s water system was valved off to prevent 
any release of water, and the small amount of water remaining in the magnet essentially 
became standing water at atmospheric pressure. The cooling system was taken out of 
service, and repair of this leak was to be performed at a future time.  On May 15, 2002, at 
approximately 10:30 hrs, the Technical Supervisor (TS) and a Technician from the MSG 
along with two RCTs entered Building 913, through the North Gate.  The MSG personnel 
were to diagnose and repair the water leak on the magnet.  The RCTs performed a survey 
prior to the MSG personnel entering the area.  The MSG TS inspected the magnet and 
determined that a water hose fitting was leaking.  The TS left the magnet area and 
returned to the North Gate area to fabricate a replacement hose.  The TS with one of the 
RCTs, reentered the area. The TS loosened the hose fitting on the existing magnet 
cooling hose, releasing approximately 1 liter of water onto the floor.  The TS removed 
the old hose and attached one half of the new hose to the magnet.  The TS observed that 
he was approaching 17 mrem (170 PSv) on his digital dosimeter and left the area so as to 
not exceed the 20-mrem (0.2 mSv) dose-limit, which was specified on the radiological 
work permit used for this job.  The MSG Technician entered the magnet area to complete 
attaching the water hose to the magnet.  As observed by the RCT, both the MSG TS and 
Technician had walked in the released magnet water.  As a prudent practice the RCT 
frisked the two workers for contamination.  The sole of one the MSG TS shoes was 
contaminated at a level of 1500 dpm.  This shoe was decontaminated and returned to the 
TS.  The MSG Technician’s shoes were contaminated at a level of 6,000 dpm.  These 
shoes could not be decontaminated and were confiscated by the RCT.  Additional surveys 
showed that the workers had no additional contamination.  The shoes were analyzed; Na-
24 (14 hour half life) and Be-7 (54 day half life) were found.  These isotopes were 
unexpected in the cooling water; usually the water is activated with short-lived isotopes 
such as O-15 (half life of 2 minutes).  Investigators believed that the water standing in the 
magnet for several months had become activated by the AGS main ring.  The AGS had 
recently operated with high-intensity protons.  The workers were not injured by the 
 74
contamination and they controlled the contamination well (ORPS CH-BH-BNL-AGS-
2002-0001).
On December 30, 2003 at approximately 0900 hours, a representative of the Collider-
Accelerator Department (C-AD) Booster/Alternating Gradient Synchrotron (AGS) Ring 
Power Supply Systems Group was contacted by personnel at the BNL Warehouse 
(Building 100) informing them that a flatbed truck had arrived with 7 crates of electrical 
equipment.  The crates were too large to be stored in Building 100 so it was decided that 
the equipment should be off loaded at a storage location in Building 912.  The crates 
were closely packed on the front of the flatbed truck precluding the use of an overhead 
crane to remove them.  Plant Engineering (EP) Riggers, assigned to the C-A Department, 
proceeded to off load the crates from the flatbed truck with a fork truck rated at 3.5 tons.  
The Power Supply Group representatives went to Building 912 to observe the off loading 
of the crates.  They did not have specific information about the individual crates but knew 
what the total equipment package was.  They observed that rigging was proceeding 
smoothly and left the area.  The rigging crew did not have information about crate 
contents, center of gravity, or weight, and the crate markings did not contain any specific 
information.  Five crates were offloaded without incident.  The riggers did not band each 
crate to the lift truck.  When the lift truck, rated at 3.5 tons, was moving the sixth crate, 
the lift truck encountered a rainwater-filled pothole in the apron area in front of the roll 
up door.  Because of the down-up motion of traversing the pothole, the load (a 
transformer) shifted inside the crate; it was not secured to the crate bottom as is the usual 
practice of shippers.  The rigger, who was guiding the lift truck operator, ran to the 
opposite side to help steady the load.  He realized that his pushing on the crate was 
having no effect; the crate was very heavy.  He backed away and the crate brushed his leg 
as it fell off the lift truck tines, which were a few inches above the floor.  His leg as 
bruised.  The transformer sustained obvious physical damage in the fall.  The injured 
rigger was sent to the medical clinic, the final, small crate was offloaded to allow the 
delivery driver to leave the scene, and an investigation was commenced.  Causal factors 
were: 1) crates not adequately labeled as to its contents, weight, and center of gravity; 2) 
crates were not adequately constructed for the contents contained within; 3) the 
transformer was not secured to the crate bottom by the shipper; 4) the shipping manifest 
did not have information about crates and contents; 5) the crates were not strapped to the 
mast of the fork truck for increased stability and security as required in the Plant 
Engineering procedure on forklift safety; 6) the apron/road surface was in need of repair 
and condition was concealed by rainwater; and 7) the Riggers did not adequately follow 
Plant Engineering Forklift Safety procedures in moving the crates.  The apparent cause of 
the incident was inadequate work planning.  The rigging crew had limited information 
about the individual crates they were transferring (ORPS CH-BH-BNL-AGS-2003-
0001).
An important environmental and safety issue arose with the AGS and Brookhaven 
National Laboratory in 1997 (Ingrassia, 2001).  Tritium was found in the ground water.  
The first discovery was 5 Ci of tritium from the spent fuel rod storage pool at the High 
Flux Beam Reactor, a fission reactor on site.  The DOE terminated the contract with the 
Associated Universities managing contractor, closed the fission reactor, and wrote a new 
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contract that highlighted environmental compliance (Briggs, 2001).  With the RHIC 
nearing completion, the accelerator staff realized that being able to prove environmental 
compliance would be crucial to continued operation of the AGS and startup of the RHIC.  
After detailed checks the site for other possible sources of tritium, three sources were 
found at the AGS.  One tritium source was in the earthen shielding near an active beam 
dump, another source in the earthen shielding due to chronic beam losses on one of the 
final quadrupole magnets, and one from the earthen shielding near a decommissioned 
beam dump.  Another source was found elsewhere in the accelerator complex, but has not 
been openly discussed.  The active beam dump area had a tritium concentration that was 
twice the Environmental Protection Agency’s drinking water standard, and the 
quadrupole magnet area had a tritium concentration that was 90 times the drinking water 
standard.  Since rainwater would transport the tritium and activated sodium to the water 
table, this was an environmental concern and also a personnel safety concern of ingestion 
and exposure since Brookhaven has always taken its on-site drinking water, and process 
water , from six on-site wells (Bennett, 2000).  Steel, concrete and soil are the primary 
shielding materials for accelerators, based on experience, economics, and convenience 
(Chao, 1999).  The AGS and RHIC are no exception.  Most of the secondary particles, 
created from shielding material interactions with the primary protons from the beam, are 
stopped by the shielding.  When a high energy secondary particle interacts with soil 
shielding, the longest lived radionuclides produced are tritium and sodium-22, at 12.3 and 
2.6 years, respectively.  The tritium and sodium form water soluble compounds that are 
easily dispersed by rainwater.  After these sources of tritium were identified, changes 
were made to prevent tritium mobilization to the groundwater.  For the active beam 
dump, it was positioned so that it will not inadvertently intercept the proton beam, which 
will reduce the scattered protons.  A gunite cap was placed over the soil above both beam 
dump locations to prevent rainwater from leaching the tritium and sodium to the water 
table or the site boundary.  For the quadrupole, the beam optics were reworked to prevent 
beam losses.  Loss monitors were installed near the quadrupole and are regularly checked 
for beam losses in transport.  A gunite cap was placed over the soil near the quadrupole 
as well.  The corrective actions for the other trouble spot was not discussed.  The 
accelerator operators have been given watchdog software that will generate an alarm 
when beam losses are high at critical, monitored locations or during prescribed segments 
of the acceleration cycles.  The operators have been trained to react as required to beam 
losses and to proactively prevent beam losses where possible. 
3.5  Other High Energy Physics Machines 
There have been several other events at smaller facilities.  Brief descriptions of these 
older events are presented in Table 3.  A few other events are described in more detail 
below.
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Table 3.  Operational Events at Particle Accelerators 
Event date Event Description Event Damage Reference 
11/08/1960 Two employees were accidentally 
exposed to an electron beam from a 
Van de Graaff accelerator. 
12,340 rem and 
1,277 rem to 
hands
WASH, 1975 
10/17/1963 While making an adjustment on a 
synchrotron, an employee received a 
radiation exposure. 
Whole-body
exposure of 3.8 
rem 
WASH, 1975 
07/21/1964 A hydrogen purifier exploded when a 
valve was inadvertently left closed 
during a purging operation. 
Precooler and 
adsorber coils 
were torn open 
and the dewar 
was bulged. 
WASH, 1975 
01/11/1965 An employee received radiation 
exposure while working next to a 
cyclotron vault. 
3.6 rem whole-
body exposure 
WASH, 1975 
05/06/1965 A fire occurred due to capacitor 
failure in an electrical pulsing 
modulator of an electron accelerator.  
No injuries. 
$127k in 
equipment and 
cleanup costs. 
WASH, 1975 
05/22/1965 a physicist received radiation to a 
finger when the beam shutter on a 
Van de Graaff machine opened 
without his knowledge. 
51 rem to a 
finger. 
WASH, 1975 
07/07/1965 An employee thought an x-ray 
machine was off and he reached in to 
change materials.  He received 
exposure to his hand. 
1,000 rem to 
fingers, 2nd
degree burns.  12 
days lost during 
burn recovery. 
WASH, 1975 
09/15/1965 An employee was unaware that an x-
ray machine was on and the shutter 
was open; he reached into the 
machine to wipe away moisture. 
80,000 rem to 
fingers; 100 days 
lost time and 
amputation of 
part of his index 
finger. 
WASH, 1975 
03/18/1966 A hydrogen explosion occurred at the 
inlet to an adsorber coil of a bubble 
chamber when hydrogen flow began. 
No injuries, 
$11.6k damage 
WASH, 1975 
06/06 to 19/ 
1966
An employee at a university linear 
accelerator had an overexposure. 
50 rem whole 
body
WASH, 1975 
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Table 3.  Continued. 
Event date Event Description Event Damage Reference 
12/09/1966 A rubber cooling water hose for an 
experimental magnet ruptured, the 
water spray caused a short circuit 
across the bus connections.  The arc 
ignited polyethylene sheeting. 
No injuries, 
$8.3k in damage 
WASH, 1975 
06/14/1967 A Van de Graaff accelerating tube, in 
its cradle, was being moved by crane.  
Workers did not check the four lifting 
slings, which had been shackled but 
not lashed together.  When lifted, the 
tube slid out of its cradle and fell 
4.5 m to the floor. 
No injuries, 
$10.6k in 
damage
WASH, 1975 
12/24/1967 A fire began in the compressor trailer 
for a bubble chamber facility.  The 
cause was probably electrical. 
No injuries. 
Compressors, 
piping and 
wiring were 
damaged, $15k. 
WASH, 1975 
06/23/1968 A defective transformer joint failed, 
resulting in a fire.  The power supply 
transformer was damaged. 
No injuries. 
Damages at $12k 
WASH, 1975 
07/24/1970 A bomb was exploded at the 
University of Wisconsin, fatally 
injuring a researcher in the low 
energy physics lab.  This act was 
attributed to student unrest. 
One fatality. WASH, 1975 
11/17-18/
1970
A staff assistant was exposed when 
handling Cu targets from alpha 
particle irradiation in a cyclotron 
finger doses 
from 150 to 480 
rem. 
WASH, 1975 
08/19/1972 An electrical failure in the rotor of a 
motor in the main magnet supply 
system resulted in a forced shutdown 
of the synchrotron.  The motor had to 
be removed and sent to a shop for 
repairs.
No injuries. 
$45k to repair. 
WASH, 1975 
01/14/1973 A staff engineer was electrocuted 
during energized trouble-shooting 
operations of a high voltage, high 
power RF amplifier at a synchrotron.  
Attempts to revive the man failed. 
One fatality. WASH, 1975 
 78
Table 3.  Continued. 
Event date Event Description Event Damage Reference 
07/15/1974 An electrical engineer was 
electrocuted when he sustained a 
shock from a betatron capacitor bank 
and its support structure that were 
energized to ~5 kV from a low 
impedance power source.  The 
engineer was working on an 
energized control circuit at the time. 
One fatality. WASH, 1975 
11/11/1974 A graduate student received exposure 
from a 3 MeV proton beam at a 
tandem Van de Graaff generator. 
First and second 
degree burns on 
hand, 2E+6 rads 
to 2nd degree 
area, and 4.6E+5 
rads to 1st degree 
area. 
01/26/1976 Fatigue cracks were found in a 
bubble chamber, operations were 
delayed for 10 months. 
No injuries. 
$75k in damage. 
DOE, 1980 
Table 3 presented several types of events: radiation overexposures, fatal electrical 
accidents, and equipment fires.  While these events occurred from thirty to forty years 
ago, the hazards and concerns are still valid.  Other events important to industrial safety 
are discussed below.   
On July 5, 1965, an explosion and fire occurred in the experimental hall of the 
Cambridge electron accelerator (AEC, 1966).  The complex was located on the grounds 
of Harvard University, and consisted of a laboratory/office building, a cryogenics 
building, a power building, the experimental hall, and the accelerator tunnel.  Three 
experiments were under way in the experiment hall on the day of the explosion.  These 
were a 500-liter liquid hydrogen bubble chamber, a liquid hydrogen target and Freon-
filled counter for photoproduction of mesons from the accelerator beam, and an 
experiment on elastic photoproduction of K mesons that used a propane-filled Cerenkov 
counter and an ethylene filled Cerenkov counter.  Other important equipment included 
the two 100-pound storage cylinders of liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) used to fuel the 
emergency electrical generator.  These two cylinders were mounted not far from the 
bubble chamber.  While operations were in progress, at 0332 hours an explosion occurred 
at the bubble chamber.  Investigation revealed that the inner thin beryllium window (3-
mm thick, 241-mm diameter) catastrophically failed, and that window shards and the 
hydrogen jet from the chamber then almost instantaneously failed the outer beryllium 
window of the same size.  The inner beryllium window was thought to have failed due to 
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fracture from excessive mechanical and thermal stresses placed on it by the window-
mounting system when cooled to cryogenic temperature; investigators concluded that the 
inner window had been poorly designed.  The failure of both windows allowed about half 
the contents of the chamber to be rapidly expelled into the room.  The most likely 
ignition source for the vaporizing cryogenic hydrogen was the fracture energy of the 
outer beryllium window, but numerous other sources of ignition were also present.  This 
deflagration of hydrogen in the air caused an overpressure of about 10.3 kPa (1.5 psig) in 
the experiment hall.  The pressure lifted the roof and then it settled back onto the 
building.  All the personnel injuries were attributed to the first explosion.  Roof 
insulation, a tar-coated fiberboard, was ignited in some locations.  Melting tar that fell to 
the floor also burned in many locations.  Combustibles in the room (cables, papers, hoses, 
fallen roof insulation) ignited near the bubble chamber.  Most of the secondary fires were 
of short duration due to limited combustibles and conditions being unfavorable for 
continued combustion.  Exceptions were fires consuming hydrogen near the bubble 
chamber, the darkroom, the two LPG tanks, and the propane supply tanks for the 
Cerenkov counter.  Fire near the two LPG tanks sufficiently heated the tanks until they 
vented.  The venting LPG caused a second explosion and an intense gas-fed fire.  Fire 
heat melted the mylar window of the Cerenkov counter and falling roof debris damaged 
the propane gas manifold.  The window and manifold failures were believed to be the 
causes of propane release; the gas ignited and also added to the fire.  The heat caused the 
six propane tanks in the room to pressurize and lift their relief valves to vent.  Fire heat 
also melted the fusible safety links on the cylinder valves to allow even more venting.  
The venting propane caused another fierce fire in the room.  Portions of the roof and 
combustible materials in the room burned until the fire department extinguished the fires.  
Eight people in the room were injured, one perished 15 days after the event due to third-
degree burns over 60% of his body and having suffered a ruptured liver from the event 
trauma.  Of the seven other staff and researchers, one had severe burns, one had serious 
burns, one had burns and back injury, two had modest burns, one suffered head injuries 
and lacerations, and the last person had injuries to his chin and leg.  Also, two firefighters 
were injured, one from smoke inhalation and one suffered a laceration that required 
stitches (WASH, 1975).  This facility cost $11.6 M to construct, and the fire damage 
amounted to $1.45 M to repair the building and replace the equipment.  These 
catastrophic explosions and fire resulted in a loss at over 12% of the initial cost of the 
facility (AEC, 1966).  This event is definitely a case where a component failure produced 
catastrophic results. 
Dewald (1988) discussed a fire that broke out in a duoplasmatron ion source at the 
Cologne tandem accelerator in the summer of 1984.  The fire was most likely caused by a 
defective resistor or a high voltage discharge on top of the ion source chamber.  The fire 
ignited under the plexiglass shielding.  The shielding, cables, gas tubes, polyvinyl 
chloride tubes, and resistors were completely destroyed; plaster fell from the ceiling due 
to the intense heat and the smoke blackened the walls and ceiling.  The burning polyvinyl 
chloride released HCl gas, which caused a great deal of corrosion to aluminum and 
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stainless steel surfaces, power supply contacts, electrical wiring (insulation and wire), and 
other surfaces.  The accelerator was down for over 6 months to clean the facility and 
repair the fire damage. 
The following event has been included here due to the fact that the same type of 
operation occurs at accelerators and fusion experiments.  The Los Alamos National 
Laboratory Gas Facility was receiving a gas shipment via a tube trailer on June 3, 1981.  
A hydrogen tube trailer and an oxygen tube trailer were simultaneously connected to the 
same manifold.  There were insufficient barriers – only one shutoff valve – between the 
two types of gas.  Incorrect purging procedures contributed to the event by allowing 
damage to the one valve and subsequent flow of higher pressure oxygen into one tube of 
the hydrogen trailer.  Investigators believed that ignition was caused by contamination 
(i.e., sand particles) traveling through the valve at high velocity.  The resulting explosion 
ruptured the tube, propelling tube fragments up to 380 m away from the trailer and 
creating a fireball of short duration.  The fireball caused first and second degree burns 
over about 30% of the body of each of the two employees.  One of the employees also 
suffered a small area of third degree burns.  The tube trailer suffered major damage, the 
facility suffered minor damage.  The total estimated damage was $25k (DOE, 1982).  The 
accident investigation revealed that the cause was inadvertent mixing of hydrogen and 
oxygen due to insufficient technical and safety training of the personnel involved, lack of 
management control of the operation, lack of standard operating procedures for the task 
being attempted, and inadequate/poorly maintained equipment. 
The CAIRS web site provided this information: the Superconducting Super Collider 
construction site near Waxahachie. Texas, suffered a construction accident.  A 
construction worker was killed on January 29, 1993.  An employee of the 
Obayashi/Dillingham company, a subcontractor at the SSC project site, was fatally 
injured when a concrete tunnel segment fell, crushing him against the segment erection 
device.
3.6  Summary 
Figure 9 gives the DOE safety performance data for all research and development 
facilities from 1993-2003.  Comparisons of these overall rate data to Figures 1, 3, 5, and 
7 show that for staff members, PPPL varies between being equal to the yearly ‘all DOE 
research’ values and having much higher rate values, SLAC varies between being equal 
to the ‘all DOE research’ values and having about double the rate values, FNAL is about 
the same as the ‘all DOE research’ values, and CEBAF/Jlab is usually slightly below the 
‘all DOE research’ values for lost work day rates.  For services subcontractors, SLAC 
and FNAL were much higher than the ‘all DOE research’ values, CEBAF was lower, and 
PPPL did not list services separately.  For construction, SLAC had rates generally higher 
by factors of 2 to 3, FNAL was slightly lower than the DOE values (except for a few 
peak years), and CEBAF was generally lower than the DOE rates except for one spike  
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Figure 9.  Plots of All DOE Research Industrial Safety Performance from 1993-2003. 
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upward.  Both SLAC and FNAL had construction fatalities, as did the Superconducting 
Super Collider; but CEBAF and RHIC did not experience any construction fatalities.  
These fatality results may be due to the time frames of the construction; SLAC and 
FNAL main construction was in the 1960’s (before the comprehensive OSHA regulations 
were in effect) and the early 1970’s (when OSHA was a new administration, having just 
come into effect in 1971).  In the 1980’s and 1990’s, when OSHA regulations had 
become more enforced in the construction industry, the overall trend was decreased 
annual numbers of fatalities.  The additional construction at FNAL and CEBAF in the 
1990’s and 2000’s has been completed without any construction fatalities.  The data show 
that there have not been any staff or subcontractor fatalities in the operation and 
maintenance of the accelerators, but there have been high consequence occupational 
accidents, usually dealing with electrical energy.  Therefore, a strong program of 
electrical safety is considered essential for future experiments. 
The initial expectation was that since FNAL is a worldwide leading particle accelerator 
and that SLAC is also a major facility in the world, that the facilities would be operated 
very professionally.  However, the safety records show that these machines are not 
always operated with trend-setting safety or with best practices.  Busick (1979) described 
that experimenters are human and possess human responses to pressure.  As experimental 
apparatus becomes more complex and costly, time pressure increases.  Safeguards are 
often viewed as serious impediments to experimental necessity.  When pressures mount 
and safety barriers are in the way there is strong desire to bypass such barriers.  Busick 
advocated enlightenment rather than enforcement as the means to obtain compliance with 
safety requirements; explaining the reasons for safety barriers rather than handing out 
punishment when a worker was caught in a violation.  Busick believed that willing 
support of the experimenters and staff was essential to provide a safe working 
environment.  Patterson (1994) describes the growth of high energy physics post-WW II.  
There was a somewhat cavalier attitude toward chronic radiation exposure, the only 
safety respect that was given by the research staff was for possible large, acute radiation 
doses.  This was because there was adequate and accepted proof at the time that these 
doses could incur great harm or even be lethal.  The experimenters were definitely in 
charge of the machines, it was nearly impossible for safety personnel to keep the 
experimenters and users from the machine even though close contact with the machine 
meant radiation exposure.  Experimenters and technicians would walk and crawl over all 
parts of the machines; they only acknowledged dangers were present when the beam was 
on.  If radiation safety was taken cavalierly, then we can be reasonably certain that 
industrial safety was not diligently addressed.  This sort of attitude seems to have 
survived in the institutional memory of these facilities despite the DOE and OSHA rules 
and regulations that the facilities must comply with.  Overall, FNAL and SLAC produce 
physics results and have accomplished these results without any operational fatalities.  
They have experienced occupational accidents, but these accident events have been 
accepted by the DOE.  While these losses may be acceptable, it is nonetheless clear that 
safe operations are good business.  In an example from another industry, Mottel (1995) 
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described the DuPont company’s safety story.  Mottel pointed out that while safety 
programs cost money, the savings by safe operations are greater than the safety program 
costs.  The DuPont company has operated safety programs that do not cost significantly 
more than other companies, but DuPont has had lost work case rates a factor of 10 less 
than the comparable chemical industry.  The savings in medical costs and replacement 
work alone recoup the safety program costs.  Mottel also describes some other savings: 
lost work time accidents generally mean replacing a skilled employee with a less skilled 
backup employee, safe performance minimizes the disruption of efficient plant 
operations, safe performance enhances maintenance at optimum operating conditions and 
minimizes damage to equipment and materials, and safe workers perform better than 
unsafe workers.  Mottel also noted that employee morale is much higher in high safety 
facilities.  Even when workers complain about safety requirements slowing their 
progress, they still tend to mentally equate the time, funding, and effort spent on safety as 
indications that management is interested in them as individuals.  With such good morale 
built up, the total group works toward productive goals, including safe and efficient 
operations.  Mottel also stated that at DuPont, employees and managers had clear safety 
goals, everyone understood that safety was a condition of continued employment.  Since 
ITER is higher risk than present fusion experiments, continued attention to occupational 
safety is needed. 
Another important issue seen from the ORPS reports and accident investigations is that 
more and more of the work has been subcontracted to outside companies as cost savings 
and time efficiency measures.  Cost savings may have been realized by keeping smaller 
maintenance staff, but from the ORPS and accident reports it is also clear that there has 
been inadequate supervision by accelerator staff to determine that the subcontractors 
were meeting their safety obligations as specified in their contracts.  This inadequate 
oversight combined with inadequate subcontractor safety and lack of subcontractor 
familiarity with the facilities has resulted in some of the highest consequence events at 
the accelerators, including electric arc burns, falls, chemical combustion accidents, and 
other events.  If ITER hires subcontractors, then proper oversight of the subcontractors is 
necessary to enforce occupational safety. 
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4.0 NUCLEAR POWER PLANT OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY
This chapter presents data gathered from the US nuclear industry about the light water 
reactor nuclear power plants, to allow general comparisons to the other data from DOE 
experiment facilities.  Power plant operation is covered by the US Bureau of Labor 
Statistics (BLS) under ‘electric services’, but this category includes all types of power 
plants.  These include coal-fired plants, oil and gas burning plants, hydroelectric dams, 
wind farms and solar plants, pumped storage, compressed air storage, and nuclear plants.  
The data have been binned too broadly for close comparisons.  Yager (2001) noted this, 
and the author verified this same observation with the BLS.  Nuclear plants are about 
20% of the US electrical power production; however, nuclear power plants tend to 
employ more staff than other types of power plants so using a scaling factor of 20% of 
the electric services category values would be inaccurate.  Also, scanning news reports 
indicates that there are accidents involved with the material handling of large quantities 
of coal, including rail accidents, injuries from moving coal at the plant site and crushing 
the coal before burning, and the occasional explosion of coal dust.  There have also been 
several events of steam line breaks in coal-fired plants that resulted in fatalities, the worst 
event in the US being the Mohave power plant event in June 1985, which resulted in six 
employee fatalities and ten employees being seriously injured (Bangs, 1986).  
The reader should recall that the first commercial nuclear power plant in the US was the 
Shippingport pressurized water reactor (PWR) that came on line in 1957, and the next 
plants were the Dresden I boiling water reactor (BWR) and the Yankee Rowe PWR in 
1960, and the Big Rock Point BWR in 1963.  There were 18 plants on line by mid-1965.  
After that, dozens more plants came on line in the rest of the 1960’s and the 1970’s.  
After the Three Mile Island accident in 1979, new plant orders were retracted, and only a 
few plants that were under construction have been completed since then.  There are now 
just over 100 operating power plants in the US.  As stated above, the BLS does not 
partition its data by the type of plant that an electric power industry worker chooses as 
his/her vocation.  Therefore, other data sets have been sought.  The earliest occupational 
safety data located was a series of industry-specific reports that the US Atomic Energy 
Commission requested from the BLS.  These data spanned 1965-1970 (BLS, 1967; BLS, 
1969; BLS, 1970; BLS 1971; BLS, 1972) and are presented in Table 4.  There seems to 
be great reluctance on the part of the nuclear power plant companies to discuss their 
occupational injuries or fatalities.  Perhaps this is due to the nuclear industry’s concern 
that their industrial injuries and fatalities would be misconstrued by the media and the 
public as being related to ionizing radiation when they are not.   
Other sources of occupational safety data have also been compiled and published.  
O’Donnell (1982) referred to the data in Table 4, and they used plant data from the 
Tennessee Valley Authority, that was operating several nuclear power plants at that time 
(Browns Ferry 1, 2, and 3 were all operational by 1977; the Sequoyah and Watt’s Bar 
plants came on line later).  This is only a small sample of the 100 US power plants that 
now operate.  
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Table 4.  Early Values of Occupational Safety Rates for the Nuclear Fission Industry 
Annual Injury Frequency Rate 
Type of Activity 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 
Production of special 
materials for use in 
reactors 
(graphite, beryllium, 
etc.) 
9.2
(0.018)
13.3
(0.027)
25.2
(0.050)
36.8
(0.074)
28.2
(0.056)
42.6
(0.085)
Fuel element 
fabrication 
4.2
(0.008)
4.6
(0.009)
6.9
(0.014)
5.3
(0.011)
7.1
(0.014)
6.4
(0.013)
Reactor and reactor 
component design and 
manufacture 
4.2
(0.008)
4.0
(0.008)
2.8
(0.006)
4.8
(0.01)
4.7
(0.01)
3.3
(0.007)
Design and engineering 
of nuclear facilities 
7.2
(0.014)
5.9
(0.012)
10.5
(0.021)
1.4
(0.003)
1.6
(0.003)
2.3
(0.005)
Power reactor operation 
and maintenance 
3.3
(0.007)
3.9
(0.008)
5.0
(0.01)
n/c n/c 7.9 
(0.016)
Nuclear instruments 
manufacturing
3.8
(0.008)
5.8
(0.012)
5.5
(0.011)
6.8
(0.014)
6.2
(0.012)
7.9
(0.016)
Processing and 
packaging 
radioisotopes
1.3
(0.003)
1.8
(0.004)
7.9
(0.016)
6.5
(0.013)
n/c 4.5 
(0.009)
Private research labs 3.7
(0.007)
4.7
(0.009)
2.7
(0.005)
4.0
(0.008)
4.6
(0.009)
4.0
(0.008)
Injury distribution (%) 
death 
permanent impairments 
temporary impairments 
1.1
5.8
93.1
1.3
4.7
94.0
0.5
2.9
96.6
1.0
3.3
95.7
0.7
3.8
95.5
0.8
2.6
96.6
Notes:  The injury frequency rate is the number of injuries per million employee-hours 
per year.  Assuming a standard work year of 2,000 hours, this rate is per 500 workers 
per year.  The second number, in parenthesis, is the annual rate per individual worker. 
“n/c” stands for not cited; the data were omitted if they were of questionable statistical 
reliability (e.g., low values of man-hours worked were reported to BLS).   
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O’Donnell data from Tennessee Valley Authority plants is given below: 
Incidence Rates 1975  1976  1977
fatalities   0.0  0.0  0.0 (note: they assumed 0.01/100 man-years)
per 100 man-years 
Serious injuries 0.38  0.27  1.7 
per 100 man-years 
Cochran (1999) reported some data from a Nuclear News magazine article (Rippon, 
1981) that outlined worker injury rates that had been complied for a United Kingdom 
safety report; this report also cited other data sources.  Operating a nuclear power station 
of 1,000 MWe at 75% availability gave these results: 
  Nuclear power plant annual operation (including reprocessing)  
Study  Accidental injuries per 750 MWe Accidental deaths per 750 MWe
Inhaber   1.37    0.01-0.013 
Norwegian   0.7-2.8    0.01-0.2 
Swedish    11.1    0.03 
WASH-1224   1.42    0.012 
Comar & Sagan  1.3    0.01 
Fagnani & Maccia  4.9    0.013 
Hamilton   1.3    0.015 
Black & Niehaus  3.48    0.011 (this value excludes reprocessing)
Ranges   0.7-11.1   0.01-0.2 
To convert the UK report values to injuries and fatalities per worker-year, the average 
number of workers at a nuclear power plant is needed.  Not all the sources above were 
US data, and only counts of US workers at nuclear plants are available, but these are 
probably similar to UK staffing counts.  Due to the assumption of similar staffing, the 
conversion will only be applied to the ranges of values.  The annual radiation exposure 
NUREG (Burrows, 2002) gives the number of workers monitored for radiation exposure 
in all of the 104 commercial power plants in the US.  This number of monitored workers 
was 140,776 for 2001 and the average number of workers per plant is rounded off to 
1,350.  The Statistical Abstract of the US for 2002 cited 354,000 workers in the overall 
electrical services industry (code 491).  Therefore, nuclear plants that produce about 20% 
of the nation’s power employ ~40% of the electric services workers, meaning that nuclear 
plants are more highly staffed than coal-fired, hydroelectric, and other types of power 
plants.  These data qualitatively agree with industry claims of high amounts of staffing at 
nuclear versus other power facilities.  As a first approximation, we assume that most of 
the US plants are large output; this is reasonable since the first several plants that were 
small power output have been decommissioned (e.g., Shippingport, Dresden 1, Big Rock 
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Point, Yankee Rowe).  Using this average number of workers per plant value to match 
the 1,000 MWe plant, a new range values has been calculated for the data given above: 
 Accidental injuries per worker-year Accidental deaths per worker-year
Adjusted Ranges 5.19E-04 – 8.22E-03   7.4E-06 – 1.48E-03 
The US industry has had a more recent publication of occupational safety data in Nuclear 
News (NN, 2001).  These data were compiled by the US Institute of Nuclear Power 
Operations (INPO).  Their compilation was based on 200,000 worker-hours, with a 
standard work year being 2,000 hours.  Yearly aggregate values for lost work time 
injuries, injuries resulting in restricted work, and fatalities (combined under the term 
“accidents”) for nuclear power plants have been given as: 
  Accidents per    Accidents per 
Calendar year  200,000 worker-hours  worker-year
1980     2.10   0.0210 
1984    1.50   0.0150 
1988    1.34   0.0134 
1990    1.03   0.0103 
1992    0.77   0.0077 
1994    0.64   0.0064 
1996    0.46   0.0046 
1998    0.29   0.0029 
1999    0.34   0.0034 
2000    0.26   0.0026 
The stated 1998-1999-2000 goal value was 0.40 accidents/200,000 worker-hours, or 
0.004 accidents per worker-year.  Note the factor of 8 decrease in the accident rate from 
1980 to 2000, even though the number of plants coming on line was still slowly 
increasing throughout the 1980’s and the plants were increasing their on-line time from 
~70% availability to ~90% availability.  INPO has also published a performance 
indicators update (INPO, 2003) that gives 2001 and 2002 values of 0.24 and 0.22 
accidents per 200,000 worker-hours.  Loomis (1999) stated that in a study of five power 
companies (operating mainly fossil fueled plants) that included 1,454,370 worker-years, 
the fatality rate was 0.0132/worker-year.  The Loomis study listed causes of death, in 
descending order, as electric current exposure, homicide, falls from height, exposure to 
explosions, ‘struck by object’, drowning, burns, machinery-related, and motor vehicle 
accidents.  The electrical events were 45% of the deaths, and were divided into high 
energy work (i.e., linemen, substation operators, and cable splicers), medium energy 
work (i.e., mechanics, machinists, operators, welders who work near energized buses and 
switchgear), and low energy work, such as that performed by instrumentation and 
controls technicians, relay technicians, telecommunication technicians, and riggers.   
The World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO) has also published some 
occupational safety data that has been shared from member utilities (WANO, 2003).  The 
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accident rate is for industrial accidents that result in lost work time, restricted work, or 
fatalities.  These data are summarized below for comparison to the Nuclear News/INPO 
data: 
Calendar   Number of   Accident Rate per  Accident Rate 
Year  Power Plants Reporting 200,000 man-hours  per worker-yr
1990   169    1.04   0.0104 
1992   175    0.80   0.0080 
1994   183    0.63   0.0063 
1996   198    0.51   0.0051 
1998   202    0.42   0.0042 
2000   203    0.33   0.0033 
2001   200    0.33   0.0033 
2002   203    0.31   0.0031 
2003   201    0.28   0.0028 
The US is a member of WANO, and the count of US nuclear power plants in the 1990-
2003 time span was about 100; consequently there are data from about 100 other plants in 
other WANO member countries represented in this table.  The numbers closely agree to 
the Nuclear News/INPO values.  Therefore, of the ~400 worldwide reactors, the 
occupational safety rates at half the plants are quite favorable. 
These statistical data were the only published data found in an extensive literature search.  
Assuming that these data are essentially correct, there remains the issue of how to 
decompose the reported “accident” data into fatality and injury events.  The earliest data 
compiled by the BLS held some percentage values that have been given at the bottom of 
Table 4.  It is reasonable to assume that two factors would tend to reduce the cited 
percentages of death in occupational accidents.  The first is the OSHA regulations that 
came into effect in 1971.  While the set of BLS reports shows that the nuclear industry 
was typically experiencing fewer incidents than general industry, some aspects of the 
OSHA regulations would still impact power plant safety; for example, electrical safety 
and ladder safety regulations.  The OSHA regulations have had the overall industry effect 
of reducing occupational fatalities throughout the country.  From the National Institute of 
Occupational Safety and Health web site cdc.gov/niosh: 
“The numbers and rates of traumatic occupational fatalities declined from 
1980 through 1998. The number of fatal occupational injuries decreased 
35%, from 7,343 fatalities in 1980 to 4,798 in 1998. The annual fatality 
rate per 100,000 civilian workers decreased 47%, from 7.4 in 1980 to 3.9 
in 1998.”
The second factor responsible for saving lives is the increasing medical knowledge and 
increased levels of emergency medical care, with paramedics and emergency medical 
technicians that can administer first aid and lifesaving measures much more quickly than 
the 1950’s and 1960’s ambulances that merely transported an injured person to a hospital.  
The exact count of recent annual fatalities at nuclear power plants is not readily available, 
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but fatality counts are believed to be only a few persons each year, from causes such as 
electrocutions, vehicle accidents, falls and other events.  Considering 2002, when the 
only known work-related fatality at a US nuclear plant was a worker who was 
electrocuted while trimming tree branches near a 138 kV line on a reactor site (LER, 
2002), then the fatal accident ratio is 1/140,776 or 7.1E-06 fatalities per worker-year.  
Combining with 0.0022 accidents per worker-year for 2002 from INPO, the fatality 
percentage is 0.32%.  Comparing to the data in Table 4-1, this is a small decrease in the 
fatality percentage, but consideration must also be given to the fact that the industry has 
also expanded a great deal in ~30 years.  
An overall table of the commercial power plant operation occupational safety data is 
given below, on a per plant worker basis.  Subcontractors are not included in these 
estimates: 
  Accident rate   Fatality rate 
Year  per worker-year per worker-year Source
1965  0.007   7.7E-05  (BLS, 1967) 
1966  0.008   1.0E-04  (BLS, 1967) 
1967  0.01   5.0E-05  (BLS, 1969) 
1968  n/c   n/c   (BLS, 1970) 
1969  n/c   n/c   (BLS, 1971) 
1970  0.016   1.3E-04  (BLS, 1972) 
Data from only two plants: 
1975  0.0038   1E-04 (assumed)  (O’Donnell, 1982) 
1976  0.0027   1E-04 (assumed)  (O’Donnell, 1982) 
1977  0.017   1E-04 (assumed)  (O’Donnell, 1982) 
1980   0.0210   1.3E-04  (NN, 2001), (assumed 0.6% deaths)
1984  0.0150   9.0E-05  (NN, 2001), (assumed 0.6% deaths)
1985  0.0110   6.6E-05  (INPO, 2003), (assumed 0.6% deaths)
1988  0.0134   8.0E-05  (NN, 2001), (assumed 0.6% deaths)
1990  0.0103   4.6E-05  (NN, 2001), (assumed 0.6% deaths)
1992  0.0077   3.5E-05  (NN, 2001), (assumed 0.45% deaths)
1994  0.0064   2.9E-05  (NN, 2001), (assumed 0.45% deaths)
1995  0.0055   2.5E-05  (INPO, 2003), (assumed 0.45% deaths)
1996  0.0046   2.1E-05  (NN, 2001), (assumed 0.45% deaths) 
1997  0.0045   2.0E-05  (INPO, 2003), (assumed 0.45% deaths)
1998  0.0029   1.3E-05  (NN, 2001), (assumed 0.45% deaths)
1999  0.0034   1.5E-05  (NN, 2001), (assumed 0.45% deaths)
2000  0.0026   8.3E-06  (NN, 2001), used 0.32% deaths
2001  0.0024   7.7E-06  (INPO, 2003), used 0.32% deaths
2002  0.0022   7.0E-06  (INPO, 2003), used 0.32% deaths
The comparison values show that the accident rates at nuclear power plants have been 
decreasing with time, which means that fission plants have become safer places to work.  
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The fission power industry is maturing; plant operators and maintainers, and their 
managers, have recognized the hazards and they mitigate or avoid hazards.  US fission 
plants now operate in the 85-90% availability range per calendar year (Cadwallader, 
1999), due to several factors - understanding the plant, the decrease in ‘infant mortality’ 
equipment failures that typically occur in the first few years of new plant operation, 
economics drivers, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s scram reduction program.  
What is notable for fission plants is that the most hazardous plant areas are no longer 
routinely occupied. 
Unfortunately, the fission plant occupational safety data resolution does not allow 
estimation of the accident or fatality risk for individual occupations (e.g., welder, 
mechanic, electrician, etc.) or operation in the plant, such as maintenance, surveillance, or 
inspection tasks, operations evolutions, or other tasks.  Only the yearly totals have been 
reported by INPO and WANO.  These data apply only to the utility personnel, that is, the 
people who are permanently assigned to the power plant, not subcontractors who are 
hired for special tasks.  Subcontractors were not included in these estimates.  The data 
can only serve as bounding values for overall yearly safety estimates for fusion workers.  
From previous chapters, there have not been any occupational fatalities in operation of 
the fusion experiments or accelerators, so there is no fatality rate.  Lost work case rates 
for PPPL, SLAC, FNAL and CEBAF, from Figures 1, 3, 5, and 7, have been compared to 
the accident rates given for fission plants and were very comparable in past decades, but 
now the fusion and accelerator rates are in the 0.02/worker-year range and the fission 
plants have reduced their accident rate to the 0.002/worker-year range.  However, the 
severity of the accidents is usually quite low for the technology facilities (as seen in 
Figures 2, 4, 6, and 8) while the accident severity for the power plants is not known. 
Scanning the NRC database and web site has given a few recent power plant events of 
industrial safety interest; however, these databases are not obligated to report 
occupational injuries that did not endanger the public with exposure to radiation.  In 
10CFR50.72, the NRC must be notified in case an event or situation at a licensee was 
related to the health or safety of the plant workers and the licensee planned to make a 
press release; such as an on-site fatality or the release of radioactive materials.  This 
includes transporting a potentially contaminated worker off-site for medical treatment.  
Some injuries have also been reported as a courtesy to the NRC.  Of course, occupational
accidents and fatalities are reported to OSHA, but OSHA and the BLS do not publish 
data strictly for nuclear power plants.  Some events of industrial safety concern from 
nuclear power plants are discussed below. 
A few NRC publications have discussed industrial safety.  Bertini (1980) and Sailor 
(1985) discussed several events: seven employees injured at the Robinson-2 PWR in 
1970 when a safety valve failed; an employee was seriously injured when he was drawn 
through a manhole in a containment air lock at the Surry-2 PWR in 1973; two employees 
were injured in a hydrogen gas explosion from the off-gas system at the Cooper BWR in 
1975; and one employee injured in a hydrogen gas explosion from the off-gas system at 
the Millstone-1 PWR in 1977.  The workers at Robinson-2 were testing the secondary 
side safety relief valves before the plant was operational.  When they began to attach the 
 95
testing equipment to the ninth valve, a fan of steam jetted out and the valve 
catastrophically failed, tearing loose and shooting up about 40 m.  The workers were 
showered with debris and were being impinged by steam.  They were either blown from 
the scaffolding to the floor or leapt down to avoid the steam.  The seven men were 
transported by ambulance to the hospital, where they were treated for steam burns and 
injuries.  Bertini also described the Surry-2 event with the worker drawn through the air 
lock on December 10, 1973.  The plant was operating and the control room received an 
alarm that containment pressure was slightly increasing.  An operator was sent to 
investigate the seals of the air lock doors.  He entered the air lock but forgot to close the 
outer door and reduce the pressure in the passageway.  As he was checking the seal to a 
0.46-m diameter escape hatch, the hatch seal failed and the hatch opened.  The air 
pressure difference between the containment and the passageway propelled the worker 
into the hatch and he fell ~5 m into the containment building where he struck a crane.  
Other workers did not know what had happened to the employee; the plant shut down on 
the containment air pressure increasing and two more operators were sent to investigate.  
They saw the outer airlock door open and the inner hatch open; they assumed the first 
operator had entered the containment and that he was careless to leave both sides of the 
airlock open.  They closed the outer door to re-establish containment pressure.  After 
about 30 minutes, the injured man crawled back into the airlock but could not open it, and 
now the air pressure on the door was about 27 kPa (4 psi), so the door could not be 
opened.  The other workers found him in the airlock, and the containment had to be 
brought up to a higher pressure to be able to open the outer door and render aid to the 
operator.  This took another 30 minutes.  He was seriously injured, but he recovered from 
his injuries and returned to work.   
Sailor (1985) and Bertini (1980) described explosions at the Millstone-1 PWR on 
December 13, 1977.  During plant operation, a small hydrogen gas explosion occurred in 
the auxiliary building.  The damage was minor; the cause was not certain.  The plant 
continued to operate.  Some of the water seals in the off-gas system were blown out in the 
first explosion.  The seals were not properly refilled, so hydrogen leaked out of the off-
gas system (as it is designed to do).  When enough hydrogen had accumulated in the 
auxiliary building, electrical equipment sparks ignited the gas and a larger explosion 
occurred about 3.5 hours later.  The door to the auxiliary building was blown from its 
hinges and traveled 54.8 m (180 feet) where it struck the warehouse building.  One man 
was seriously injured and was hospitalized for 4 days.   
Bertini (1980) also described an event at the Surry-1 plant on July 27, 1972.  Workers 
were attempting to vent steam from the secondary coolant system while the plant was in 
hot-standby to perform maintenance on the main turbine bypass valves.  They 
manipulated the atmospheric steam dump valves, but these valves did not work.  They 
tried another valve and one of the three men went outside to see if the steam was venting 
from the release line.  It was not, and when he returned to the building he saw that the 
upper level where the valves were was full of steam.  The other two men had become 
engulfed in steam.  The third man called for valve closure and for help, but the two men 
were badly scalded and died four days later.  In that plant design, the release line was not 
welded to the vent valve exhaust (presumably due to thermal expansion and contraction 
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issues), it was sleeve fitted.  On the day of the event, investigators believed that the valve 
hung up on the sleeve and then pushed downward farther than normal, so that steam 
escaped from the sleeve connection into the surrounding area.   
On November 5, 1975, the Cooper power plant suffered a hydrogen gas explosion in the 
auxiliary building.  A misaligned valve (that gave proper valve lineup indication in the 
control room) on the main condenser allowed steam, hydrogen and oxygen to back up 
into a sump in the auxiliary building.  When the sump began to register high pressure, 
employees were sent to investigate.  As one raised the manhole cover, the other turned on 
the air sampler (this is proper procedure for testing the atmosphere in the sump before 
entry).  The air sampler apparently sparked, and the gas deflagrated.  The one worker was 
seriously injured and the other received minor burns.  They both recovered and returned 
to work.
On June 28, 1982, a feedwater heat extraction line failed at the Oconee 2 PWR (NRC, 
1982).  Two persons nearby suffered steam burns and had to be hospitalized.  On 
December 9, 1986, a main feedwater pipe failed catastrophically at the Surry 2 PWR 
(NRC, 1986).  Eight workers were nearby, replacing thermal insulation on other piping.  
Four of the workers died from the burns they received from flashing feedwater, two 
healed in the hospital, and two were treated and released from the hospital the day of the 
event.  That event motivated the NRC to cause the utilities to make studies of high energy 
line breaks and map the hazardous areas in their plants.   
The NRC has also published a notice (NRC, 1988) that described four fatal electrocution 
accidents among electricians at US nuclear power plants in the 1970’s and 1980’s.  In 
1971 at the Quad Cities BWR, an electrician was pulling cable and the cable 
inadvertently became energized, electrocuting him.  In 1980, an electrical worker was 
cleaning breaker cubicles at the San Onofre PWR; he contacted a live 4 kV line and was 
electrocuted (note that this event is similar, in type but not in outcome, to one of the 
FNAL events cited in chapter 3).  In 1987 at the Wolf Creek PWR, and electrical 
technician was cleaning transformer cubicles and came in contact with an energized 4 kV 
line, electrocuting him.  In 1988, at the same plant, an electrician was attempting to pull 
additional wires through a conduit while the existing 480 V lines in the conduit were 
energized.  During his work to get the new wires through the conduit, damaged insulation 
on the existing lines allowed a short circuit that electrocuted the electrician.  On June 9, 
1993, a quarterly in-service test of the high pressure coolant injection turbines was in 
progress at the Quad Cities plant.  The turbine’s exhaust steam line rupture disks burst 
during the test due to a pressure pulsation, and the five people in the room were burned 
by steam and were also slightly contaminated.  The four workers performing the test were 
not severely injured, and, even though they were stated to have become complacent with 
the test procedure, they were not standing near the rupture disks.  The fifth person, a 
health physics technician, was the most severely injured.  The technician was making 
routine rounds and was not aware of the danger posed by the quarterly test (NRC, 1993).  
The steam release caused the room’s fire doors to be blown off their hinges [they were 
probably rated for only 6.8 kPa (1 psig) overpressure; the room was likely rated for high 
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pressure but the doors were not].  The NRC notice stated that if the release had been from 
the turbine steam inlet rather than the exhaust, the damage would have been more severe.   
A more recent event involved a contract worker trimming tree limbs and shrubbery 
behind the emergency diesel generator building, near a 138 kV line, at the Indian Point 2 
plant on July 19, 2002 (LER, 2002).  The trimming work resulted in an electrical ground 
path through the worker, resulting in electrocution.  A loss of offsite power event 
occurred at the power plant because of that short circuit to ground.  Emergency medical 
personnel were not able to revive the worker.   
Some other nuclear power plant worker injury events and near miss events were listed in 
the NRC Event Notification Reports and are summarized in Table 5.  These events are of 
interest since they originate from failures of power plant environment, and many of the 
same types of equipment and systems could be used in ITER or other large fusion 
experiments.  A few of these events are due to personnel errors (choosing their footing, 
using PPE, etc.).  Some of the cited events did not result in personnel injuries, they were 
“near miss” events that did not cause injuries simply because no workers were nearby at 
the time of the event.  All of these types of events, equipment failures, personnel 
judgments, and near misses, require closer examination for industrial safety. 
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Table 5.  Recent Power Reactor Events of Industrial Safety Concern 
US NRC 
Event
Notification 
Report
number Plant Date Description of Event 
35763 Millstone 05/25/1999 The reactor was manually tripped from 100% power 
because of a steam leak in the 1A feedwater heater.  
All control rods fully inserted.  The plant is stable in 
hot standby.   The steam leak was discovered when 
oscillations in the feedwater heater water level 
resulted in a main control board annunicator.  
Personnel sent to investigate the feedwater heater 
reported a steam leak in the pipe leading up to the 
flange to which the relief valve is connected.  
Operators then manually tripped the reactor.  Access 
to the turbine building is restricted while the 
feedwater heater is steaming down.  There were no 
injuries in this event.
36162 Salem 09/14/1999 An employee was transported to Salem Hospital after 
exhibiting heat stress symptoms after a containment 
entry.  A complete frisk could not be completed prior 
to loading him in the ambulance.  A radiation 
technician was able to complete the frisk prior to the 
arrival at the hospital, but after the hospital had been 
mobilized to accept a contaminated, injured 
individual.  The frisk revealed that the individual was 
not contaminated.  The individual is expected to fully 
recover.  
36203 Three Mile 
Island-1
09/21/1999 During refueling operations, the licensee transported 
a worker, who injured his lower back while working 
inside containment on the upper manway, to the 
Hershey Medical Center.  He may have been 
contaminated, so he was accompanied by Health 
Physics personnel to the hospital. 
32644 Hope Creek 09/29/1999 At 2117 hours, the 'B' control room ventilation train 
chiller tripped resulting in an automatic start of the 
'A' control room ventilation train.  The trip was the 
direct result of a major freon leak dispersing into the 
auxiliary building.  All non-essential personnel were 
evacuated from the auxiliary building.  An Unusual 
Event was declared at 2133 hours in accordance with 
Emergency Classification Guidance because the 
release of toxic gas deemed detrimental to safe 
operation of the plant.  No personnel injuries have 
occurred, and all access to the auxiliary building is 
being controlled until follow-up actions are complete.  
The leak was terminated because the full freon 
charge in the chiller dispersed (1 metric ton, or 2,200 
pounds), and the atmosphere in the auxiliary building 
has been restored to normal.  The licensee terminated 
the Unusual Event at 0158 hours on 09/30/99.   
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Table 5.  Continued. 
US NRC 
Event
Notification 
Report
number Plant Date Description of Event 
36408 Point Beach 11/06/1999 An employee slipped and fell in the plant laundry 
room.  An ambulance was called due to a possible 
hip injury.  The potentially contaminated person was 
taken to a hospital. 
36457 Brown’s 
Ferry-2 
11/18/1999 During replacement of an oil cooler discharge 
temperature switch by Instrument Maintenance, the 
pressure boundary of the oil system was 
inadvertently breached for a total of approximately 
five minutes (the work package assumed that the 
Temperature Switch had a well, but it when the 
Temperature Switch was removed it was discovered 
that the switch did not have a well).  The breach 
occurred because adequate documentation was not 
included in the work package.  The switch was 
successfully replaced.  
36502 Salem 12/11/1999 An instrument line on a 10 Ton Carbon Dioxide tank 
broke off, causing the tank to discharge into the tank 
storage area, which is located at the 25.6 m (84 foot) 
level in the Auxiliary Building.  No personnel were 
in the area when the instrument line broke.  Personnel 
entered the room wearing self-contained breathing 
apparatus and isolated the leak.  No one was injured 
by the incident.   
36583 River Bend 01/12/2000 At 1515 hours, an injured contract employee was 
transported offsite to a hospital for medical treatment.  
The individual was erecting scaffolding in the 
Turbine Building, fell approximately 6 m (20 feet) 
and sustained injuries.  The individual was working 
inside the Controlled Access Area, but not inside a 
Contaminated Area, and a thorough survey for 
radioactive contamination could not be performed 
prior to transport.  Therefore, the individual was 
considered to be potentially contaminated.  A 
radiation protection technician accompanied the 
ambulance to the hospital and a second radiation 
protection technician has been dispatched to the 
hospital as well.  The injured contract employee has 
been verified not contaminated.  Preliminary medical 
evaluation revealed no life threatening injuries.
36645 Quad Cities-
2
01/31/2000 At 1005 hours the control room received a report of a 
small explosion in the Unit 2 pipeway between the 
main steam isolation valve room and the low-
pressure heater bay.  Control room personnel, in 
accordance with station procedures, notified the local 
fire department of an explosion and possible fire.  
There were no personnel injuries, no equipment 
damage, and no fire.  As a result of the call to the fire 
department, local law enforcement agencies and two 
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Table 5.  Continued. 
US NRC 
Event
Notification 
Report
number Plant Date Description of Event 
36645 Quad Cities-
2
01/31/2000 (continued) television stations responded to the site.  
For a period of time, the state road in the vicinity of 
the plant was closed by law enforcement agencies.  
The cause of the explosion reported to the control 
room was a very loud, sudden noise that resulted 
when a nylon bag containing small oxygen and 
acetylene bottles and hoses was opened.  The sound 
was most likely the result of the ignition of a small 
amount of oxygen and acetylene trapped in the bag.  
Although no notification was made or planned for 
local media or law enforcement support, personnel 
from both of these areas were dispatched to the site.  
There were no injuries or fire.  No plant equipment 
was affected.  
37783 Perry 02/26/2000 At 1350 hours, an injury occurred to a worker when 
the individual fell and injured his back.  At 1426, the 
worker was attended by local Emergency Medical 
Personnel who transported the individual to the local 
Hospital.  Initial frisking of the individual showed no 
contamination, but due to his back injury his back 
was not completely monitored until arrival at the 
hospital. At the hospital, it was determined the 
individual had three small (quarter size, i.e., ~2.5-cm 
diameter) and very low level contaminated spots of 
100 counts corrected above the background of 80 
counts per minute (cpm).  One spot was located in 
the back of the individual's head and was 
immediately removed with water.  Two additional 
spots were detected on the worker's pants and these 
were also immediately removed.  The individual was 
further surveyed and no contamination was found.  
No dose was received by the individual as a result of 
the contamination.  The decon materials and clothing 
were contained and returned to the plant by radiation 
safety supervision. The ambulance, hospital 
personnel and hospital materials were all surveyed 
and released as no contamination was detected.
36813 Catawba-2 03/20/2000 A vendor support employee was injured due to a fall 
(approximately 1.5 to 2.4 m, or 6 to 8 feet) in the 
lower containment.  The individual was supporting 
reactor coolant pump work.  Due to injuries, the 
individual could not be fully frisked for 
contamination.  Until further determination, 
individual is considered potentially contaminated and 
is being transported offsite to the local medical 
facility.  Further investigation revealed that the  
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Table 5.  Continued 
US NRC 
Event
Notification 
Report
number Plant Date Description of Event 
36813 Catawba-2 03/20/2000 (continued) injured individual was not contaminated, 
however the harness and nylon choker used to lift the 
injured man has some low level fixed contamination. 
These materials have been transported back to the 
site and all areas of the hospital and the transport 
vehicle have been surveyed clean.    
38369 Crystal 
River-3 
10/09/2001 During refueling, a contract worker injured his leg 
while working in the Reactor Building.  The injury 
required the worker to be transported offsite to a 
local medical facility.  A Health Physics technician 
(HP) accompanied the individual to the medical 
facility since he was potentially contaminated.  
Subsequent survey found radioactive contamination 
on the individual's clothing and on the backboard 
used for transport.  The HP took custody of the 
contaminated material and returned it to the plant.
38822 Nine Mile 
Point
04/02/2002 The licensee declared an unusual event at 0029 hours 
due to a CO2 discharge from a broken hose reel on 
the turbine building fire suppression CO2 system.  
The hose reel was broken during work activities.  The 
turbine building, reactor building, radioactive waste 
building, and control building were evacuated.  The 
plant’s control room was not evacuated.  The broken 
hose reel was isolated to terminate the release of 
CO2.  No personnel injuries were identified as a 
result of the event. 
38959 Peach 
Bottom
06/02/2002 The "Cardox system" fire suppression system 
injected CO2 in the emergency diesel room at 0033 
hours, during diesel testing.   An alert was declared at 
0102 due to the detection of toxic CO2 gas within a 
vital area.  The room was evacuated safely (only two 
people were in the room at that time) and there were 
no injuries.  There was no fire damage and the CO2
tank was isolated. 
39180 Wolf Creek 09/10/2002 At approximately 1400 hours a report was received in 
the control room of a non-work related medical 
emergency involving a contract employee.  Onsite 
medical personnel responded and commenced first 
aid including cardiopulmonary resuscitation.  An 
ambulance was dispatched and the individual was 
transported offsite to a local hospital.  Station 
personnel were subsequently notified by hospital 
personnel that the contract employee had passed 
away.
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39269 St. Lucie 10/11/2002 At 0925 hours, a release of chlorine gas was noted 
from the sodium hypochlorite area, and smell of 
chlorine gas was noted in the Turbine Generator 
Building.  All personnel were evacuated from the 
Turbine Generator Building as a precautionary 
measure, and emergency personnel were dispatched 
to determine the concentration of chlorine gas.  At 
the release site the chlorine gas concentration was 3 
ppm.  Per the material safety data sheet, the 
Immediately Dangerous to Life or Health limit is 30 
ppm.  No Emergency Action Levels were entered.  
Additional samples were taken in the Turbine 
Generator building prior to allowing unrestricted 
access into the area.  Both Units’ Control Rooms 
were placed in the air recirculation mode as a 
precautionary measure.  There were no injuries from 
this event.  The leak was stopped.  The chlorine gas 
was generated while cleaning the NaOCl lines with 
muriatic acid to remove calcium buildup.  The acid 
caused evolution of gaseous chlorine.  The licensee 
investigated why chlorine gas was released this time 
when it was not released when the lines were cleaned 
in the past.  The licensee surmised that they may 
have used a stronger concentration of muriatic acid 
this time.  (note: NaOCl is used for chlorination to 
prevent biofouling in heat exchange equipment).
39321 Arkansas 
Nuclear-1 
10/24/2002 While working under the Reactor Vessel Head, an 
individual bumped his head on a Control Rod Drive 
Lead Screw.  The contact resulted in a 2.5-cm 
laceration on the side of his head.  The Emergency 
Medical Response Team was activated and 
responded to the scene.  The worker was conscious 
but dazed.  An initial survey for contamination was 
performed but was inconclusive due to background 
levels at the scene and due to a head brace that had 
been placed on the individual as a precaution to 
guard against neck injury.  An ambulance was called 
to the site and the individual was transported with a 
Health Physicist to the regional Medical Center.  
Additional surveying of the individual revealed that 
the individual’s head was slightly contaminated at 
~100 cpm above background and the backboard used 
in transport had ~150 cpm.  The individual was 
decontaminated by plant Health Physics personnel 
dispatched to the hospital.  All of the radioactive 
material was retrieved and returned to the site.  The 
individual is in satisfactory condition and the wound 
required three stitches to close.    
 103
Table 5.  Continued 
US NRC 
Event
Notification 
Report
number Plant Date Description of Event 
39513 Cook-1 01/15/2003 At 2010 hours, a fault occurred in the Unit 1 Main 
Transformer, resulting in a fire.  The fault caused an 
automatic main generator trip and an immediate 
turbine trip and reactor trip.  The fire was originally 
extinguished at 2035, with one minor reflash that was 
promptly controlled by the fire brigade.  The 
Emergency Plan was activated at the Unusual Event    
level due to a fire within the protected area not being 
extinguished within fifteen minutes.  All applicable 
notifications were made for the Emergency Plan 
declaration, including a one-hour report to the NRC 
at 2100 hours.  There was one minor personnel injury 
involved that required off-site medical attention, due 
to the person suffering a fall and smoke inhalation.
39596 Callaway 02/13/2003 At 0954 hours the Control Room was notified of a 
personnel injury in the Turbine building.  After 
examination by the site doctor, the individual was 
transported off site for treatment.  Subsequently, on 
February 18, 2003, the individual was admitted to the 
hospital for further treatment.  Preliminary 
investigation indicates that the individual was struck 
in the face with a flying object.  The individual was 
using a filter change out tool and attempting to 
disconnect a 5 cm Camflex plug.  The line was 
apparently pressurized, resulting in plug ejection 
toward the individual's face after it was disconnected. 
39695 Susquehanna 03/24/2003 At 1652 hours, the plant declared an Unusual Event 
for a contaminated individual transported offsite.  
The individual had fallen while working in the 
drywell of the Primary Containment.  The plant is 
presently in a refuel outage.  First Aid personnel were 
dispatched and treated her injuries.  The individual's 
injuries prevented the removal of all of the protective 
clothing.  Based on the inability to remove the 
clothing and completely frisk the individual, the 
individual is being considered contaminated.  At 
1657 hours a local ambulance transported the worker 
offsite en route to a local hospital.
40157 Fort 
Calhoun
09/14/2003 At about 0549 hours, a slightly contaminated worker 
who was exhibiting heat stress symptoms was 
transported to an off-site medical facility for 
treatment.  The worker was very slightly con-
taminated on the forearms and elbows.  The worker 
was treated and is being observed prior to being 
released.  No contamination was spread off-site.
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Morning
report,
4-2003-0016
South Texas 
Project 
12/09/2003 The licensee was performing a surveillance test run 
of emergency diesel generator 22.  The diesel 
generator had been operating at full rated load for 
approximately 20 minutes when the control room 
received alarms indicating diesel generator trouble 
and that the diesel generator output breaker was 
open.  In response, an operator shutdown the engine 
for the generator by pulling the engine fuel rack 
shutoff lever.  Initial inspection by the licensee 
revealed that parts of the generator's, number 9R 
piston and connecting rod, had been ejected from the 
engine. The ejected parts created a large hole in the 
southeast side of the crankcase.  There were no 
personnel injuries.  The licensee is evaluating the 
damage and has formed a team to determine the 
cause of the failure.  
40580 Columbia 03/10/2004 This notification is being made to report an onsite 
fatality due to a non-work related, personal medical 
condition.  During the incident, plant First Responder 
personnel responded to a Control Room notification 
of a man down.  First Responder personnel initiated 
cardiopulmonary resuscitation and used an 
Automated External Defibrillator and continued until 
the Hanford Fire Department ambulance paramedics 
responded.  The individual was taken via ambulance 
to Kadlec Medical Center in Richland, Washington 
where the individual was pronounced dead.  The 
fatality occurred in the Protected Area and was not 
associated with any work inside a radiological area.
40677 Oconee-2 04/16/2004 A vendor received a possible ankle fracture while 
working in the Reactor Building.  The injured person 
was descending a ladder and stepped on a roll of poly 
material and injured his ankle when the roll shifted.  
The onsite medical assistance team responded and 
removed the vendor from the reactor building and 
prepared him for transport to a hospital using a 
hospital ambulance.  Due to the nature of the injury, 
he was unable to stand in the whole body frisker and 
was transported to the hospital as potentially 
contaminated.  A Radiation Protection Technician 
accompanied the injured person to the hospital where 
it was determined that he was not contaminated. 
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5. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
These data provide several insights.  The fusion experiment data have shown that the 
expectation of any accident events being directly related to the unique aspects of fusion 
experiments (much use of electrical power, cryogens, vacuum reservoir, radiofrequency 
heating, compressed gases, etc.) is not strictly true.  Many of the occupational accidents 
described in this report are related to typical industrial safety concerns, such as 
inadvertent power up of equipment, falling from height, dropped crane loads, trench wall 
collapse, and other events.  Some of the events did involve electrical shock, oxygen 
deficiency, and radiation overexposure, which are more directly related to fusion but can 
also occur in some other industrial activities.  In an official auditing activity and in 
subsequent reporting, it was found that fusion worker compliance with occupational 
safety and health rules, especially lockout-tagout electrical safety and confined space 
safety, was not consistent.  The fusion events do serve to indicate what areas of 
occupational safety are important and should be examined for ITER. 
The first insight for the particle accelerator facilities is that these facilities are not as 
benign as is generally believed in the nuclear industry.  Because these facilities do not 
handle large thermal energies in the form of superheated steam or high temperature, high 
pressure liquids, and the radiation created at the accelerator’s target is well shielded with 
concrete and earth, many believe that accelerators pose a very low hazard to workers.  
While there have not been any occupational fatalities during operation or maintenance of 
these machines, there have been some severe occupational injuries, particularly electrical 
injuries.  This report has also documented that there have been construction fatalities at 
accelerators, meaning that we should endeavor to guard against construction fatalities 
during ITER construction since ITER is more complex than most accelerators.  
Accelerator radiation safety reports have shown that ionizing and non-ionizing radiation 
safety has not always been practiced; some inadvertent exposures have occurred.  
Another insight is the trend for the past ~10 years of hiring small companies to perform 
tasks in the facilities on an ‘as needed’ basis.  This practice reduces operating costs by 
reducing the number of permanent staff and having maintenance and construction teams 
on site only when needed for new projects.  Such contracting is also thought to increase 
machine availability because larger numbers of outside workers can be allocated to tasks 
during facility outages so that outage time is decreased.  If a smaller, permanent work 
force is used, outages tend to be longer duration.  These outside companies send skilled, 
licensed craftsmen, but the craftsmen are not familiar with the facility and appear to not 
be well supervised by accelerator personnel.  Some of these subcontract workers have 
suffered severe injuries at the accelerators, and some injuries have also occurred at fusion 
experiments.  Occupational safety specialists refer to such situations as “setting the 
person up to fail”, which means placing a worker into an industrial environment with 
insufficient knowledge and supervision so that he is highly likely to make an error that 
will either harm himself or others, or both.  From an occupational safety perspective, 
ITER should not be operated and maintained by subcontracted companies unless the 
contracts are for long terms (e.g., 10 years or more), which gives the staff of the 
subcontracted company the time to become familiar with the facility and its operation.  
The accelerators have continued to operate with these occupational injuries; however, the 
 108
evidence from other industries is that safe operations offer higher efficiency and 
productivity.  With ITER being the most expensive machine of its type ever built and 
being a showcase for worldwide fusion, safe operations that improve machine 
performance are highly desirable. 
The fusion experiment and accelerator occupational safety data showed that technicians 
are the most frequently injured workers in these facilities.  This is due to the fact that the 
technicians are most often working ‘hands-on’ with the components and systems of the 
experiment and suffer the minor injuries (contusions, lacerations, sprains, etc.).  Some of 
the occupational accidents described in this report were caused by workers not following 
the existing safety rules.  Occupational safety specialists are quick to point out that 
OSHA rules are minimums that positively affect worker safety; if the workers follow 
even only these minimum OSHA regulations then they have increased their protection 
and reduced losses.  Other occupational accident events in this report were created by 
workers not realizing all the issues or hazards of the workplace, such as the incident 
where an inadvertent movement of an overhead crane allowed the crane hook to strike 
and dislodge a hand rail, which fell from height and struck a worker.  A third category of 
accident noted in this report is workers exposed to energies or substances released when 
equipment has failed.  Fusion experiments and the accelerators had few accidents of this 
latter category, but the brief review of power plant data revealed a number of accidents 
originating with breached or failed equipment.  Since ITER lies somewhere between 
present day fusion experiments and power plants, the human decisions and awareness 
aspect of accidents, and the equipment failure aspect of accidents, must both be addressed 
for occupational safety. 
The nuclear fission plant occupational safety data did not have very fine resolution.  The 
Bureau of Labor Statistics does not divide the power plant worker data by type of plant or 
by occupation within the electric power industry.  Therefore, it is difficult to determine if 
any one occupational type (e.g., electrician, welder, mechanic, etc.) has had the highest 
injuries or if one occupation was at higher risk than another.  The power plant data had 
fatality frequency estimates while there have not been any operational fatalities at the 
fusion experiments or accelerators.  However, the power plant worker accident rates were 
lower than the comparable lost work case rates for both fusion and accelerators, this may 
be due to the hands-on nature of experiments that are often shut down for modifications 
and other reasons while high availability power plants have less work performed during 
operation.  There are probably differences in the consequences of the injuries; the DOE 
data is typically low consequence, but the power plant worker accident consequence 
information is not known.  The fission power plant data can be used in goal-setting for a 
robust fusion experiment that is similar to a power plant, but the fission power data are 
not otherwise very helpful except as case histories.  Reasons for the lack of resolution in 
the data are not clear.  It is suspected that since the radiological aspects of nuclear power 
are often exaggerated by the media, there is reluctance on the part of public utilities to 
discuss any type of accident event in a nuclear plant that is not mandated by law.   
The event descriptions provided here can serve to support occupational safety analysis for 
the ITER design.  A room-by-room analysis of ITER for occupational hazards is planned. 
